Jeffrey Bernard Beeman v. United States
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18352
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Jeffrey B. Beeman was convicted in 2009 of felon-in-possession (firearm and ammunition) and a cocaine distribution offense and received concurrent 210-month sentences after the district court applied the ACCA enhancement.
- His PSR listed three prior Georgia convictions: one aggravated assault (1990) and two cocaine distribution convictions (1999); the PSR and sentencing court did not specify which ACCA clause (elements, enumerated, or residual) was relied on.
- In 2015 the Supreme Court in Johnson struck down the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague; Welch (2016) made Johnson retroactive on collateral review.
- Beeman filed a §2255 motion in June 2016 arguing (1) his ACCA enhancement depended on the now-invalid residual clause (a Johnson claim) and (2) alternatively that Descamps meant his Georgia aggravated-assault conviction did not qualify under the elements clause (a Descamps claim).
- The district court denied relief as untimely (characterizing the motion as a Descamps claim) and on the merits; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding the Descamps-based claim was untimely but that the timely Johnson claim failed on the merits because Beeman did not prove it was more likely than not the sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness under 28 U.S.C. §2255(f)(3) — whether Des-camps or Johnson can restart the AEDPA clock | Beeman: his §2255 was timely because filed within one year of Johnson and he relied on Johnson (and Descamps support) | Gov: Descamps did not create a new right for §2255(f)(3); only Johnson restarts the clock | Court: Johnson restarts the clock for Johnson claims; Descamps clarified existing law and cannot serve as a §2255(f)(3) trigger, so Descamps-based arguments are untimely |
| Burden of proof for a Johnson §2255 claim | Beeman: movant should prevail if it’s possible the residual clause was relied on; burden should not require proving which clause was used when record is silent | Gov: movant must prove entitlement to relief; if record is ambiguous movant loses | Court: movant bears burden to prove by preponderance that the residual clause was the basis; if equally likely other clauses were relied on, movant fails |
| Merits — whether Beeman’s ACCA enhancement ‘turned on’ the residual clause | Beeman: aggravated-assault predicate historically counted via residual clause and Descamps shows elements clause does not apply | Gov: no record proof the sentencing court relied solely on residual clause; elements clause or other predicates might suffice | Court: Beeman failed to show it was more likely than not the residual clause was essential to enhancement; Johnson claim fails |
| Role of Descamps in a Johnson claim | Beeman: Descamps analysis may be used to show the predicate could not qualify under the elements clause, supporting Johnson relief | Gov: reliance on Descamps is a separate (untimely) claim and cannot restart AEDPA clock | Court: Descamps is not a newly recognized right for §2255(f)(3); Descamps arguments can be (and here were) treated as untimely stand-alone claims, though Descamps may be informative on the merits in some contexts — but Beeman didn’t meet his burden here |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson is retroactive on collateral review)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (clarified use of the categorical and modified-categorical approaches for predicate-offense analysis)
- Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 2016) (Descamps is clarifying precedent and does not create a new right for §2255(f)(3))
- Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2015) (§2255 movant bears burden to prove entitlement to relief)