James Timothy SAMPLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. David BALLARD, Warden, Mount Olive Correctional Facility, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 16-6740
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
June 23, 2017
268 F.3d 268
Before TRAXLER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion, in which Judge Traxler and Judge Diaz joined.
FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
This petition for relief under
I.
This case comes before us on Appellant James Samples‘s second habeas petition filed pursuant to
Samples was convicted in January 1998 for first degree murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment without mercy in Kanawha County, West Virginia. After an unsucсessful habeas petition in state court, Samples filed his first pro se petition under
On January 21, 2014, Magistrate Judge Dwane L. Tinsley submitted a report of proposed findings and recommendations (PF&R),1 finding that Samples had not exhausted all of his claims. See Samples v. Ballard (Samples I), No. 2:13-cv-11638, 2014 WL 1338562 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 21, 2014). Magistrate Judge Tinsley explicitly stated that Samples could argue pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012), that his procedural default should be excused due to ineffective assistance of state habeas coun-
Judge Thomas E. Johnston adopted in part the PF&R on the basis of a failure to exhaust, and dismissed the 2013 Petition as a “mixed petition”2 without prejudice on March 31, 2014. Samples v. Ballard (Samples II), No. 2:13-cv-11638, 2014 WL 1342312 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2014), adopting-in-part Samples I, 2014 WL 1338562. In doing so, Judge Johnston also stated that “Petitioner may be able to state a claim pursuant to Martinez, but such claim must be brоught pursuant to a properly filed habeas petition in federal court. . . . [T]o the extent that Petitioner chooses to pursue this argument, he should address the Martinez requirements in his new federal habeas petition. . . .” Id. at *3.
Following another unsuccessful state court habeas petition, Samples filed a second pro se § 2254 petition (the “2014 Petition“), the petition at issue in this case. On February 6, 2015, Magistrate Judge Tinsley entered a PF&R wherein he evaluated all claims on their merits, found each claim to be without merit, and recommended granting the government‘s motion for summary judgment. Samples v. Ballard (Samples III), No. 2:14-cv-15413, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177412 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 6, 2015).
Samples then filed objections to the PF&R on March 10, 2015, still pro se. See generally J.A. 195-217. In those objections, Samples raised brand new contentions related to the effectiveness of trial counsel, and argued that cause existed to excuse his failure to exhaust these issues due to the ineffectiveness of his court-appointed post-conviction counsel in state court. Samples argued that his trial counsel was deficient due to “six acts of omission” and that his post-conviction counsel “declined to present or explicatе petitioner‘s meritorious claims for relief predicated on trial counsel‘s six acts of omission.” J.A. 201-02.3 He further requested that the district court “find [post-conviction counsel] were ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)] when they failed to present trial counsel‘s failure to investigate the facts underlying the six acts of omission. . . . [and] excuse [Samples]‘s failure to present this claim to the [Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia] due to [post-conviction counsel‘s] act of omission” pursuant to Martinez. J.A. 201-02. Later, Samples furthеr stated that he was “denied meaningful and effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, when court-appointed counsel omitted [an issue] from the petition for post-conviction relief and the petition for appeal.” J.A. 207.
In a thorough opinion, Judge Johnston overruled the objections, and specifically
Judge Johnston concluded that Samples was “us[ing] his objections to plead new claims that should have been raised in the habeas petition.” Id. at *19. Judge Johnston treated the issue as a matter of waiver; however, he acknowledged that our holding from United States v. George, 971 F.2d 1113 (4th Cir. 1992), might control. The court expressed its belief that George does not apply in the habeas corрus context whatsoever, but also noted that applying George likely would not mandate a different result, because Samples was “seek[ing] to use his objections to assert an entirely novel habeas claim.” Id. at *20. The court went on to explain that “[p]ermitting [Samples] to raise his Martinez claim at this point in the case would show disregard for
In so ruling, Judge Johnston noted that his “procedural ruling [was] debatable, at least without further clarification оf the limits of George,” and so granted a certificate of appealability on the issue. Id. The judgment order specifically granted the certificate “limited to the procedural issue of whether [Samples]‘s claims should be heard where they were raised for the first time in objections to the Magistrate judge‘s PF&R.” J.A. 258. The court subsequently granted Samples‘s request to appoint counsel, and granted appointed counsel an extension of time to file a notice of appeal. Samples then timely noted this appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
II.
