James Blakely v. Robert Wards
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21389
| 4th Cir. | 2013Background
- James G. Blakely, a state prisoner, sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal after the district court granted summary judgment for defendants in his 2010 § 1983 action.
- The Fourth Circuit originally denied IFP and, on reconsideration en banc, limited review to whether certain prior dispositions against Blakely qualify as "strikes" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
- Blakely had multiple prior federal suits disposed of at summary judgment; several of those orders expressly characterized the suits as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim.
- The core legal question: does a summary-judgment disposition that explicitly states one of the § 1915(g) grounds count as a "dismissal" (i.e., a strike) for three-strikes purposes?
- The en banc majority held that the dispositive inquiry is the substance of the prior order: if the summary-judgment order explicitly states the action was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, it counts as a strike.
- Because Blakely had more than three prior qualifying dismissals, the court denied his motion for reconsideration and refused IFP status on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether summary-judgment dispositions can constitute a § 1915(g) "dismissal" (a strike) | Summary judgment orders, as a procedural matter, are not "dismissals" and thus cannot count as strikes | A disposition counts if it explicitly states the case was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim, regardless of procedural posture | Held: A summary-judgment dismissal that expressly states one of the § 1915(g) grounds counts as a strike |
| Whether Tolbert established a bright-line rule excluding summary judgment from strikes | Tolbert supposedly held summary-judgment dismissals are never strikes | Tolbert addressed a different question (whether partial-claim dismissals count) and its reference to summary judgment was dictum and inapposite | Held: Tolbert does not bar treating qualifying summary-judgment orders as strikes |
| Whether courts should parse prior summary-judgment orders to determine strike status | Parsing summary-judgment orders is impractical and increases workload | Look only to the face of the prior order; if it explicitly invokes the § 1915(g) grounds, it’s a strike | Held: A facial inquiry is appropriate and administrable; explicit language suffices to classify a strike |
| Whether courts retain discretionary authority under § 1915(a) to deny IFP even without three strikes | N/A (plaintiff) | Courts have residual discretion under § 1915(a) to deny IFP to abusive litigants regardless of § 1915(g) | Concurrences: Even if summary-judgment orders were doubtful strikes, courts may deny IFP in the exercise of § 1915(a) discretion; one concurrence would rely on that ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussed limits and scope of what counts as a strike under § 1915(g))
- Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (focuses on the contents of dispositions, not labels, for strike analysis)
- Butler v. Dep’t of Justice, 492 F.3d 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (recognizes discretionary denial of IFP under § 1915(a) for abusive filers)
- Byrd v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopts a two-prong approach: count strikes only if entire action is dismissed explicitly for the enumerated reasons or under rules/statutes limited to those reasons)
- In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) (Supreme Court recognizes discretionary aspects of IFP authority)
- Bell v. Thompson, 545 U.S. 794 (2005) (examples of courts referring to summary-judgment dispositions as dismissals)