Jane Taylor v. James Moskow
17-10847
| 11th Cir. | Oct 31, 2017Background
- Jane Taylor sued her brother James Moskow in Florida state court seeking an accounting of a trust (former trustee Moskow) and asserted conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty; Moskow removed to federal court.
- District court twice dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, allowed amendment; Taylor filed a second amended complaint adding the current trustee (Coral Gables Trust Company) and John Shupenko and moved to remand.
- District court denied joinder of the Florida-resident trustee and Shupenko (finding late amendment), dismissed Moskow for lack of personal jurisdiction, and denied remand; Taylor appealed.
- Allegations: Moskow (a California citizen) allegedly diverted trust funds while trustee (trust situs then Massachusetts); after trust moved to Florida under their mother as trustee, Taylor alleged Moskow conspired with Shupenko to unduly influence their mother and to deprive Taylor of distributions.
- Key procedural facts: Taylor sought to add Florida defendants after the scheduling-order deadline and did not seek Rule 16(b) relief; court applied Florida long-arm statute and due process analysis for specific personal jurisdiction and reviewed joinder denial for abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by denying joinder of Florida-resident trustee and Shupenko | Taylor: joinder necessary and prompted by district court’s directions; remand required if joinder allowed | Moskow: joinder was untimely under scheduling order; court may deny joinder under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) | Denial affirmed: amendment was untimely, Taylor showed no good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) and the court properly exercised discretion |
| Whether denial of remand was error after joinder refusal | Taylor: remand required because joinder would have destroyed diversity | Moskow: since joinder denied, diversity remains and remand is unwarranted | Denial affirmed: no joinder, federal jurisdiction retained |
| Whether Florida courts (and thus the district court) had specific personal jurisdiction over Moskow based on conspiracy/undue influence allegations | Taylor: conspiracy with Shupenko and related acts connect Moskow to Florida | Moskow: alleged conduct and effects occurred outside Florida (Massachusetts); conspiracy not adequately pled to invoke long-arm | Dismissal affirmed: conspiracy claim failed to plead underlying tort/undue influence; long-arm does not reach Moskow |
| Whether Florida long-arm subsections (business activities, tort in Florida, real property, Fla. Stat. § 48.193(4)) support jurisdiction | Taylor: various subsections apply because of alleged business activity, tortious harm to Taylor in Florida, lease of Miami property, and related probate actions | Moskow: no Florida office/clients/revenue; alleged tortious acts occurred in Massachusetts; lease not tied to cause of action; § 48.193(4) does not create jurisdiction in other cases | Dismissal affirmed: none of the cited subsections apply; statutes do not confer jurisdiction over Moskow for these claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for joinder of indispensable parties)
- Blevins v. Aksut, 849 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2017) (review standard for denial of remand)
- Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009) (personal jurisdiction review is de novo)
- PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay Beach Const., N.V., 598 F.3d 802 (11th Cir. 2010) (Florida long-arm specific vs. general jurisdiction framework)
- United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (two-step personal jurisdiction inquiry: long-arm then due process)
- Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 1998) (federal courts must construe state long-arm statutes as state supreme court would)
- Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2011) (courts may enforce scheduling orders; denying late amendments not an abuse of discretion)
- Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein–Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2005) (factors for determining business activity sufficient for long-arm jurisdiction)
- Walters v. Blankenship, 931 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (civil conspiracy requires underlying actionable wrong)
- Taylor v. Johnson, 581 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (definition and elements of undue influence)