James Turk v. Daniel Comerford, 488 F. App'x 933

Turks allege FBI task-force officers, seeking fugitive Mattice, forcibly entered their home without a warrant and conducted a search.
Emily, a current resident, had provided information and consent; Turks dispute whether consent was voluntary or coerced.
Turk had briefly interacted with Mattice at a prior crime scene; no arrest warrant for Turk, only for Mattice.
The officers surrounded the home, knocked, and used force to enter; Turk began turning the deadbolt, claims door was pushed open.
The district court granted qualified immunity on several claims, but the Turks allege illegal entry, illegal search, unlawful detention, and breach of curtilage.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reverses some grants of immunity and remands for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the initial entry violated the Fourth Amendment	Turk: entry was unlawful without warrant or unequivocal consent.	Stasenko: consent implied by Turk beginning to turn the deadbolt; no coercion.	Initial entry violated Fourth Amendment; no immunity.
Whether Turk's and Mrs. Turk's consent to search was voluntary	Beauchamp coercion and threats rendered consent invalid.	Consent could be voluntary despite coercive atmosphere.	Consent was not valid; coercion tainted the search.
Whether the subsequent search was permissible in light of invalid entry	Search followed unlawful entry and lacked valid consent.	Consent from Mrs. Turk and conduct could authorize search.	Search not permissible; qualified immunity not applicable for the search.
Whether Stasenko’s detention of Turk in the foyer violated the Fourth Amendment	Detention without reasonable suspicion or probable cause was unlawful.	Detention based on permissible entry/search; Summers may apply.	Detention violated Fourth Amendment; no immunity.
Whether Rexing and Comerford can be held liable given their roles	Rexing entered with others; potential personal participation in unconstitutional conduct.	Comerford not present initially; Rexing’s entry disputed; qualified immunity uncertain.	Rexing: factual dispute; Comerford: summary judgment proper in Turks’ favor on entry/search claims.

Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (U.S. 1981) (requires search warrants for third-person residences absent consent or exigent circumstances)
Moon v. United States, 513 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 2008) (consent must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given)
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. Supreme Court 1973) (consent must be voluntary; knowledge of authority alone not enough)
Beauchamp, 659 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2011) (coercive factors can invalidate consent even without explicit threats)
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (U.S. 1961) (voluntariness of consent requires absence of coercion)
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (U.S. 1980) (home entry requires warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (detentions require reasonable suspicion to justify police action)
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (U.S. 1983) (consent must be voluntary and not coerced by authority)
Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (U.S. 2003) (coercive tactics negate consent to seize)
Summers v. City of Toledo Police Dept., 452 U.S. 692 (U.S. 1981) (detention during valid search warrants; Summers addressed but not controlling where entry is unlawful)
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (U.S. 1980) (detention depends on whether a reasonable person would feel not free to leave)
Carter v. United States, 378 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that nonverbal consent (stepping aside) can be valid)