REPUBLIC OF SUDAN v. HARRISON ET AL.
No. 16-1094
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
March 26, 2019
587 U. S. ____ (2019)
ALITO, J.
Argued November 7, 2018
(Slip Opinion)
OCTOBER TERM, 2018
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN v. HARRISON ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 16-1094. Argued November 7, 2018—Decided March 26, 2019
Respondents, victims of the bombing of the USS Cole and their family members, sued the Republic of Sudan under the FSIA, alleging that Sudan provided material support to al Qaeda for the bombing. The court clerk, at respondents’ request, addressed the service packet to Sudan‘s
Syllabus
Held: Most naturally read,
(a) A letter or package is “addressed” to an intended recipient when his or her name and address are placed on the outside. The noun “address” means “a residence or place of business.” Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 25. A foreign nation‘s embassy in the United States is neither the residence nor the usual place of business of that nation‘s foreign minister. Similarly, to “dispatch” a letter to an addressee connotes sending it directly. It is also significant that service under
(b) Several related provisions in
(c) This reading of
(d) Respondents’ remaining arguments are unavailing. First, their
Syllabus
suggestion that
802 F. 3d 399, reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 16—1094
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, PETITIONER v. RICK HARRISON, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[March 26, 2019]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the requirements applicable to a particular method of serving civil process on a foreign state. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), a foreign state may be served by means of a mailing that is “addressed and dispatched . . . to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.”
I
A
Under the FSIA, a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction of courts in this country unless one of several enumerated exceptions to immunity applies.
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in federal district courts.
Section 1608(a) governs service of process on “a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state.”
“sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.”
§1608(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Finally, if service cannot be made within 30 days under
Once served, a foreign state or political subdivision has 60 days to file a responsive pleading.
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foreign state or political subdivision does not do this, it runs the risk of incurring a default judgment. See
B
On October 12, 2000, the USS Cole, a United States Navy guided-missile destroyer, entered the harbor of Aden, Yemen, for what was intended to be a brief refueling stop. While refueling was underway, a small boat drew along the side of the Cole, and the occupants of the boat detonated explosives that tore a hole in the side of the Cole. Seventeen crewmembers were killed, and dozens more were injured. Al Qaeda later claimed responsibility for the attack.
Respondents in this case are victims of the USS Cole bombing and their family members. In 2010, respondents sued petitioner, the Republic of Sudan, alleging that Sudan had provided material support to al Qaeda for the bombing. See
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in the litigation, the District Court for the District of Columbia held an evidentiary hearing and entered a $314 million default judgment against Sudan. Again at respondents’ request, the clerk of the court mailed a copy of the default judgment in the same manner that the clerk had previously used. See
With their default judgment in hand, respondents turned to the District Court for the Southern District of New York, where they sought to register the judgment and satisfy it through orders requiring several banks to turn over Sudanese assets. See
At this point, Sudan made an appearance for the purpose of contesting jurisdiction. It filed a notice of appeal from each of the three turnover orders and contended on appeal that the default judgment was invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction. In particular, Sudan maintained that
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the orders of the District Court. 802 F. 3d 399 (2015). The Second Circuit reasoned that, although
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method chosen by plaintiffs—a mailing addressed to the minister of foreign affairs at the embassy—was consistent with the language of the statute and could reasonably be expected to result in delivery to the intended person.” Ibid.
Sudan filed a petition for rehearing, and the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of Sudan‘s petition. The panel ordered supplemental briefing and heard additional oral argument, but it once again affirmed, reiterating its view that
Subsequent to the Second Circuit‘s decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in a similar case that
We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict. 585 U. S. 1109 (2018).
II
A
The question before us concerns the meaning of
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foreign state concerned.”
The most natural reading of this language is that service must be mailed directly to the foreign minister‘s office in the foreign state. Although this is not, we grant, the only plausible reading of the statutory text, it is the most natural one. See, e.g., United States v. Hohri, 482 U. S. 64, 69—71 (1987) (choosing the “more natural” reading of a statute); ICC v. Texas, 479 U. S. 450, 456—457 (1987) (same); see also Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U. S. 33, 41 (2008) (similar).
