James O. Young v. State of Indiana, 980 N.E.2d 412

Young was convicted of Class D felony domestic battery in the presence of a child and Class D felony strangulation after a jury trial in Elkhart Superior Court.
Medrano, Young’s wife, appeared battered and later reported to firefighters and police that Young had beaten her and taken their children.
Gomez, a friend, visited earlier and observed the couple arguing; she left before any physical contact occurred.
Firefighters Hochstetler and Sanders treated Medrano at Station 5 and learned of her injuries and her statement about Young; Medrano spoke limited English and required interpretation.
Officer Stuff arrived, observed Medrano’s injuries and bruising, and arrested Young based on her statements and visible injuries.
Medrano did not testify; the court admitted firefighters’ testimony about her statements and, over objections, Officer Stuff’s testimony; the jury found Young guilty on both charges, leading to an appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is Medrano’s firefighter testimony admissible as excited utterance under the Confrontation Clause?	Young contends primary purpose was to prove past events for prosecution.	Young argues statements were testimonial and violated Confrontation Clause unless cross-examined.	Admissible as excited utterance; primary purpose was ongoing emergency, not testimonial.
Is Medrano’s statement to Officer Stuff admissible as an excited utterance?	Medrano’s statement to Stuff should be excluded as irrelevant to emergency.	Statements were excited utterances and admissible to prove the offense.	Not admissible as excited utterance; the stress/continuing emergency requirement not satisfied.
Was the error in admitting Officer Stuff’s testimony harmless?	Erroneous admission should be harmless if cumulative.	Stuff’s testimony was non-cumulative and essential to strangulation conviction.	Error was not harmless; reversal of strangulation conviction possible retrial.
Was there sufficient evidence to support domestic battery as a Class D felony based on presence of a child?	Medrano’s statements and injuries support the in-presence-of-child element.	Evidence did not prove the child was present during the actual battery.	Insufficient to prove presence; remand to enter Class A misdemeanor domestic battery; reverse D felony.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (Confrontation Clause; testimonial vs non-testimonial statements)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (U.S. 2006) (ongoing emergency vs past-events inquiry for statements)
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 131 (sic: use correct 1143) (U.S. 2011) (primary purpose framework for testimonial nature)
Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (primary purpose and formality considerations in statements)
Martin, 885 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emergency-related questioning in domestic contexts)
Davenport v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. 2001) (extreme and continuing stress in excited utterance analysis)
Yamobi v. State, 672 N.E.2d 1344 (Ind. 1996) (spontaneity of statements to questions within excited utterance analysis)
Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005) (statements made under physical/psychological distress admissible)
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (U.S. 2004) (example cited in context of police investigations)
Perry v. State, 956 N.E.2d 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (application of primary purpose framework to non-police interactions)