The opinion of the Court was delivered by
The principal issue in this appeal is whether plaintiff waived his right to sue his former employer in the Law Division for alleged violations of the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to - 42(LAD). Plaintiff is a physician formerly associated with an obstetrics and gynecology practice in Morris County. He claims that he was unlawfully discharged from that practice on account of his gender. He also asserts under the common law that his employer’s conduct constituted defamation and tortious interference with his economic advantage.
The trial court determined that plaintiffs claims, including those asserted under the LAD, were subject to arbitration pursuant to the parties’ written employment agreement. That agreement, which plaintiff signed prior to joining the practice, provides that “any controversy arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration[.]” The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determination.
We now reverse. We hold that because of its ambiguity the language contained in the arbitration clause does not constitute an enforceable waiver of plaintiffs statutory rights under the LAD. Therefore, plaintiff may proceed with his discrimination action in the Law Division. Consistent with principles of judicial economy, plaintiffs common-law claims should be tried in the same action as the LAD claim.
I.
David Garfinkel, M.D. (plaintiff) and the Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Associates, P.A. (MOGA) entered into an employment agreement on August 9, 1996. The agreement sets forth plaintiffs work obligations, salary, eligibility for stock ownership *128 in the association, and restrictions on subsequent employment. In respect of termination, the agreement enumerates the circumstances under which either party may terminate employment and the remuneration that would be due plaintiff in the event of termination.
Critical to the disposition of this appeal, paragraph eighteen of the agreement provides:
Except as otherwise expressly set forth in Paragraphs 14 or 15 hereof, any controversy or claim arising out of, or relating to, this Agreement or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in Morristown, New Jersey, in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association, and judgement [sic] upon any reward [sic] rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
By its express language, the arbitration clause does not apply to post-termination employment restrictions (paragraph fourteen) and pension benefits (paragraph fifteen). We note, however, that paragraph fifteen provides that plaintiff shall share in the employer’s pension or profit sharing plan and does not, on its face, contemplate litigation. Instead, paragraph thirteen, which pertains to severance pay and is not expressly excluded from the arbitration clause, contemplates certain action by a “court of competent jurisdiction” in the event of plaintiffs discharge. We thus assume that the drafters of the arbitration provision inadvertently referred to paragraph fifteen when they actually intended to refer to paragraph thirteen.
In January 1998, MOGA allegedly informed plaintiff that he would not be permitted to exercise his option to become a shareholder because he was “born the wrong sex.” Nonetheless, MOGA continued to employ plaintiff. On March 6, 1998, one of the shareholder-physicians of MOGA informed plaintiff that he was being terminated. Two days later, another MOGA shareholder informed plaintiff that he should not return to work. The following day that same shareholder allegedly stated to plaintiff that the reason for his termination was that he “did not attract patients well because he was male[J”
*129 In September 1998, plaintiff filed this action in the Law Division against MOGA and its two shareholders (defendants), as well as Lifeline Medical Associates, described by plaintiff as a successor in interest to MOGA. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that defendants breached the employment agreement, violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in that agreement, violated the LAD, tortiously interfered with plaintiffs prospective economic advantage, and defamed him. In its answer and counterclaim, MOGA alleges that plaintiff misrepresented the extent of his practice prior to entering into the agreement, and wrongfully solicited patients away from MOGA for his exclusive economic benefit.
On the basis of the arbitration clause of the agreement (paragraph eighteen), defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff responded that his consent to that clause was not voluntary because it was a non-negotiable provision, that the clause itself was unenforceable because it precluded access to the courts in respect of a discrimination claim, and that defendants waived operation of the clause by virtue of their answer and counterclaim. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, ruling that the arbitration provision was binding in respect of all claims, including those asserted under the LAD. The court concluded that the parties had made a knowing and voluntary choice to arbitrate their disputes and that public policy favored arbitration in this setting.
In a reported opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determination.
Garfinkel v. Morristown Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., P.A.,
333
N.J.Super.
