Jeffery Lynn Pruett v. State, 484 S.W.3d 167

Jeffery Lynn Pruett was convicted of arson and sentenced to 20 years for intentionally starting a fire that damaged the family home he co-owned with his siblings.
Neighbors saw Pruett near the house moments before smoke was observed; one neighbor reported he appeared to be holding something.
Firefighters and an arson investigator concluded the fire began on the back of the house and a flammable liquid was likely used; the State Fire Marshal later reported no ignitable-liquid residue detected.
No one was in the house when the fire occurred; neighbors extinguished part of the fire with a garden hose before firefighters arrived.
The indictment charged two alternative theories: (1) knowing the habitation was within city limits, or (2) knowing the habitation was on property belonging to another. The jury returned a general verdict.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence given indictment language (ownership variance)	State: indictment alleging habitation "belonging to another" was a proper theory among alternatives	Pruett: house was co-owned as tenants in common, so State failed to prove it was "owned by another" as alleged	Overruled—general verdict allowed conviction under the unchallenged alternative (knowing habitation was within city limits)
Sufficiency of evidence for deadly-weapon finding (fire)	State: fire can be a deadly weapon; testimony that fire endangered firefighters and neighbors supports finding	Pruett: actual danger was not shown—neighbors and firefighters were not placed in actual danger; firefighting efforts limited spread	Sustained—evidence insufficient to show fire, as used, posed actual danger of death or serious bodily injury; deadly-weapon finding deleted

L.M.W. v. State, 891 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1994) (general-verdict rule: unchallenged theory can sustain conviction)
Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (same principle on alternative theories)
Aguirre v. State, 732 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (same principle on alternative theories)
Mims v. State, 335 S.W.3d 247 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010) (fire may qualify as a deadly weapon in proper circumstances)
Mixon v. State, 781 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989) (capability inquiry for deadly-weapon finding)
Brister v. State, 449 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (three-part test for deadly-weapon finding; actual danger required)
Sierra v. State, 280 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (evaluate capability in light of facts that actually existed)
Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (danger must be actual, not hypothetical)
Williams v. State, 946 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997) (reversed deadly-weapon finding where actual danger was lacking)
Williams v. State, 970 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (affirming limited aspects; cited for modification authority)