James Hill v. Madison County School Board
797 F.3d 948
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- A 14-year-old Sparkman Middle School student (Doe) was anally raped on Jan. 22, 2010 after school staff (via a teacher’s aide) arranged a sting in which Doe was used as bait to catch a fellow student (CJC) purportedly propositioning girls in bathrooms.
- School officials (Principal Blair; Asst. Principals Dunaway and Terrell; teacher’s aide Simpson) had prior knowledge of multiple disciplinary entries and allegations against CJC (iNOW database entries for sexual misconduct and violence), but paper investigative notes were routinely shredded and recordkeeping/coding was informal.
- Facts are disputed about who authorized or ratified the sting: Simpson devised the plan; Dunaway’s role is contested (Simpson says she told Dunaway; Dunaway denies being informed); Blair acknowledged a “catch in the act” mentality and directed heightened monitoring but did not inspect paper files.
- After the incident, school officials treated the matter as disciplinary (short suspension; iNOW entry characterized as “inappropriate touching”), preserved only records tied directly to the Jan. 22 incident, and made minimal policy/training changes.
- Doe withdrew from the school, received counseling and medication for depression, and sued the Board and individual officials under Title IX, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (equal protection and substantive due process), and Alabama tort claims (negligence/wantonness; tort of outrage).
- On summary judgment the district court dismissed Doe’s Title IX claim and most § 1983 and state-law claims; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Title IX student-on-student liability: whether the Board had actual knowledge and was deliberately indifferent to harassment that was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive | Doe: Board officials knew of CJC’s prior sexual misconduct, permitted a sting using Doe as bait, and failed to remediate or change policies — creating a genuine dispute on all Title IX elements | Board: incidents were isolated, not shown to be severe/pervasive; administrators lacked actual knowledge that conduct met Davis standard; response was not clearly unreasonable | Reversed: A reasonable jury could find the Board had actual knowledge, was deliberately indifferent, and the harassment (including the sting) was severe/pervasive and barred Doe’s access to education; Title IX summary judgment improper |
| §1983 municipal liability (Board) for equal protection violations based on policies/training or “catch in the act” policy | Doe: Board policies and training failures created a custom enabling Simpson’s sting and the violation of constitutional rights | Board: §1983 municipal liability requires a plainly obvious causal link; sting was not a plainly obvious consequence of Board policies; no deliberate indifference at municipal policymaker level | Affirmed: Board not liable under §1983 — plaintiff failed to show municipal deliberate indifference with the requisite causal nexus |
| §1983 individual liability (Blair, Dunaway, Simpson) — deliberate indifference/acquiescence to sexual harassment | Doe: Blair, Dunaway, Simpson knew or ratified the sting and acted with deliberate indifference; therefore qualified immunity not available | Defs: qualified immunity; lack of clearly established law for such a sting; insufficient proof of actual knowledge/acquiescence | Mixed: Reversed as to Blair, Dunaway, Simpson — genuine disputes of material fact on deliberate indifference and clearly established law for Blair/Dunaway/Simpson; affirmed as to Terrell (no evidence she ratified or had policymaking authority) |
| Alabama state-law claims and immunity; tort of outrage against Simpson | Doe: Blair and Dunaway acted beyond authority/bad faith; Simpson’s conduct was extreme, caused severe emotional distress | Defs: Blair entitled to state-agent immunity; Simpson not immune; conduct not meeting outrage standard | Mixed: Blair entitled to state-agent immunity (affirmed); Dunaway not entitled to immunity (affirmed denial); Simpson liable on tort of outrage claims (reversed summary judgment in Doe’s favor) |
Key Cases Cited
- Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (U.S. 1998) (school liable for teacher-on-student harassment only where an official with authority had actual notice and was deliberately indifferent)
- Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (U.S. 1999) (student-on-student Title IX liability where funding recipient is deliberately indifferent to known harassment that is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive)
- Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007) (articulates multi-element test for student-on-student Title IX claims and evaluates cumulative facts like prior misconduct and institutional response)
- Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (U.S. 1997) (municipal §1983 liability requires proof of culpable policymaker conduct and a direct causal link; deliberate indifference standard is stringent)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (U.S. 1982) (qualified immunity test: protection unless conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights)
- Doe v. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010) (school’s deliberate indifference may be shown by effectively doing nothing in response to peer sexual harassment)