James Hayes v. Delbert Services Corporation
811 F.3d 666
| 4th Cir. | 2016Background
- Western Sky, a lender based on the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation, issued high‑rate payday loans to out‑of‑state consumers; loans included forum, governing‑law, and arbitration clauses purporting to make Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal law exclusively applicable and tribal forum/arbitration exclusive.
- Hayes received a Western Sky loan and later sued Delbert Services (a non‑tribal servicer/collector) in federal court alleging FDCPA and TCPA violations arising from collection practices.
- The loan agreement’s arbitration clause required disputes to be resolved by a tribal representative under the Tribe’s consumer dispute rules and also included a choice‑of‑law clause disavowing all state and federal law.
- A later added clause permitted the borrower to select AAA or JAMS to “administer” arbitration, but did not clearly supplant the tribal appointment/choice‑of‑law provisions.
- The district court rejected Delbert’s tribal‑forum and tribal‑exhaustion arguments but compelled arbitration, reasoning the AAA/JAMS option rescued the arbitration clause.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding the arbitration agreement unenforceable because it prospectively waived application of federal law to federal statutory claims and was thus a substantive waiver of federally protected rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of arbitration agreement that disavows state and federal law | Hayes: agreement invalid because it prospectively forbids application of federal law, effecting an unenforceable substantive waiver | Delbert: arbitration is enforceable; AAA/JAMS administration clause cures tribal‑forum defects and parties agreed to arbitrate | Held: arbitration agreement unenforceable — it categorically renounces federal law and constitutes an impermissible substantive waiver |
| Validity of tribal arbitration mechanism | Hayes: tribal appointment process and consumer dispute rules are non‑existent or illusory, rendering mechanism a sham | Delbert: later AAA/JAMS clause fixes appointment and procedure problems | Held: Court need not resolve fully because the choice‑of‑law waiver independently invalidates the agreement; but noted serious defects in tribal mechanism |
| Severability of offending provisions | Hayes: unenforceable provisions go to the essence and should not be severed | Delbert: offending parts can be severed and arbitration enforced via AAA/JAMS | Held: Non‑severable — offending clauses are integral to the scheme and reflect intent to avoid federal law; cannot be excised |
| Applicability of tribal‑exhaustion and forum‑selection clause to Delbert | Hayes: case should proceed in federal court; forum clause doesn't reach third‑party servicer | Delbert: dispute belongs in tribal court and tribal exhaustion applies | Held: District court correctly rejected Delbert’s tribal forum and exhaustion defenses; Fourth Circuit adopted those reasons on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (strong federal policy favoring arbitration)
- AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (arbitrability is generally for courts to decide)
- Rent‑A‑Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (distinguishing delegation to arbitrator and requiring clear and unmistakable evidence)
- Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler‑Chrysler‑Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (federal statutory claims generally arbitrable absent contrary congressional command)
- American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (class‑action waivers enforceable absent substantive waiver of statutory rights)
- CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (arbitrability of certain federal statutory claims)
- Green Tree Financial Corp.‑Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (arbitration provisions may be invalid if costs preclude vindication of statutory rights)
- Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006) (choice‑of‑law cannot be used to effectuate waiver of federal statutory protections)
