Jeffrey Bernard Beeman v. United States, 899 F.3d 1218

Jeffrey Beeman was convicted in 2009 of cocaine distribution and being a felon in possession; the district court applied the ACCA and imposed an enhanced sentence based on three prior convictions (two drug, one Georgia aggravated assault).
Beeman did not appeal his ACCA sentence but filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in 2016 after Johnson v. United States invalidated ACCA’s residual clause.
Beeman raised two theories: a Descamps challenge to the elements/modified-categorical approach (arguing the aggravated-assault conviction cannot satisfy the elements clause) and a Johnson claim that the sentence depended on the now-invalid residual clause.
The panel held the Descamps-based claim untimely under § 2255(f), but treated the Johnson claim as timely under § 2255(f)(3).
The panel required a § 2255 movant asserting Johnson relief to prove by a preponderance that the sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause; Beeman failed to provide record evidence or contemporaneous caselaw showing exclusive reliance on the residual clause, so relief was denied.
Judge Martin (joined by Judge Jill Pryor) dissented from the denial of en banc rehearing, arguing the panel wrongly erected a narrow "historical-fact" test and that showing a conviction cannot qualify under the elements/enumerated clauses (using Descamps methodology) properly proves reliance on the residual clause.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of Descamps claim under § 2255(f)	Beeman: Descamps changes predicate-analysis, so claim should be considered	Gov: Descamps did not announce a new right that restarts AEDPA time; claim untimely	Descamps claim untimely; Descamps not treated as newly recognized right for tolling § 2255(f)(3) here
Whether Johnson claim timely under § 2255(f)(3)	Beeman: Johnson announced a new, retroactive rule; filed within one year	Gov: (implicitly) timeliness contested as to scope; panel accepted Johnson timeliness	Johnson claim deemed timely under § 2255(f)(3) (panel)
Burden to prove that sentence relied on residual clause	Beeman: Showing that conviction cannot qualify under elements/enumerated clauses proves reliance on residual clause	Gov: Movant must prove sentencing court actually relied solely on residual clause	Movant must prove by preponderance that sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause; mere present-day inability to qualify under other clauses insufficient
Proper use of Descamps on collateral review merits	Beeman: Descamps methodology should be applied to evaluate predicate status now and can show reliance on residual clause	Panel: Descamps may be retroactive but cannot be used to circumvent AEDPA timeliness; historical record at sentencing controls	Panel requires reliance on contemporaneous sentencing record or caselaw; dissent argues this ignores Descamps methodology and fairness

Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017) (panel decision at issue refusing relief under § 2255)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Supreme Court invalidating ACCA residual clause)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (clarifying categorical/modified-categorical approach to predicate offenses)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (holding Johnson retroactive on collateral review)
In re Thomas, 823 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2016) (movant must prove residual clause affected sentence by preponderance)
Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 2016) (discussed retroactivity and application of Descamps/Johnson)
Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir. 2001) (party with burden loses if evidence does not clearly explain events)
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (explaining burden of persuasion concept)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach to defining predicate offenses)
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (limits to what crimes qualify as predicates under ACCA)