Jamar Osborne v. Warren Kenneth Paxton
03-15-00374-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 12, 2015Background
- Osborne, a Green Party candidate, challenged Paxton’s eligibility to serve as Texas Attorney General due to Paxton’s status as a licensed attorney.
- Osborne alleged that a licensed attorney cannot serve in the Executive or Legislative branches but only in a judicial capacity.
- Paxton moved for summary judgment; the district court granted two traditional summary judgments taking nothing on Osborne’s claims.
- Osborne did not pass the bar; Paxton is a licensed attorney and won the election.
- Osborne alleged procedural defects and mischaracterizations of the motions but the district court maintained take-nothing judgments.
- On appeal, Osborne argues the separation of powers and lack of material fact issues; Paxton seeks affirmation of the judgments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a licensed attorney may serve as Attorney General without violating separation of powers. | Osborne; licensed attorney cannot hold executive office. | Paxton; Supreme Court decisions permit an attorney general to serve; no prohibition. | No separation-of-powers violation; district court affirmed. |
| Whether summary judgment was proper given the pleadings. | Osborne; general denial creates a fact issue. | Paxton; traditional summary judgment appropriate because no material facts remain. | Traditional summary judgment proper; no material fact issues. |
| Whether Osborne waived any arguments regarding no-evidence summary judgment and right to the office. | Osborne preserved all arguments. | Arguments waived; motions were traditional, not no-evidence; no right to office. | Waived; issues not preserved on appeal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Brooks, 89 S.W. 1052 (Tex. 1905) (recognizes judicial nature of AG duties and separation-of-powers considerations)
- Medrano v. Texas, 421 S.W.3d 869 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014) (upholding AG's authority despite executive/judicial division)
- Moody v. Baum, 452 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1970) (restricts right to hold public office against ineligibility principles)
- Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. 1964) (statutory interpretation against broad ineligibility for office)
- Southwestern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Larue, 367 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1963) (summary judgment with general denial can be proper when no facts are in dispute)
- Richard v. Reynolds Metal Co., 108 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003) (no pet.; no material fact issues preclude traditional summary judgment)