291,
*130 We also granted the Attorney General’s motion on behalf of the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights (the Division) for leave to appear as amicus curiae. The Division does not object to the use of arbitration to resolve discrimination complaints. It does, however, oppose “compulsory and binding arbitration in settings where it is based on a vaguely worded clause or where the waiver was not voluntary.” The Division contends that the Court need not address the issue of voluntariness because the arbitration clause in plaintiffs agreement is ambiguous on its face. On that basis alone, the Division asserts, the clause should not be enforced.
II.
A.
We begin our analysis by reaffirming that “the clear public policy of this State is to abolish discrimination in the work place.”
Fuchilla v. Layman,
109
N.J.
319, 334,
The LAD provides a mechanism by which victims of discrimination may seek redress for their injuries. Pertinent to this appeal, the statute provides aggrieved employees with a choice of forum to prosecute their claims. The employee may pursue an administrative remedy by filing a verified complaint with the Division, or may file suit in the Law Division of the Superior Court.
N.J.S.A.
10:5-13;
Hernandez v. Region Nine Hous. Corp.,
146
N.J.
645, 652,
[T]here is a clear mandate of public policy permitting persons alleging violations of the LAD to proceed administratively or judicially. Within the LAD there is an established right permitting a party to seek redress in the courts directly or through the Division. The history of the [LAD] also indicates that there is a clear right to a trial by jury for the aggrieved. The Division [on] Civil Rights was empowered by the LAD to investigate and prosecute discrimination claims. The Division was also given broad rights to remedy the effects of unlawful discrimination!]
[Ackerman v. The Money Store, 321 N.J.Super. 308, 324,728 A.2d 873 (Law Div.1998) (internal citations omitted).]
In addition to furthering the strong aims of the LAD, our jurisprudence has recognized arbitration as a favored method for resolving disputes.
See Barcon
Assocs.
v. Tri-County Asphalt Corp.,
86
N.J.
179, 186,
The ancient practice of arbitration “[i]n its broad sense, [ ] is a substitution, by consent of the parties, of another tribunal for the tribunal provided by the ordinary processes of law. The object of arbitration is the final disposition, in a speedy, inexpensive, expeditious and perhaps less formal manner, of the controversial differences between the parties.”
[Carpenter v. Bloomer, 54 N.J.Super. 157, 162,148 A.2d 497 (App.Div.1959) (quoting E. Eng’g Co. v. Ocean City, 11 N.J. Misc. 508, 510-11,167 A. 522 (Sup.Ct.1933)).]
That parties to an agreement may waive statutory remedies in favor of arbitration is a settled principle of law in this State.
See, e.g., Red Bank Reg’l Educ. Ass’n v. Red Bank Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ.,
78
N.J.
122, 140,
Because of the favored status afforded to arbitration, “[a]n agreement to arbitrate should be read liberally in favor of arbitration.”
Marchak v. Claridge Commons, Inc.,
134
N.J.
275, 282,
B.
In applying those tenets, we first note the approach taken by the Appellate Division in two recent decisions,
Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, supra,
330
N.J.Super.
252,
The court concluded that the arbitration clause was ambiguous in respect of the employee’s LAD claim and thus “should be construed against the interest of defendant.”
Id.
at 270, 273,
The Appellate Division reached the same result in
Alamo Rent A Car, Inc. v. Galarza, supra,
306
N.J.Super.
384,
The court found that the FamPact language was ambiguous in respect of the employee’s discrimination claim. The court reasoned:
... No reading of the [FamPact] arbitration clause clearly and unmistakably establishes that [the employee] waived her right to pursue her LAD claim. By its very terms, the [] arbitration clause applies only to disputes under the [FamPact] not controversies arising under the LAD. If [the employer] wanted to enter into a contract to bind [the employee] to arbitration under all circumstances, it should have written an inclusive arbitration clause. This is not a difficult chore____
The [ ] arbitration clause does not approach ... the kind of language which we view as more fully ensuring that a waiver of statutory remedies is indeed knowing and voluntarily]. On its face, it is simply inadequate to require arbitration of any issue other than a [FamPact] violation.
[Id. at 394-95,703 A.2d 961 .]