This case presents a series of separate but related issues. As an initial matter, we
We consider de novo the questions of whether George applies, how it applies, and whether it was appropriately applied in this case. United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 2014). Our additional review of the district court‘s disposition of the casе is for abuse of discretion. Cf. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 183 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 622-23 (9th Cir. 2000)) (applying an abuse of discretion standard when the district judge rejected supplemental evidence after a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation).
A.
A review of George is a necessary first step in our analysis. In George, a West Virginia county magistrate had issued two search warrants—one for a truck and one for a house—in connection with an investigation of a shooting. 971 F.2d at 1116. The defendant moved to suppress certain evidence obtained in the execution of those warrants, specifically, the truck‘s tires and hacksaw blades found in the truck. Id. The issue of suppression was referred to a federal magistrate judge to issue proposed findings and recommendations. Id. The federal magistrate judge found both search warrants invalid for lack of probable cause, and found the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule inapplicable. Id.
The government filed objections to the PF&R, challenging the findings of probable cause and the inapplicability of the good faith exception. Id. The government “also raised for the first time two additional arguments in oppоsition to the suppression motions,” arguing that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his truck tires, and that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1116-17. The district court adopted the PF&R in its entirety and “refus[ed] to consider the government‘s privacy and inevitable discovery arguments because the government had not raised these arguments before the magistrate.” Id. at 1117.
On appeal, we considered whether the district court‘s procedural conclusion was sound. In making this determination, we relied on the text of the Federal Magistrates Act,
We believe that as part of its obligation to determine de novo any issue to which proper objection is made, a district court is required to consider all arguments directed to that issue, regardless of whether they were raised before the magistrate. By definition, de novo review entаils consideration of an issue as if it had not been decided previously. It follows, therefore, that the party entitled to de novo review must be permitted to raise before the court any argument as to that issue that it could have raised before the magistrate. The district court cannot artificially limit the scope of its review by resort to ordinary prudential rules, such as waiver, provided that proper objection to the magistrate‘s proposed finding or conclusion has been made and the appellant‘s right to de novo rеview by the district court thereby established. Not only is this so as a matter of statutory construction; any other conclusion would render the district court‘s ultimate decision at least vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
George, 971 F.2d at 1118 (footnotes omitted) (emphases added) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 683, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980); United States v. Shami, 754 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Elsoffer, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 1981)).
In essence, George envisions a hierarchical scheme, wherein a legal case is divided into issues, and issues are further subdivided into arguments. In George, the legal case was the entire criminal case, the issue was suppression of evidence from the truck, and the arguments made against suppression by the government were (1) existence of a valid warrant; (2) good faith reliance on a valid warrant; (3) no reasonable exрectation of privacy; and (4) inevitable discovery. The government argued only the first two positions to the magistrate judge, and we ruled in George that the district judge could not deem the latter two waived and must entertain them.
B.
We now turn to the question of whether George can apply in the habeas context. We conclude that it does.
As described above, the decision in George turned on the interpretation of the Federal Magistrates Act—specifically
(b) Reference to a Magistrate Judge. A judge may, under
28 U.S.C. § 636(b) , refer the petition to a magistrate judge to conduct hearings and to file proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. . . . The judge must determine de novo any proposed finding or recommendation to which objection is made. The judge may accept, reject, ormodify any proposed finding or recommendation.
Habeas R. 8(b).
We have no cause to interpret the “de novo determination” language of
C.
Having determined that George does apply to habeas cases, we must now resolve exactly how it is to be applied. In the case at hand, the district court declined to consider Samples‘s objections related to the “six acts of omission” for which he sought to have his procedural default excused under Martinez, finding that they constituted a “novel issue.” See Samples IV, 2016 WL 1271508, at *18. Samples urges us to find this in error under George. He submits that his entire § 2254 petition is one “issue“—i.e., “that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States,”
Applying the George framework to a habeas petition, we find the following three levels: (1) the legal case is the habeas petition; (2) the issues or claims are the asserted grounds for relief; and (3) the arguments are whatever position is taken in support of or against each asserted ground for relief. The contrary position urged by Samples—that the issue is illegal custody and the grounds for relief are merely arguments to that point—is belied by habeas corpus jurisprudence, including statutes and case law.
