60 F.4th 684
D.C. Cir.2023Background
- Plaintiff Jahinnslerth Orozco is a blind FBI intelligence analyst who relies on screen‑access software and alleges core FBI software is inaccessible.
- Orozco filed administrative complaints under 29 U.S.C. § 794d with the DOJ Assistant Attorney General for Administration and the FBI CIO; the FBI routed the matter to its EEO employment procedures and dismissed the complaint.
- After receiving no remedial action, Orozco sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to compel use of accessible technology under § 794d of the Rehabilitation Act.
- The district court dismissed, holding § 794d(f)(3) did not create a private right for employees because it incorporated § 794a(a)(2)’s cause of action but not Title VI’s limitations on who may sue (i.e., only recipients/federal providers of federal assistance).
- The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding § 794d(f)(3) plainly makes the remedies, procedures, and rights available to “any individual with a disability filing a complaint,” including federal employees who seek only non‑monetary relief; remanded remaining exhaustion questions to the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 794d(f)(3) provides a private cause of action for federal employees who file an administrative complaint about inaccessible technology | § 794d(f)(3) makes the Title VI remedies/procedures/rights available to “any individual with a disability filing a complaint,” so employees like Orozco may sue for injunctive/declaratory relief | The cross‑reference imports § 794a(a)(2)’s limitation that only persons aggrieved by recipients or federal providers of federal assistance may sue, and agencies acting as employers are not such providers | Held for Orozco: § 794d(f)(3)’s plain text gives a private right to any individual with a disability who filed the required administrative complaint, including employees seeking non‑monetary relief |
| Whether incorporation of § 794a(a)(2) imports § 794a’s limitations on who may sue | Incorporation covers remedies/procedures/rights but not § 794a’s separate definitional limitation; § 794d(f)(3) has its own plaintiff definition | The government argued incorporation should carry corresponding limitations | Held that incorporation of remedies does not import external limitations; § 794d(f)(3)’s own definitional clause controls |
| Whether sovereign‑immunity or waiver principles defeat a private suit for non‑monetary relief | § 702 of the APA waives sovereign immunity for non‑monetary relief; § 794d(f)(3) authorizes injunctive/declaratory relief | Government invoked canon construing ambiguities against waivers of sovereign immunity | Held ambiguity resolved by plain text; APA § 702 waiver covers non‑monetary suits and nothing in § 794d negates that waiver |
| Whether Orozco’s filings suffice to establish jurisdiction given exhaustion issues | Orozco filed the administrative complaint(s) required by § 794d(f)(1), which is enough to invoke § 794d(f)(3)’s cause of action | Government argued additional exhaustion may have been required | Held Orozco’s filings establish jurisdiction; any remaining exhaustion defenses are non‑jurisdictional and remanded to district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (U.S. 1984) (incorporation of remedies does not import another statute’s plaintiff‑limiting definitional provisions)
- Lane v. Peña, 518 U.S. 187 (U.S. 1996) (federal agencies generally are not “federal providers of assistance” when acting as employers)
- Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (U.S. 2002) (Rehabilitation Act extends Title VI remedies to disability claims)
- Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (agencies procuring technology are generally not acting as providers of federal financial assistance)
- Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 139 S. Ct. 1048 (U.S. 2019) (start statutory analysis with the statute’s text)
- Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255 (U.S. 1999) (APA § 702 waives sovereign immunity for non‑monetary relief)
- Perry Capital LLC v. Mnuchin, 864 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (APA § 702 waiver applies broadly to suits seeking non‑monetary relief)
- Doak v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (administrative exhaustion principles and jurisdictional effects)