James Everett v. David Bergh, 477 F. App'x 325

Everett was convicted of second-degree murder in Michigan in 1999 for killing Latesha Lewis after threats against the Faircrest Street house.
He presented an alibi (family testified he was in New York) which the jury did not credit, resulting in a 25–50 year sentence.
Everett pursued state post-conviction relief; the Michigan courts denied relief, and he then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The district court denied relief, and Everett appeals, arguing procedural default and ineffective assistance and other claims.
The Michigan rule 6.508(D)(3) barred many claims as not raised on direct appeal, which the state courts enforced.
The court analyzes procedural default and ultimately concludes Everett’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Everett’s claims are procedurally defaulted	Everett argues state rule 6.508(D)(3) is an adequate ground, but the last reasoned decision shows default.	Michigan courts properly enforced Rule 6.508(D)(3) to bar claims from habeas review.	Yes; claims are procedurally defaulted.
Whether ineffective assistance can excuse procedural default	Everett claims appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising claims, constituting cause to excuse default.	No ineffective assistance shown that would excuse default; Strickland standard not met for each claim.	No, ineffective assistance does not excuse default.
Whether the evidence was insufficient to sustain second-degree murder	Everett argues insufficient proof of elements (death, causation, malice, lack of justification).	Evidence showed motive, flight, proximity to the scene, and witnesses linking Everett to the crime.	Insufficient argument; claim defaulted and not considered.
Whether remaining claims of trial misconduct, ineffective assistance, or bias were plainly meritorious	Everett contends misconduct and bias unsupported by the record warrant relief.	Claims not plainly meritorious to constitute ineffective assistance or bias relief on direct appeal.	Not plainly meritorious; not considered.

Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286 (6th Cir. 2010) (an en banc decision defining procedural default analysis)
Akrawi v. Booker, 572 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2009) (adequacy of state grounds for default analysis)
Browning v. Foltz, 837 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1988) (habeas review and interstate detainers not a basis for relief)
United States v. Robinson, 455 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2006) (Barker factors and delay analysis standard)
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court 1982) (speedy-trial protections lapse after dismissal and delay analysis)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court 1984) (ineffective assistance standard)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to default)
Webb v. Mitchell, 586 F.3d 383 (6th Cir. 2009) (guide to ineffective assistance and default)
Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000) (de novo review for ineffective assistance claims)