First, the statutes governing habeas petitions themselves refer to each basis for which the petitioner‘s custody may be illegal as a separate “claim.” See, e.g.,
Second, Supreme Court case law indicates that different grounds for relief are treated as different claims. In a pre-AEDPA case about exhaustion under § 2254, the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause a rule requiring exhaustion of all claims furthers the purposes underlying the habeas statute, we hold that a district court must dismiss such ‘mixed petitions,’ leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to state court to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims to the district court.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (emphases added).8 More to the point, Martinez itself makes this distinction. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 7, 17, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (referring to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim at issue as one “ground for relief” in his petition and referring to multiple claims of ineffective assistаnce of trial counsel). From these cases, we see that the Supreme Court considers each ground for relief an independent claim.
Translating this to the George framework, we do not believe that an “issue” as referred to in George can be defined at the high level of generality Samples urges us to apply here. Rather, an “issue” in the habeas context is a ground for relief, and “arguments” are the legal positions related to the ground for relief. Accord Cooper v. Ward, 149 F.3d 1167, at *1 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (unreported table decision) (finding that the district court “properly declined to address” an “ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time in the objections to the magistrate judge‘s recommendations” (citing George, 971 F.2d at 1117-18)); White v. Keller, No. 10-cv-841, 2013 WL 791008, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2013) (“Of course, the court is required to consider all arguments directed to an issue addressed in an objection, regardless of whether they were raised before the magistrate judge. In this case, however, Petitioner seeks to assert a new claim, not to make an argument with respect to an existing claim.” (citing George, 971 F.2d at 1118)).9 Agreeing with
Samples would require us to find that a habeas petitioner could merely state that he is in illegal custody and then make all arguments later. This would result in an end run around AEDPA, and is not what our case law intends.
D.
Having found that George can meaningfully apply in the habeas context, we now review the district court‘s analysis of Samples‘s objections. Although the district court appeared to indicate that it believed George did not apply, the court‘s actual analysis of Samples‘s objections comports with the understanding of George we have explained above. We thereforе find no error in how the district court disposed of the objections.
In his pro se objections to the PF&R, Samples appears to do two things: (1) make a freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel; and (2) argue that the “six acts of omission” by his trial counsel—which all agree are not actually included in the 2014 Petition anywhere—should be considered by the district court as grounds for relief, and that cause exists to excuse any failure to exhaust those issues based on the failure of state habeas counsel. Both of thеse are new grounds for relief, and under the George framework outlined above, that makes them new “issues” and not new “arguments” related to issues contained within the 2014 Petition.
Although Samples did make claims regarding other instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his petition, he did not claim ineffective assistance of counsel based on the “six acts of omission.” Rather, he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel based on an incomplete voir dire, permitting the jury to be informed that Samplеs was a convicted felon at the time of the murder, failure to propose certain
Therefore, under George, there was no obligation for the district court to hear either of the new claims made by Samples in his objections to the PF&R. Thus, Judge Johnston did not err in finding that he was not required to hear the claims.
E.
Finally, the parties have briefed whether it was otherwise an abuse of discretion for the district court to decline to hear the claims made by Samples in his objections to the PF&R, even though the district court was not required to hear these claims under George. We find no abuse of discretion.
Turning to the first new claim—a freestanding claim of ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel—such a ground is not a permissiblе avenue of relief in a federal habeas petition.
With respect to the second new claim—the six acts of omission of his trial counsel—the district court properly exercised its discretion in declining to hear this claim. Samples was on notice from both the opinions in Samples I and Samples II relating to the 2013 Petition that if he wanted to raise claims that had been procedurally defaulted in a subsequent petition, he needed to allege the necessary factual circumstances to demonstrate сause to excuse default. Samples has offered no justification for why he did not follow the directions of the courts in Samples I and Samples II, and offers no argument as to why Judge Johnston should have permitted Samples to effectively amend his habeas petition in this manner. We can think of none either.
III.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
HENRY F. FLOYD
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE