James Rogers v. Sheriff Nelson O'Donnell
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 24830
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Three off-duty Richmond, KY police officers (Murphy, Hensley, Rogers) engaged in consensual-but-rough sexual activity with April McQueen on Oct. 26, 2009; McQueen’s accounts of consent varied over time.
- Neighbors and sheriff’s deputies became involved; McQueen gave recorded statements Oct. 27–28; later met with prosecutors and testified before the grand jury multiple times, at times stating parts were nonconsensual.
- Grand jury indicted Murphy for fourth-degree assault and all three officers for witness tampering; at trial (Mar. 2010) McQueen testified the acts were consensual and the officers were acquitted.
- The officers sued multiple defendants in federal court asserting § 1983 and state-law claims (malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation, conspiracy). Two prosecutors, David W. Smith and Jennifer Hall Smith (the Smith defendants), moved for dismissal/summary judgment on immunity grounds.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the Smiths: absolute immunity as to the Dec. 21 grand-jury–room meeting; Jennifer Smith was given qualified immunity (not absolute) for the Nov. 12 interview; David Smith was dismissed for lack of alleged involvement. Plaintiffs appealed; Smiths cross-appealed denial of attorneys’ fees.
- Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo, held both prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity for the Dec. 21 meeting and that Jennifer Smith also had absolute immunity for the Nov. 12 interview, affirmed summary judgment for the Smiths and affirmed denial of attorneys’ fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for meetings with victim/witness (Nov. 12 interview) | Plaintiffs: Nov. 12 meeting was investigatory, so only qualified immunity applies | Defendants: Meeting was part of prosecutorial function (evaluation/preparation for grand jury) and thus absolutely immune | Held: Absolute immunity applies to Jennifer Smith for Nov. 12 interview (district court erred to the contrary) |
| Whether prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for post–grand jury meeting (Dec. 21 in grand jury room) | Plaintiffs: Decision premature; discovery needed to show non-advocative conduct | Defendants: Meeting was advocacy aimed at controlling testimony—absolute immunity | Held: Absolute immunity applies; refusal to allow more discovery was not an abuse of discretion |
| Whether David Smith was sufficiently alleged to have participated | Plaintiffs: May have authorized/acquiesced; discovery could show involvement | Defendants: No allegations of David’s involvement in Nov. 12; thus not liable | Held: Dismissal for lack of alleged involvement affirmed; even if involved, would share absolute immunity |
| Whether defendants should be awarded attorneys’ fees under § 1988 | Defendants: Claims barred by immunity merited fees | Plaintiffs: Claims were colorable, not frivolous | Held: District court did not abuse discretion denying fees (claims not frivolous) |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors absolutely immune for actions intimately associated with judicial phase)
- Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (use functional approach to determine absolute immunity)
- Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2010) (summary of absolute vs. qualified prosecutorial immunity)
- Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003) (prosecutorial decisions re witness testimony and preparation entitled to absolute immunity)
- Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2002) (prosecutor absolutely immune for professional evaluation and presentation of evidence to grand jury)
- Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435 (6th Cir. 1997) (investigative acts in direct preparation of judicial proceedings can warrant absolute immunity)
- Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (look to nature of function, not actor, in immunity analysis)
- Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011) (standard for awarding attorneys’ fees under § 1988; frivolousness required)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) (distinguishes prosecutorial advocacy from administrative/investigative acts)