James Robertson, Sr. v. Intratek Computer, 976 F.3d 575

Background

Robertson signed an arbitration agreement with Intratek as a condition of employment in June 2011; the policy covered "any controversy, dispute or claim between any employee and the Company, or its officers, agents or other employees related to employment," including torts and federal-law claims.
Robertson worked on VA contracts and was terminated in September 2015; he filed a whistleblower complaint with the VA OIG alleging bribery by Intratek's CEO Fahami and VA employee Rininger.
After the OIG investigation was pending, Robertson sued Intratek, Fahami, and Rininger (May 7, 2018), alleging violation of 41 U.S.C. § 4712 and tortious interference.
Intratek and Fahami moved to compel arbitration; the magistrate and district court found § 4712 did not bar arbitration, held all claims were subject to arbitration, denied Robertson leave to add his company as a plaintiff, and dismissed the case without prejudice.
Robertson appealed; Fifth Circuit reviewed the arbitration ruling de novo and the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 41 U.S.C. § 4712 precludes enforcement of a predispute arbitration agreement	§ 4712(c)(2) gives a right to a jury trial and § 4712(c)(7) makes rights/remedies nonwaivable, so arbitration cannot strip the jury right	The statute creates substantive whistleblower rights and a procedure; it does not clearly preclude arbitration or waive the FAA	Held: § 4712 does not override the FAA; it does not provide the clear congressional command needed to bar arbitration
Whether the arbitration agreement covers Robertson's claims against Intratek and Fahami	Robertson argued some claims were not listed and that he is a former employee so agreement shouldn't apply	Intratek/Fahami pointed to broad language covering claims related to employment, torts, and violations of federal law	Held: Agreement covers Robertson's claims against Intratek and Fahami (claims relate to employment and fall within the contract's broad scope)
Whether claims against Rininger (a VA official, nonsignatory) are subject to Intratek's arbitration agreement	Robertson did not argue these should be arbitrated against the nonsignatory Rininger	Defendants implicitly relied on district court's blanket arbitration order; no legal basis explained to bind nonsignatory Rininger	Held: Arbitration does not apply to Rininger; district court erred in compelling arbitration of those claims
Whether denial of leave to amend to add Robertson Technologies, Inc. was an abuse of discretion	Robertson sought to add his company after magistrate recommended arbitration, arguing it could not be compelled to arbitrate	Defendants argued amendment was untimely and a tactical maneuver to avoid arbitration	Held: Denial was not an abuse of discretion—motion was untimely and appeared tactical; Rule 19 inapplicable because the company was alleged alter ego

Key Cases Cited

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (stating mere statutory references to court processes do not show Congress intended to override the FAA)
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (courts must enforce arbitration agreements absent contrary congressional command)
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (Congressional intent to bar arbitration must appear in text or legislative history)
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (statutory antiwaiver language does not necessarily prevent arbitration of statutory claims)
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (absence of specific statutory discussion of arbitration suggests Congress did not displace the FAA)
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (FAA preempts state-law limits on arbitration of employment-related disputes)
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (statutory claims may be subject to arbitration under the FAA)