Jayquon Massey v. Superintendent Coal Township S, 19-2808

Background

In 2007 Jayquon Massey was robbed at gunpoint, encountered the same suspects in a red SUV on four subsequent occasions, and during the final encounter fired two shots; a bystander, Cheryl Wilds, was killed.
Massey testified he fired believing he was about to be shot; he was charged with criminal homicide, carrying a firearm without a license, and recklessly endangering another person, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to life without parole.
At the charge conference trial counsel requested a perfect self-defense instruction, refused a voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self-defense) instruction, and instead asked for an involuntary manslaughter instruction; counsel did not articulate a strategic basis on the record.
On PCRA review Massey claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction; the PCRA court denied relief as strategic, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed on prejudice grounds.
Massey filed a federal §2254 petition that arrived after AEDPA’s deadline; he contended counsel mailed the petition and that lost mail warranted equitable tolling. The District Court denied tolling and denied relief on the merits; the Third Circuit granted a COA.
The Third Circuit held (1) equitable tolling was warranted for seven days given the circumstances and notice to the Commonwealth, (2) trial counsel performed deficiently by refusing the voluntary manslaughter instruction without a recorded strategic basis, and (3) Massey demonstrated Strickland prejudice (reasonably probable at least one juror would have accepted imperfect self-defense); the court remanded with instructions to release unless retried within a reasonable time.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness / equitable tolling	Massey argued counsel timely mailed the §2254 petition and lost mail is an extraordinary circumstance; he acted diligently.	Commonwealth argued there was insufficient proof counsel mailed the petition and counsel’s delay contacting the Clerk was attorney error not warranting tolling.	Court tolled AEDPA 7 days, found diligence and extraordinary circumstances (notice to Commonwealth via email) and deemed petition timely.
Ineffective assistance — deficient performance (Strickland prong 1)	Massey argued counsel lacked understanding of law and declined a voluntary manslaughter instruction without strategy, demonstrating unreasonable performance.	Commonwealth argued trial counsel made a strategic choice to pursue acquittal and sought involuntary manslaughter instead.	Court held counsel’s refusal was objectively unreasonable (ignorance of law + no articulated strategy) and thus deficient.
Ineffective assistance — prejudice (Strickland prong 2)	Massey argued a reasonable probability exists that at least one juror would have accepted imperfect self-defense (voluntary manslaughter) had it been charged.	Commonwealth argued no reasonable probability of a lesser conviction because jury could have found provocation or failure to retreat.	Court held the Superior Court applied the wrong standard (required a jury-level result); under the single-juror standard prejudice was shown and relief warranted.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing two-part ineffective-assistance test)
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (deference standard for federal habeas review under §2254)
Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (prejudice satisfied if it is reasonably probable that at least one juror was affected)
Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (attorney’s ignorance of fundamental law plus failure to research can be unreasonable performance)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (diligence and extraordinary-circumstance framework for equitable tolling under AEDPA)
Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257 (discussing Strickland standards in the Third Circuit)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (standard for when state-court factual findings are objectively unreasonable)