187 A.3d 299
R.I.2018Background
- Parties are adjacent owners in Charlestown; plaintiffs (Lot 24) claimed historic dock access across Lots 23 and 31-2 (defendants). Plaintiffs previously sued (2007–2010); the parties negotiated a consent order resolving easement disputes and creating two easements: a Pedestrian/Golf Cart Easement and a 15-foot-wide Launching and Retrieval Easement (for hauling, launching, retrieving boats up to 16').
- The consent order specified dimensions, seasonal use dates, a post-and-chain device location (installed ~1988), and a process for relocating the Lot 24 floating dock with CRMC approval (cost apportionment defined).
- After entry of the consent order, defendants erected a fence along the southern boundary of the 15-foot Launching and Retrieval Easement and installed the post-and-chain across the full path; plaintiffs alleged these actions prevented necessary three‑point turns to launch/retrieve boats and removed a historical ‘‘courtesy gate.’'
- Plaintiffs sought declarations and injunctions: (1) right to go beyond the 15-foot easement to turn vehicles, (2) mandatory removal/modification of the fence and restoration of the courtesy gate, and (3) right to reinstall dock posts at the relocated dock. Defendants counterclaimed for breach based on plaintiffs’ refusal to execute the definitive plan and amended consent order, seeking attorneys’ fees.
- A nonjury bench trial produced findings that the consent order was a clear, unambiguous contract; plaintiffs knew 15 feet was insufficient for a three‑point turn but accepted it during negotiations. Trial court denied plaintiffs’ relief, found plaintiffs breached the consent order, ordered compliance, and denied defendants’ fee request. Plaintiffs appealed; defendants cross‑appealed the denial of fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs may lawfully go beyond the 15‑foot Launching and Retrieval Easement to execute vehicle turns necessary to launch/retrieve boats | Consent order’s purpose (to permit launching/retrieving) supersedes the 15‑ft dimension; incidental/occasional turning outside easement should be allowed | The consent order is unambiguous: it prescribes a 15‑ft width; parties negotiated knowingly and must be bound by the terms | Court: Consent order is clear and unambiguous; width is 15 ft; no right to stray beyond it; judgment for defendants affirmed |
| Whether plaintiffs are entitled to a ‘‘courtesy gate’’ beside the post‑and‑chain device as existed historically | Historical courtesy gate was part of prior practice and should be reinstated | Consent order permits a specific post‑and‑chain device in a specified location; it is silent on any courtesy gate | Court: Agreement is silent about a courtesy gate; cannot add term; no relief granted |
| Whether plaintiffs may install the historic dock posts at the relocated dock terminus | Dock posts are necessary to use the relocated floating dock as before and should be allowed | Consent order and CRMC materials did not include posts; plaintiffs approved CRMC submission and cannot now insist on posts | Court: Consent order governs relocation process and is silent as to permanent posts; plaintiffs failed to secure inclusion; no right to reinstall posts |
| Whether defendants are entitled to attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs’ breach | N/A | Defendants: statute or contract (§ 9‑1‑45; consent order sanctions) supports fees because defendants prevailed on breach claim | Court: Trial justice acted within discretion in denying fees; under the American rule and given a justiciable issue existed, denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Whittemore v. Thompson, 139 A.3d 530 (R.I. 2016) (deference to trial justice factual findings in bench trials)
- Bucci v. Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB, 68 A.3d 1069 (R.I. 2013) (de novo review for legal questions; ambiguity of contract is a question of law)
- W.P. Associates v. Forcier, Inc., 637 A.2d 353 (R.I. 1994) (contract must be viewed as a whole; unambiguous agreements are enforced as written)
- Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc., 973 A.2d 553 (R.I. 2009) (when contract words are clear, courts will not consider subjective intent or add terms)
- Carpenter v. Hanslin, 900 A.2d 1136 (R.I. 2006) (permitting limited incidental use outside a right‑of‑way in a fact‑specific easement case—distinguished by court)
- Danforth v. More, 129 A.3d 63 (R.I. 2016) (review of attorneys’ fees awards: legal basis reviewed de novo, award or denial reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Rivera v. Gagnon, 847 A.2d 280 (R.I. 2004) (parties may negotiate unfavorable contracts; courts enforce the bargain reached)