A key term in
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We acknowledge that there are circumstances in which a mailing may be “addressed” to the intended recipient at a place other than the individual‘s residence or usual place of business. For example, if the person sending the mailing does not know the intended recipient‘s current home or business address, the sender might use the intended recipient‘s last known address in the hope that the mailing will be forwarded. Or a sender might send a mailing to a third party who is thought to be in a position to ensure that the mailing is ultimately received by the intended recipient. But in the great majority of cases, addressing a mailing to X means placing on the outside of the mailing both X‘s name and the address of X‘s residence or customary place of work.
Section 1608(a)(3)‘s use of the term “dispatched” points in the same direction. To “dispatch” a communication means “to send [it] off or away (as to a special destination) with promptness or speed often as a matter of official business.” Webster‘s Third 653; see also OED
A few examples illustrate this point. Suppose that a person is instructed to “address” a letter to the Attorney General of the United States and “dispatch” the letter (i.e., to “send [it] off post-haste“) to the Attorney General. The person giving these instructions would likely be disappointed and probably annoyed to learn that the letter had been sent to, let us say, the office of the United States Attorney for the District of Idaho. And this would be so even though a U. S. Attorney‘s office is part of the De-
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partment headed by the Attorney General and even though such an office would very probably forward the letter to the Attorney General‘s office in Washington. Similarly, a person who instructs a subordinate to dispatch a letter to the CEO of a big corporation that owns retail outlets throughout the country would probably be irritated to learn that the letter had been mailed to one of those stores instead of corporate headquarters. To “dispatch” a letter to an addressee connotes sending it directly.
A similar understanding underlies the venerable “mailbox rule.” As first-year law students learn in their course on contracts, there is a presumption that a mailed acceptance of an offer is deemed operative when “dispatched” if it is “properly addressed.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 66, p. 161 (1979) (Restatement); Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185, 193 (1884). But no acceptance would be deemed properly addressed and dispatched if it lacked, and thus was not sent to, the offeror‘s address (or an address that the offeror held out as the place for receipt of an acceptance). See Restatement § 66, Comment b.
It is also significant that service under
For all these reasons, we think that the most natural reading of
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the foreign minister‘s name and customary address and that it be sent to the minister in a direct and expeditious way. And the minister‘s customary office is the place where he or she generally works, not a farflung outpost that the minister may at most occasionally visit.
B
Several related provisions in
One such provision is
Respondents read
This argument runs up against two well-settled principles of statutory interpretation. First, “Congress generally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one
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section of a statute but omits it in another.” Department of Homeland Security v. MacLean, 574 U. S. 383, 391 (2015). Because Congress included the “reasonably calculated to give actual notice” language only in
2
Section 1608(b)(2) similarly supports our interpretation of
This language is significant for three reasons. First, it expressly allows service on an agent. Second, it specifies the particular individuals who are permitted to be served as agents of the recipient. Third, it makes clear that service on the agent may occur in the United States if an
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agent here falls within the provision‘s terms.
If Congress had contemplated anything similar under
3
Section 1608(c) further buttresses our reading of
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Under all these methods, service is deemed to have occurred only when there is a strong basis for concluding that the service packet will very shortly thereafter come into the hands of a foreign official who will know what needs to be done. Under
It is easy to see why Congress could take that view with respect to a person designated for the receipt of process in a “special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision,”
Respondents seek to soften the blow of an untimely delivery to the minister by noting that the foreign state can try to vacate a default judgment under
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is a poor substitute for sure and timely receipt of service,
C
The ordinary meaning of the “addressed and dispatched” requirement in
1
Take the
The virtually identical methods of service outlined in
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employee would not necessarily satisfy
2
Our interpretation of
Article 22(1) of the Vienna Convention provides: “The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U. S. T. 3237, T. I. A. S. No. 7502. Since at least 1974, the State Department has taken the position that Article 22(1)‘s principle of inviolability precludes serving a foreign state by mailing process to the foreign state‘s embassy
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reiterated this view in amicus curiae briefs filed in this Court and in the Second Circuit. The Government also informs us that United States embassies do not accept service of process when the United States is sued in a foreign court, and the Government expresses concern that accepting respondents’ interpretation of
Contending that the State Department held a different view of Article 22(1) before 1974, respondents argue that the Department‘s interpretation of the Vienna Convention is wrong, but we need not decide this question. By giving
III
Respondents’ remaining arguments do not alter our conclusion. First, respondents contend that
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location . . . is likely to have a direct line of communication to the foreign minister,” ibid., it is not at all clear why service could not be sent to places in the United States other than a foreign state‘s embassy. Why not allow the packet to be sent, for example, to a consulate? The residence of the foreign state‘s ambassador? The foreign state‘s mission to the United Nations? Would the answer depend on the size or presumed expertise of the staff at the delivery location? The difficult line-drawing problems that flow from respondents’ interpretation of
Second, respondents (and the dissent, see post, at 5—6) contrast the language of
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publicized litigation of which the Government of Sudan may have been aware prior to entry of default judgment. But there are circumstances in which the rule of law demands adherence to strict requirements even when the equities of a particular case may seem to point in the opposite direction. The service rules set out in
Moreover, as respondents’ counsel acknowledged at oral argument, holding that Sudan was not properly served under
*
We interpret
It is so ordered.
