James Hanna v. Todd Ishee, 694 F.3d 596

Petitioner Hanna was convicted of aggravated murder with three aggravating specifications and sentenced to death in Ohio; trial occurred in 1998 with a guilt phase and a separate penalty phase.
The state’s case relied on medical records, prison official testimony, Petitioner’s statements, and letters he wrote; defense centered on Petitioner’s intent during the attack.
A deadly weapon charge was dismissed; the jury found aggravated murder with one aggravating facet and the specifications for § 2929.04(A)(5) and § 2929.01.
Post-conviction proceedings in Ohio challenged Brady material, ineffective assistance, and sentencing issues; discovery and an evidentiary hearing were granted by the district court for § 2254 review.
The district court and state courts rejected most claims; the federal district court denied habeas relief, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, applying AEDPA standards.
On appeal, Hanna argues four main issues: Brady material, ineffective assistance (juror and mitigation), and a flawed jury instruction on causation during penalty.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Brady material regarding Lee impeachment	Hanna claims suppressed evidence showing Lee’s potential deal with prosecutors.	Hanna contends suppression existed and affected impeachment and outcome.	Unexhausted claim denied on merits; suppression not material to outcome.
Failure to discover ineligible juror	Counsel should have discovered juror’s felon status; bias possible due to juror’s background.	Record shows no deliberate concealment; no actual bias proven; voir dire not ineffective.	No reversible error; no Strickland prejudice shown.
Ineffective assistance for mitigation strategy	Counsel should have introduced prison-life and psychological testimony to mitigate.	Investigation and evidence presented were reasonable; additional testimony would be speculative and cumulative.	No Strickland deficiency or prejudice; decision not contrary to clearly established law.
Causation instruction in penalty phase	The causation instruction diluted mens rea and violated due process.	Overall instructions properly instructed specific intent; causation language did not lower the burden.	Instruction not a due-process violation; not reversible under Estelle/Winship standards.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (U.S. 2000) (AEDPA deference and standard for governing habeas review)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (U.S. 1991) (habeas relief not granted for state-law instructional error absent constitutional error)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1970) (beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for elements of crime)
Estelle v. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1985) (Francis distinguished; not controlling on causation error here)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S. 1995) (materiality and suppression framework for Brady material)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S. 1985) (familiar Brady materiality standard)
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1985) (intent-focused instruction distinction relevance to due process)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (duty to investigate mitigating evidence; reasonableness standard)
Holder v. Palmer, 588 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2009) (bias analysis for juror)
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (U.S. 1984) (impartial jury; voir dire standards)