Javier Reyes v. United States, 998 F.3d 753

Reyes was convicted in 2005 of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a "crime of violence" (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and sentenced with a career-offender enhancement based on prior Illinois convictions.
The Supreme Court in Johnson (2015) held a statutory residual clause unconstitutionally vague; subsequent cases (Dimaya, Davis) extended that reasoning to similar residual clauses in other statutes, affecting the definition of "crime of violence."
Reyes filed a successive § 2255 motion arguing Johnson/Davis undermined his career-offender treatment and that his § 924(c) brandishing conviction was invalid because jury instructions allegedly allowed conviction based on conspiracy (which is not a "crime of violence").
The district court denied relief; it issued a certificate of appealability limited to whether the § 924(c) conviction violated the Constitution given the jury instructions and evolving case law.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the merits, holding the jury was properly instructed (§ 924(c) was tied to robbery, not merely to conspiracy) and that any potential confusion would have been harmless; the court also rejected the government's alternative procedural-jurisdiction argument.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Reyes)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether Reyes's § 924(c) conviction is invalid because jury instructions allowed conviction based on conspiracy (not a "crime of violence").	Jury instructions conflated Pinkerton v. United States vicarious liability with § 924(c), permitting conviction if brandishing was in furtherance of conspiracy (non-crime of violence).	Instructions separately and clearly required that the firearm be brandished in furtherance of the robbery; conspiracy was not treated as the § 924(c) predicate.	Affirmed: jury instructions properly distinguished Pinkerton and § 924(c); conviction stands; any error would be harmless.
Whether Reyes needed a new appellate authorization to amend his previously authorized successive § 2255 motion.	Once an application is screened and authorized, district courts may entertain amendments under Rule 15; screening covers successive applications, not every amendment.	Failure to obtain fresh panel authorization for added claims deprives the district court of jurisdiction.	Rejected the procedural bar: the court declined to affirm on that ground and held the district court did not err in considering Reyes's amended claim.

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (holding a residual clause unconstitutional for vagueness)
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (requiring reversal when a general verdict may rest on an invalid theory)
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (holding § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (extending Johnson reasoning to a similar residual clause in immigration law)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (holding the advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenge)
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (establishing conspirator vicarious liability for reasonably foreseeable crimes in furtherance of a conspiracy)
United States v. Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. en banc) (applying Johnson to the career-offender Guideline; later abrogated by Beckles)
D'Antoni v. United States, 916 F.3d 658 (7th Cir.) (conspiracy not a "crime of violence" under analogous definitions)
United States v. Williams, 864 F.3d 826 (7th Cir.) (bank robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the elements clause)
United States v. Reyes, 542 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2008) (Reyes's direct appeal)