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 16—1094
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN, PETITIONER v. RICK HARRISON, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
[March 26, 2019]
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
The Court holds that service on a foreign state by certified mail under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) is defective unless the packet is “addressed and dispatched to the foreign minister at the minister‘s office in the foreign state.” Ante, at 17 (emphasis added). This bright-line rule may be attractive from a policy perspective, but the FSIA neither specifies nor precludes the use of any particular address. Instead, the statute requires only that the packet be sent to a particular person—“the head of the ministry of foreign affairs.”
Given the unique role that embassies play in facilitating communications between states, a foreign state‘s embassy in Washington, D. C., is, absent an indication to the contrary, a place where a U. S. litigant can serve the state‘s foreign minister. Because there is no evidence in this case suggesting that Sudan‘s Embassy declined the service packet addressed to its foreign minister—as it was free to do—I would hold that respondents complied with the FSIA when they addressed and dispatched a service packet to Sudan‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs at Sudan‘s Embassy in Washington, D. C. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
THOMAS, J., dissenting
I
To serve a foreign state by certified mail under the FSIA, the service packet must be “addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned.” Ibid. In many respects, I approach this statutory text in the same way as the Court. I have no quarrel with the majority‘s definitions of the relevant statutory terms, ante, at 6—7, and I agree that the FSIA does not deem a
In short, I agree with the majority that
II
A foreign state‘s embassy in Washington, D. C., is generally a place where a U. S. court can communicate by mail with the state‘s foreign minister. Unless an embassy decides to decline packages containing judicial summonses—as it is free to do, both in individual cases or as a broader policy—a service packet addressed and dispatched to a foreign minister at the address of its embassy in the
THOMAS, J., dissenting
United States satisfies
Because embassies are “responsible for state-to-state relationships,” Malone, The Modern Diplomatic Mission, in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy 124 (A. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur eds. 2013), an important function of an embassy or other “diplomatic mission” is to “act as a permanent channel of communication between the sending state and the receiving state.” G. Berridge & A. James, A Dictionary of Diplomacy 73 (2d ed. 2003). Embassies fulfill this function in numerous ways, including by using secure faxes, e-mails, or the “diplomatic bag” to transmit documents to the states they represent. A. Aust, Handbook of International Law 122 (2d ed. 2010); see ibid. (the diplomatic bag is a mailbag or freight container containing diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use). Thus, as one amicus brief aptly puts it, embassies “have direct lines of communications with the home country, and a pipeline to route communications to the proper offices and officials.” Brief for Former U. S. Counterterrorism Officials et al. as Amici Curiae 29.
Numerous provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) confirm this reality, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U. S. T. 3237, T. I. A. S. No. 7502. Under the VCDR, an embassy “may employ all appropriate means” of communicating with the state whose interests it represents, Art. 27(1), including “modern means of communication such as (mobile) telecommunication, fax, and email,” Wouters, Duquet, & Meuwissen, The Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, in The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy, supra, at 523. The VCDR provides substantial protections for the “official correspondence of the mission” and the diplomatic bag, which may include “diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use.” Arts. 27(1)—(5); cf. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Arts. 3, 5(j), 35, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U. S. T. 77, T. I. A. S. No. 6820 (recognizing that
THOMAS, J., dissenting
embassies may perform “[c]onsular functions,” such as “transmitting judicial and extrajudicial documents,” and affording protections to official communications).
