31 F.4th 560
7th Cir.2022Background:
- Perez, a Staples sales representative (former national trainer), had documented performance problems beginning in mid-2015 and was placed on repeated corrective plans.
- In March 2016 Staples put Perez on an "associate success plan" (Mar 7–Jun 6, 2016) requiring: $75,000 in Salesforce "wins" per 30-day period; five selling appointments per week (one a first meeting); and a $1,000,000 Salesforce pipeline with specified growth.
- During the plan Staples records show Perez did not meet the metrics (Coha reported $48k Mar, $75k Apr, $25k May); Perez disputed these figures with a self-made chart (Ex. 31) and later interactive spreadsheets.
- Perez also told his supervisor he would not participate in selling a New York‑prohibited detergent (Clax Mild Forte) and served four days as jury foreperson (May 10–13, 2016); he was terminated on June 10, 2016.
- Perez sued under the Illinois Jury Act, the Illinois Whistleblower Act, and common-law retaliatory discharge; the district court granted summary judgment for Staples, and Perez appealed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subject‑matter jurisdiction (diversity) | Removal/diversity defective after caption amendment | Diversity existed at removal and caption change does not divest jurisdiction | Diversity jurisdiction proper; amendment did not defeat jurisdiction |
| Admissibility of Perez’s sales chart (Ex. 31) | Chart proves he met the plan’s sales requirement | Chart lacks foundation and cannot be verified | Court considered chart but found it inadmissible/insufficient to show compliance |
| Failure to produce work laptop / adverse inference | Staples destroyed laptop evidence; adverse inference warranted | No evidence of bad‑faith spoliation; plaintiff waived discovery objections | No adverse inference; plaintiff waived claims about magistrate discovery rulings |
| Jury‑service retaliation (Illinois Jury Act & common law) | Jury duty was a proximate cause of termination | Termination resulted from documented poor performance under the plan | No genuine dispute that poor performance motivated firing; jury service not shown to be causal |
| Whistleblower claim re: refusal to sell NY‑prohibited detergent | Refusal to participate in illegal sale (Clax) is protected activity | Illinois Whistleblower Act requires violation of Illinois (state) or federal law; NY law not a basis; no retaliatory motive shown | Court construed “State” as Illinois; NY regulation cannot support the statutory or common‑law claim; alternatively, insufficient evidence of retaliatory motive |
Key Cases Cited
- Freeport‑McMoRan, Inc. v. KN Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426 (rule that jurisdiction assessed at time of filing/ removal)
- Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2009) (time‑of‑filing rule for removal jurisdiction)
- James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307 (7th Cir. 2020) (sham‑affidavit rule explained)
- Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2012) (Illinois common‑law retaliatory discharge burdening)
- Turner v. Memorial Medical Ctr., 911 N.E.2d 369 (Ill. 2009) (elements of common‑law retaliatory discharge under Illinois law)
- Norman‑Nunnery v. Madison Area Tech. Coll., 625 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 2010) (spoliation / adverse inference standard)
- Dal Pozzo v. Basic Machine Co., 463 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2006) (motions to alter judgment not a vehicle for evidence that could have been earlier presented)