Jean Pugin v. Merrick Garland, 20-1363

Central question: whether the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) 2018 interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) — defining an “aggravated felony” as an offense “relating to the obstruction of justice” — is entitled to Chevron deference and whether the phrase requires a nexus to a pending or ongoing proceeding.
Historical trajectory: the BIA’s 1999 Espinoza-Gonzalez definition treated “obstruction of justice” as a term of art requiring a nexus to proceedings; the BIA’s 2012 Valenzuela Gallardo decision replaced that with a broader “process of justice” standard; multiple circuits rejected the 2012 standard as unconstitutionally vague.
In 2018 the BIA revised again to cover offenses that (1) involve an affirmative, intentional attempt motivated by specific intent to interfere with an investigation or proceeding that is ongoing, pending, or reasonably foreseeable, or to interfere with punishment from a completed proceeding.
The Ninth Circuit twice struck down BIA reinterpretations (2016 for vagueness; 2020 rejecting the 2018 “reasonably foreseeable” standard). The panel in the present case upheld the BIA’s 2018 interpretation and denied rehearing en banc.
Chief Judge Gregory dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc, arguing the statutory text, context, and history show “obstruction of justice” unambiguously requires a nexus to a pending or ongoing proceeding and that the BIA’s broadened standard is unreasonable and vague.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §1101(a)(43)(S) is unambiguous (Chevron step one)	Valenzuela Gallardo: phrase unambiguous; “obstruction of justice” is a term of art requiring nexus to pending/ongoing proceedings	Government/BIA: phrase ambiguous (e.g., “relating to”); Chevron deference appropriate	Court (panel) treated the provision as ambiguous and deferred to BIA; rehearing en banc denied
Whether the BIA’s 2018 “reasonably foreseeable” / no-nexus standard is a reasonable interpretation	Petitioner: new standard conflicts with statutory history and settled Chapter 73 meaning; not reasonable	Government/BIA: interpretation reasonable and permissible exercise of agency expertise	Panel upheld BIA’s 2018 interpretation; Gregory dissent argues it is unreasonable
Whether the BIA’s “process of justice” / “reasonably foreseeable” formulations are unconstitutionally vague	Petitioner: standards are amorphous and raise vagueness concerns	Government: not unconstitutionally vague; standards administrable	Several circuits found vagueness in earlier BIA formulations; panel here rejected vagueness challenge; dissent reiterates vagueness concerns
Whether en banc review was warranted given circuit splits and broad immigration consequences	Petitioner: en banc review warranted due to conflicting circuit rulings and significant impact	Government: rehearing not required	Rehearing en banc denied; Gregory authored dissent urging en banc review

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (establishes two-step administrative-deference framework)
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (obstruction arises only when justice is being administered)
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (obstruction conviction requires nexus to judicial or grand jury proceedings)
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (reads a nexus requirement into §1512(e)(1))
Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (discusses reasonably foreseeable standard in obstruction-related statute)
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (agency may change interpretations but must be reasonable)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (amorphous statutory terms raise vagueness concerns)
Valenzuela Gallardo v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. rejecting the BIA’s 2018 interpretation)
Valenzuela Gallardo v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. rejecting the BIA’s 2012 formulation as vague)
Alwan v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 507 (5th Cir. applying nexus-based approach)
Flores v. Attorney General, 856 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. declined to defer to BIA obstruction formulations)
Victoria-Faustino v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. declined to defer to BIA’s Valenzuela articulation)
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. concurrence cautioning about Chevron’s consequences)