James Samples v. David Ballard
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 11196
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- James Samples, convicted of first-degree murder in 1998 and serving life, filed a second federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after an earlier (2013) petition was dismissed as mixed; the magistrate judge in the first proceeding invited Martinez arguments in a new petition.
- In the 2014 petition (adjudicated on the merits by the magistrate), Samples filed pro se objections to the magistrate judge’s proposed findings raising new claims of trial-counsel ineffectiveness (the "six acts of omission") and asserting Martinez-based excuse for procedural default due to ineffective state post-conviction counsel.
- The district court overruled Samples’s objections, treated the new contentions as waived/new claims and declined to consider them, and granted a certificate of appealability limited to whether claims first raised in objections must be heard by the district judge.
- On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered (1) whether United States v. George applies in habeas cases; (2) how George should be applied in the habeas context (issue/argument distinction); and (3) whether the district court erred or abused its discretion in refusing to hear Samples’s new claims.
- The court held that George applies to habeas proceedings, but that an "issue" in habeas is a distinct ground for relief (a claim) while "arguments" are positions supporting that claim; Samples’s objections raised new claims, so the district court was not required to consider them and did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Samples) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether George (971 F.2d) applies to habeas cases | George requires district courts to consider all arguments raised in objections, so new arguments in objections must be heard | George flows from the Magistrates Act and applies equally to habeas; but its scope should be limited so district courts need not entertain wholly new claims raised only in objections | George applies to habeas cases, but its scope is bounded: it requires consideration of new arguments directed to an existing claim, not the acceptance of wholly new claims raised only in objections (Affirmed) |
| How to apply George in habeas proceedings (issue vs. argument) | The entire habeas petition is a single issue (illegal custody); distinct grounds are just arguments — so any argument in objections must be heard | An "issue" in habeas is each distinct ground for relief (claim); arguments are positions supporting that ground; plaintiffs cannot preserve all claims by generic custody allegations | The court adopts the State's framework: issues = distinct grounds for relief (claims); arguments = legal positions under each claim; George does not let a petitioner convert new claims raised only in objections into preserved claims |
| Whether district court erred by not addressing Samples’s Martinez-based excuse and six acts of omission (new claims raised in objections) | Samples argued these were arguments tied to his petition and must be considered de novo by the district judge | The State argued they were new claims not pleaded in the petition and therefore not required to be considered under George; hearing them would circumvent AEDPA and procedural rules | District court did not err: the six acts of omission and Martinez-based claims were new grounds not alleged in the petition, so the court was not required to hear them (Affirmed) |
| Whether refusal to entertain (a) a freestanding claim of ineffective state habeas counsel and (b) the six trial-counsel omissions was an abuse of discretion | Samples urged consideration; Martinez allows use of ineffective post-conviction counsel to establish cause | State argued (a) freestanding ineffective post-conviction counsel claims are barred by § 2254(i); (b) Samples had been put on notice in earlier opinions and failed to timely plead the six omissions | Not an abuse of discretion: (a) freestanding claims under § 2254(i) are barred and Martinez does not create a freestanding remedy; (b) district court reasonably declined to permit belated amendment and to excuse noncompliance given prior notice and AEDPA concerns (Affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113 (4th Cir. 1992) (district court must consider all arguments directed to an issue to which proper objection is made under the Magistrates Act)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel can, in limited circumstances, establish "cause" to excuse procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims)
- Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (mixed petitions with exhausted and unexhausted claims must be dismissed; each ground for relief is treated separately for exhaustion)
- Raddatz v. United States, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (discussing de novo review by a district court of magistrate judge recommendations)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (governing standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)