Jane J. v. Commonwealth, AC 15-P-340

Plaintiff (pseudonym Jane J.) was civilly committed to the Hathorne Unit of Tewksbury State Hospital for a competency evaluation and housed in a locked unit that contained separate male and female corridors but a common recreation room and adjacent sunroom accessible to both genders.
The recreation room and sunroom had games and televisions, were unsupervised and without video surveillance, but staff performed safety checks about every 30 minutes.
About three weeks after admission, while watching television in the sunroom, the plaintiff alleges she was forcibly raped by a male patient who was also committed for a competency evaluation; the rape resulted in pregnancy and a subsequent miscarriage.
The male assailant had prior assault convictions but was not a registered sex offender and did not appear to require "strict security;" the hospital performed criminal-history checks before admission and assessed him as not posing a sexual-offense risk.
Plaintiff sued the Commonwealth under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act alleging hospital negligence in allowing mixed-gender access to the common room; the Commonwealth moved for summary judgment invoking MTCA § 10(j) immunity for harms not "originally caused" by the public employer.
The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the Commonwealth; the Appeals Court affirmed, holding the hospital's admissions/room-access practices were not an "original cause" within § 10(j) but rather a failure-to-prevent harm.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether allowing mixed-gender access to the common recreation room was an "original cause" under G. L. c. 258, § 10(j) of the rape, pregnancy, and miscarriage	Hospital's affirmative decision to house men and women in the same locked unit and permit unsupervised access to a secluded common room materially created the condition that led to the assault	The decision to allow shared access was not an affirmative act that created the specific circumstance of the rape; at most it was a failure to prevent harm, which § 10(j) immunizes	Held for Commonwealth: court concluded the hospital's conduct was not an "original cause" but a failure to prevent, so § 10(j) immunity applied

Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684 (1999) (defines "originally caused" as an affirmative act that creates the condition producing third-party harm and distinguishes such acts from failures to prevent)
Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312 (2002) (parole decision not an "original cause" where it did not materially create the specific condition leading to the injury)
Devlin v. Commonwealth, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 530 (2013) (affirmative decision to comingle convicted inmates with civilly committed patients was an "original cause")
Gennari v. Reading Pub. Schs., 77 Mass. App. Ct. 762 (2010) (placing children in an unsafe play area can be an affirmative, original cause)
Jacome v. Commonwealth, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 486 (2002) (failure-to-prevent distinction under § 10(j) in drowning case)
Bonnie W. v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 122 (1994) (Commonwealth liable when parole officer's affirmative recommendation placed victim at risk by granting access)
Pallazola v. Foxborough, 418 Mass. 639 (1994) (public-employee failures to provide protection fall within § 10(j) immunity)
Serrell v. Franklin County, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 400 (1999) (§ 10(j) bars recovery for failures to prevent inmate violence; distinguishes negligent intervention)