Jaworski v. Ernst & Young U.S. LLP
119 A.3d 939
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2015Background
- Plaintiffs Jaworski (61), Haggis (57) and Holewinski (55) were long‑term EY employees terminated in August 2012 and sued for age discrimination.
- EY had a mandatory ADR program (Common Ground) first issued in 2002 and amended in 2006 and 2007; the program required mediation then binding arbitration for "Covered Disputes," including federal and state statutory and common‑law employment claims.
- The 2006/2007 amendments emphasized that employees are bound by beginning or continuing employment after the effective date, and changed notice/fee/discovery terms; EY emailed revised program terms to employees, including the plaintiffs.
- Jaworski and Haggis signed employment agreements (2007 and 2010) expressly agreeing to arbitrate; Holewinski had signed in 2004 but continued employment past the 2007 effective date.
- Trial court initially denied defendants’ motion to compel arbitration for lack of signed paperwork, then granted reconsideration after defendants produced signed agreements; the Appellate Division affirms enforcement of the 2007 program.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether employees assented to 2007 Program without a contemporaneous signature | Holewinski: no signature to the 2007 amendment so cannot be bound | EY: Program unambiguously binds employees who continue employment after effective date; plaintiff continued working | Held: continued employment post‑effective date manifested assent; all three bound by 2007 Program |
| Whether the amendment/termination clause makes the Program illusory | Plaintiffs: EY’s unilateral modification right renders promise illusory and notice meaningless (must quit to avoid change) | EY: clause gives 30 days after second notice to preserve pre‑amendment rights by initiating mediation; changes not retroactive to disputes already in mediation | Held: Not illusory; clause construed to give employees meaningful window to preserve rights; avoids reading clause out |
| Whether termination claims are covered by "Covered Disputes" language | Plaintiffs: absence of words like "termination/discharge" excludes discharge claims | EY: Program explicitly lists statutory and common‑law employment claims including anti‑discrimination statutes | Held: Claims under LAD and similar statutes fall within Covered Disputes; language is clear and unambiguous |
| Whether fee‑sharing and arbitration procedures render waiver unconscionable or invalidate jury‑trial waiver | Plaintiffs: cost‑sharing chills statutory claims and Atalese/Delta Funding counsel stricter protections; Blann requires detailed jury waiver | EY: fee clause limits employee obligation to what law/arbitration rules permit; program clearly states waiver of court access; severability clause rescues any offending term | Held: Fee‑sharing not unconscionable as written (no requirement that employee bear all arbitrator costs); waiver of court access sufficiently clear; agreement enforceable |
Key Cases Cited
- Leodori v. CIGNA Corp., 175 N.J. 293 (2003) (requiring concrete manifestation of assent to enforce waiver of court forum)
- Atalese v. U.S. Legal Servs. Grp., L.P., 219 N.J. 430 (2014) (contractual waiver of rights must be clear and unmistakable)
- Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174 (2013) (standard of review and strong preference to enforce arbitration agreements)
- Martindale v. Sandvik, Inc., 173 N.J. 76 (2002) (continued employment can constitute sufficient consideration)
- Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 189 N.J. 28 (2006) (cost‑shifting that could force claimant to bear all arbitration costs is unconscionable)
- Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A., 168 N.J. 124 (2001) (arbitration clause must clearly convey waiver of statutory/judicial remedies)
- Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J. Super. 252 (App. Div. 2000) (continued employment and arbitration clauses analysis)
- State v. Blann, 217 N.J. 517 (2014) (context on when waiver of jury trial is knowing and voluntary)
