Jacqueline Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia
877 F.3d 1000
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Jacqueline Lewis, a Black female Union City detective, suffered a 2009 heart attack and was cleared to work without cardiac restrictions by her primary care physician.
- In 2010 UCPD required all officers to carry Tasers and mandated trainees receive a five‑second Taser shock as part of certification; Lewis’s doctor wrote June 15, 2010 recommending Lewis not be exposed to Tasers or OC spray because of her conditions.
- On June 17, 2010 Lewis was placed on indefinite unpaid administrative leave pending medical clearance and told to complete FMLA paperwork; she was not given a deadline for clearance or filing.
- Lewis requested to return to limited duty and to seek temporary outside work; UCPD denied return pending doctor release; Lewis’s doctor was on vacation and submitted FMLA paperwork after returning.
- Assistant Chief Brown terminated Lewis on July 8, 2010 for being ‘‘absent without leave’’ after her accrued paid leave was treated as exhausted; Lewis appealed administratively and then sued under the ADA, Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Lewis is "disabled" under the ADA | Lewis: heart condition and paroxysmal nocturnal dyspnea make her actually disabled and at least "regarded as" disabled | City: evidence insufficient to show substantial limitation of major life activities; only regarded as having a limitation to training | Court: insufficient evidence of actual disability, but sufficient evidence that employer regarded her as disabled |
| Whether Lewis is a "qualified individual" able to perform essential functions | Lewis: receiving a Taser shock is not an essential function; written job description does not require Taser/OC exposure; reasonable jury could find she is qualified | City: exposure to Tasers/OC is an essential function of a detective and certification required | Court: disputed fact whether exposure/certification is an essential function; summary judgment improper on qualification issue |
| