Janna Russell v. David Christopher Russell
478 S.W.3d 36
| Tex. App. | 2015Background
- Janna and David Russell divorced in 2008; Janna later filed an enforcement and contempt action alleging child-support and property-division violations, recovering $1,224 (medical support), $166.78 (child-support arrearage), and $15,799 (UGMA account funds).
- On initial appeal (Russell I), the court held the trial court abused its discretion by denying attorney’s fees under Tex. Fam. Code §157.167 without stating good cause on the record and remanded for proceedings consistent with that opinion.
- On remand the trial court denied Janna’s request for attorney’s fees (stating it found no contempt) and declined to hold a hearing; Janna sought a new trial and findings of fact, which the court largely refused to amend.
- Janna sought $122,195 in attorney’s fees, supported by testimony and billing exhibits from her attorney; cross-examination challenged reasonableness, necessity, and segregation of fees.
- The court of appeals (this opinion) concluded the trial court failed to comply with Russell I: it did not either award fees or state good cause on the record under §157.167, and it failed to consider fee recovery under the Decree’s fee-shifting provision for the UGMA claim.
- Because reasonableness and segregation are fact issues and Janna produced some evidence of fees, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on attorney’s fees and affirmed the rest of the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court failed to follow appellate mandate to address attorney’s fees | Russell: Russell I required the trial court to award fees (or, at minimum, comply with §157.167) and the remand obligated the court to award her reasonable fees. | Russell: Russell I did not mandate a specific dollar award; trial court could either award fees or state good cause for denial; it reasonably found fees excessive. | Held: Trial court erred by not complying — it neither awarded fees nor stated good cause on the record and improperly relied on lack of contempt; reversal and remand for fees. |
| Entitlement to fees under Tex. Fam. Code §157.167 for recovered child-support arrearages | Russell: §157.167 mandates reasonable fees when respondent failed to pay child support unless good cause is stated; medical support award triggered statute. | Russell: Trial court’s finding of no contempt and view that fees were excessive justified denial. | Held: §157.167 applies (no contempt finding is not required); trial court must award reasonable fees unless it states good cause on the record. |
| Entitlement to fees under the Decree’s fee-shifting provision for UGMA recovery | Russell: The Property Division (incorporated into the Decree) contains a fee-shifting clause that entitles the successful party to recover fees for enforcement of that agreement (UGMA funds). | Russell: Trial court could decide whether Janna was the successful party and whether fees were reasonable. | Held: The fee-shifting provision is part of the judgment; trial court must determine if Janna is the successful party on the UGMA claim and, if so, award reasonable fees. |
| Whether Janna proved reasonableness and segregation of $122,195 as a matter of law | Russell: Yarrell’s testimony and exhibits were uncontroverted and should support rendition for the full amount. | Russell: Fees are excessive relative to recovery; evidence was contradicted or impeached on cross-examination and fees were not properly segregated. | Held: Janna did not prove fees as a matter of law — testimony was challenged and some fees may be unrelated; but she produced some evidence, so remand for a new fee trial (with segregation) is required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014) (lodestar standard for fee reasonableness and evaluation of attorney testimony)
- Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006) (attorney’s fees recoverable only if authorized by statute or contract; segregation requirement)
- Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998) (abuse-of-discretion standard for fee awards)
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standards for legal sufficiency review)
- Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1990) (interested witness testimony on fees ordinarily creates fact issue; uncontradicted testimony rarely establishes fees as a matter of law)
- Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997) (factors for determining reasonable attorney’s fees)
- Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979) (an agreed divorce decree, once approved, is treated as the court’s judgment)