Jana Gehrke v. Chad Gehrke, 115 A.3d 1252

Jana Gehrke obtained an initial protection-from-abuse (PFA) order against Chad by agreement in July 2012; that order and subsequent agreed modifications progressively restricted Chad’s contact with Jana and their children.
After repeated violations and escalating incidents, a contested hearing in January 2014 produced a finding of abuse and an amended PFA prohibiting any contact; that order was set to expire July 20, 2014.
Jana moved in July 2014 to extend the PFA for two more years, alleging continued fear due to Chad’s pattern of violence, threats (including suicide/kill threats while armed), and repeated violations of court orders.
At the July 2014 contested extension hearing, Jana and relatives testified; Chad was advised of his rights, declined to testify, and presented no evidence.
The District Court extended the PFA for two years, citing an ongoing pattern of abuse that continued during prior orders; Chad appealed, arguing (1) the court improperly relied on pre-2012 conduct and (2) the extension unconstitutionally infringed his parental rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the court may consider pre‑order or historical abuse when deciding to extend an existing PFA	Gehrke: extension is necessary because of Chad’s continuing pattern and recent conduct; historical abuse shows ongoing risk	Chad: court erred by relying on conduct predating the initial 2012 PFA; extension must be based on new conduct	The court may consider earlier abuse and the pattern underlying prior orders when deciding an extension under 19‑A M.R.S. §4007(2); the record supported extension
Whether extending the PFA (limiting contact) unlawfully infringes Chad’s fundamental parental rights	Gehrke: State has compelling interest to protect children where abuse is shown; temporary restrictions are narrowly tailored	Chad: parental rights should be addressed in custody/divorce proceedings, not by PFA extension; extension unduly burdens parental liberty	Extension survives strict scrutiny here: statute permits temporary, narrowly tailored intrusion when abuse is found; the order was limited, modifiable, and enforcement was justified given lethal threats

Sullivan v. Doe, 100 A.3d 171 (Me. 2014) (appellate presumption as to subsidiary findings when no Rule 52 request)
O’Brien v. Weber, 48 A.3d 230 (Me. 2012) (extension is exclusive means to extend beyond two years)
Dyer v. Dyer, 5 A.3d 1049 (Me. 2010) (evidence of prior abuse may be considered when extending an order entered without particularized findings)
Walton v. Ireland, 104 A.3d 883 (Me. 2014) (contextual evaluation of threat and need for protection)
Sparks v. Sparks, 65 A.3d 1223 (Me. 2013) (statute authorizing temporary intrusion on parental rights survives strict scrutiny when abuse is found)
Griffin v. Griffin, 92 A.3d 1144 (Me. 2014) (parents have fundamental liberty interest in directing care and custody)
Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169 (Me. 2014) (strict‑scrutiny standard applies to intrusions on parental rights)