The capability of an embassy to route service papers to the sending state is confirmed by the State Department regulation
It was against this backdrop that respondents requested that their service packet be “addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of [Sudan],”
Of course, the FSIA does not impose a substantive obligation on the embassy to accept or transmit service of
THOMAS, J., dissenting
process directed to the attention of the foreign minister. A foreign state and its embassy are free to reject some or all packets addressed to the attention of the foreign minister. But, as detailed above, Sudan has pointed to nothing in the record suggesting that its embassy refused service, or that its embassy address was not a place at which its foreign minister could be reached. On these facts, I would hold that the service packet was properly “addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs.”
III
A
Instead of focusing on whether service at an embassy satisfies the FSIA, the Court articulates a bright-line rule: To comply with
The Court focuses on the foreign minister‘s “customary office” or “place of work,” ante, at 9, 7, but these terms appear nowhere in
The absence of a textual foundation for the majority‘s rule is only accentuated when
THOMAS, J., dissenting
service packet must be “addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special Consular Services.”
The Court offers three additional arguments in support of its position, but none justifies its bright-line rule.
First, the Court offers a series of hypotheticals to suggest that the term “dispatched” not only contemplates a prompt shipment, but also connotes sending the letter directly to a place where the person is likely to be physically located. Ante, at 7—8. In my opinion, these hypotheticals are inapt. The unique role of an embassy in facilitating communications between sovereign governments does not have an analog in the hypotheticals offered by the majority.1 And to the extent the statute emphasizes speed and directness, as the majority suggests, dispatching a letter to a Washington-based embassy with a direct line of communication to the foreign minister—including the ability to communicate electronically—seems at least as efficient as dispatching the letter across the globe to a foreign country, particularly if that country has recently
THOMAS, J., dissenting
experienced armed conflict or political instability.
Second, the Court notes that, under its rule, the effective date of service under
Third, the Court argues that allowing service at the embassy would make it easier to serve a foreign state than it is to serve a person in that foreign state under
B
Sudan also argues that allowing service by mail at an embassy would violate Article
THOMAS, J., dissenting
Article 22(1) of the VCDR provides that the premises of the mission—that is, “the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto . . . used for the purposes of the mission,” Art. 1(i)—“shall be inviolable.” The VCDR consistently uses the word “inviolable” to protect against physical intrusions and similar types of interference, not the jurisdiction of a court. The concept of “inviolability” is used, for instance, to protect the mission‘s “premises,” Art. 22(1); the “archives and documents of the mission,” Art. 24; the “official correspondence of the mission,” Art. 27(2); the “private residence of a diplomatic agent,” Art. 30(1); and the diplomatic agent‘s “person,” “papers, correspondence, and,” with certain exceptions, “his property,” Arts. 29, 30(2).
The provisions of the VCDR that protect against assertions of jurisdiction, by contrast, speak in terms of “immunity.” Thus, in addition to physical inviolability, the premises of the mission (and “other property thereon“) are separately “immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.” Art. 22(3). And a diplomatic agent is separately “immun[e] from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State” and, generally, from “its civil and administrative jurisdiction.” Art. 31(1). Several provisions of the VCDR distinguish between “immunity from jurisdiction, and inviolability.” Art. 38(1); see Arts. 31(1), (3).
Given the VCDR‘s consistent use of “inviolability” to protect against physical intrusions and interference, and “immunity” to protect against judicial authority, Article 22(1)‘s protection of the mission premises is best understood as a protection against the former. Thus, under the VCDR, the inviolability of the embassy‘s premises is not implicated by receipt of service papers to any greater degree than it is by receipt of other mail. Cf. Reyes v. Al-Malki, [2017] UKSC 61, ¶16 (holding that service via mail
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at the diplomatic residence—which is afforded the same level of protection as the mission premises under Article 30(1)—does not violate the VCDR).
*
Because the method of service employed by respondents here complied with the FSIA, I would affirm the judgment of the Second Circuit.