James Moss v. Kathleen Olson
699 F. App'x 477
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- James Moss was convicted in Michigan state court (2011) of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct and accosting a child based on allegations by two teenage victims, M and K, who lived in Moss’s home years earlier.
- Charges consolidated; jury convicted Moss after less than three hours of deliberation; convictions affirmed by Michigan appellate courts and leave denied by the Michigan Supreme Court.
- At trial, evidence included victims’ testimony, testimony from M’s mother (Tansey) that M at one point recanted to her, and a police report containing statements by grandmother Novella Alliston that M had recanted and that M had alcohol and sexual-behavior problems.
- Moss’s trial counsel did not interview or call Alliston and did not introduce the police report to impeach M, though counsel cross-examined M on several credibility points.
- Moss sought federal habeas relief arguing ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to investigate/call Alliston and inadequate cross-examination of M). The district court granted relief; the Sixth Circuit reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Moss) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s failure to investigate/call Alliston was constitutionally deficient and prejudicial | Counsel erred by not locating/interviewing Alliston, who would have testified M recanted; absence prejudiced outcome | State court reasonably concluded Alliston’s testimony would have been cumulative or unpersuasive; no reasonable probability of different result | Reversed: even if investigation failure might be deficient, state court reasonably found no Strickland prejudice under AEDPA |
| Whether counsel’s cross-examination of M was deficient for failing to impeach with police report inconsistencies | Counsel failed to use the police report to impeach timeline and reporting source; clearer impeachment would have undermined M’s credibility and affected verdict | Trial counsel conducted extensive cross-examination on timeline, drinking, recantation; additional questions were tactical and unlikely to change outcome | Reversed: no deficient performance shown, and AEDPA deference makes state-court prejudice finding reasonable |
| Standard of review applicable to IAC claims where state court addressed only one Strickland prong | Moss: district court should review de novo | State: AEDPA requires deference to state-court merits adjudications; where state court decided prejudice prong, AEDPA applies to that prong and de novo to any unadjudicated prong | Court applied AEDPA deference to prejudice prong and de novo review to deficiency prong when state court only addressed prejudice |
| Scope of relief — whether any relief would be limited to convictions related to M only | Moss: if reversal warranted, limit relief to M-related convictions because prejudice tied to M’s testimony | State: district court erred in granting relief; issue need not be reached because habeas relief denied | Not reached: because habeas relief reversed in full, Court declined to decide scope question |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance standard: deficiency and prejudice)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel must investigate; strategic choices require reasonable investigation)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference principles for state-court adjudications)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (deference rules when state court finds representation adequate and does not reach prejudice)
- Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (presumption that state courts follow Federal law and receive benefit of the doubt)
- Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562 (6th Cir. 2004) (prejudice analysis where counsel failed to investigate alibi witnesses)
- Stewart v. Wolfenberger, 468 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2006) (additional non-testifying alibi witnesses may be non-cumulative and prejudicial)
- Clinkscale v. Carter, 375 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2004) (prejudice where excluded alibi witnesses would have corroborated defense)
- Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2014) (distinguished; priest-confession recantation witness held prejudicial where mother’s testimony was not equivalent)