We reason similarly and conclude that paragraph eighteen of the parties’ agreement is insufficient to constitute a waiver of plaintiffs remedies under the LAD. The clause states that “any controversy or claim” that arises from the agreement or its breach shall be settled by arbitration. That language suggests that the parties intended to arbitrate only those disputes involving a contract term, a condition of employment, or some other element of the contract itself. Moreover, the language does not mention, either expressly or by general reference, statutory claims redress-able by the LAD. As noted, paragraph eighteen excepts from its purview the two paragraphs of the agreement pertaining to post-termination restrictions and severance pay. Those exceptions further suggest that the parties intended disputes over the terms and conditions of the contract, not statutory claims, to be the subject of arbitration.
Defendants urge a contrary conclusion, arguing that the language of paragraph eighteen is sufficient by its plain terms to
*135
encompass plaintiffs LAD claim. We disagree. Although we might interpret the paragraph to cover any dispute involving a term or condition of employment, the clause is silent in respect of plaintiffs statutory remedies. To enforce a waiver-of-rights provision in this setting, the Court requires some concrete manifestation of the employee’s intent as reflected in the text of the agreement itself. “In interpreting a contract, ‘[i]t is not the real intent but the intent expressed or apparent in the writing that controls.’ ”
Quigley, supra,
330
N.J.Super.
at 266,
To reiterate, the policies that support the LAD and the rights it confers on aggrieved employees are essential to eradicating discrimination in the workplace. The Court will not assume that employees intend to waive those rights unless their agreements so provide in unambiguous terms. That said, we do not suggest that a party need refer specifically to the LAD or list every imaginable statute by name to effectuate a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights. To pass muster, however, a waiver-of-rights provision should at least provide that the employee agrees to arbitrate all statutory claims arising out of the employment relationship or its termination. It should also reflect the employee’s general understanding of the type of claims included in the waiver, e.g., workplace discrimination claims. Along those lines, the court in Alamo aptly observed:
The better course would be the use of language reflecting that the employee, in fact, knows that other options such as federal and state administrative remedies and judicial remedies exist; that the employee also knows by signing the contract, those remedies are forever precluded; and that, regardless of the nature of the employee’s complaint, he or she knows that it can only be resolved by arbitration.
[Alamo, supra, 306 N.J.Super. at 394,703 A.2d 961 .]
Defendants also assert that plaintiff should be bound to the arbitration provision because he is “a medical professional who negotiated the complex agreement and a supplement thereto with the assistance of counsel.”
Garfinkel, supra,
333
N.J.Super.
at 302,
Defendants suggest that the Court should focus predominately on plaintiffs level of sophistication to ensure that he acted of his own volition. That suggestion is misplaced. Irrespective of plaintiffs status or the quality of his counsel, the Court must be convinced that he actually intended to waive his statutory rights. An unambiguous writing is essential to such a determination. See
Alamo, supra,
306
N.J.Super.
at 393, 394-95,
In sum, we are satisfied that plaintiffs purported waiver of his statutory remedies is not reflected in the language of the arbitration clause. Because the choice of forum permitted by the LAD is an integral component of the statute, we will not assume that an employee intends to surrender that choice in favor of arbitration unless that intention has been “clearly and unmistakably established[.]”
Red Bank Reg’l Educ. Ass’n, supra,
78
N.J.
at 140,
III.
We briefly address the question whether plaintiffs common-law claims should be tried in the Law Division along with the LAD claim, or whether they should be resolved separately by arbitra
*137
tion. As a general rule, courts have construed broadly worded arbitration clauses to “encompass!] tort, as well as contract claims.”
Bleumer v. Parkway Ins. Co.,
277
N.J.Super.
378, 405,
In keeping with those principles, the Court assumes, without deciding, that plaintiffs common-law claims are subject to arbitration. The question, then, is whether notions of judicial economy dictate the joinder of those claims in a single Law Division action. The Court concludes that plaintiffs claims should be so joined. “Just as we view piecemeal litigation as anathema, we also look with disfavor upon the unnecessary bifurcation of disputes between judicial resolution and arbitration.”
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Benson,
87
N.J.
191, 199,
IV.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed.
For reversal — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI — 7.
Opposed — None.