James Schultz v. Jeffrey Pugh
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14874
7th Cir.2013Background
- Plaintiff, a Wisconsin state prisoner, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming prison officials retaliated after he spoke about an alleged assault by two guards by placing him in segregation and forbidding discussion.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because plaintiff did not file a grievance in the prescribed form.
- Plaintiff asserted he feared reprisal and therefore interpreted the ban on speaking about the assault to bar filing a grievance.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants after the plaintiff failed to present evidence substantiating his fear despite being invited to do so.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding the grievance process remained available under the applicable regulation and that the plaintiff produced no evidence showing he was prevented from using it.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies before suing | He was deterred by fear of reprisal and therefore could not file a grievance | He failed to file a properly conformed grievance and so cannot proceed | Held: No exhaustion; grievance avenue was available and plaintiff offered no evidence of actual deterrence |
| Whether the grievance process was "available" despite a prohibition on speaking about the assault | The ban deterred him from filing because he thought it applied to grievances | The regulation limits false-statement offense to statements made outside the complaint review system, so filing a grievance was not prohibited | Held: Grievance route was open under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.271; no reasonable basis for fear based on that rule |
| Standard for proving unavailability due to intimidation (objective v. subjective) | Arguably plaintiff need only show he was actually deterred (subjective) | Courts require objective showing that a person of ordinary firmness would be deterred; some decisions add a subjective showing too | Held: Court noted confusion in precedent about whether both standards are required, reviewed distinctions, but affirmed on record-specific grounds (plaintiff provided no evidence of fear) |
| Whether equitable estoppel can apply where officials exploit a prisoner’s atypical infirmities to prevent exhaustion | Plaintiff hinted at intimidation but offered no proof of exploitation of special vulnerabilities | Defendants argued no such exploitation or evidence exists | Held: Court recognized the theoretical possibility of equitable estoppel but found this case remote from that scenario and did not decide the issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center, 623 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2010) (availability of administrative remedies must be real, not illusory)
- Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing possible estoppel where officials prevent exhaustion)
- Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2004) (objective-person-of-ordinary-firmness test for deterrence)
- Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing objective and subjective deterrence standards)
- Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008) (requiring subjective showing in addition to objective in some contexts)
- Ricci v. DiStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (summary judgment principles and need for specific factual detail to permit response)
- Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008) (procedural concerns about factfinding on exhaustion before merits)
- Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (use of "ordinary firmness" benchmark in prison-context injuries)
- Stoleson v. United States, 708 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1983) (eggshell-skull principle permitting recovery by unusually vulnerable plaintiffs)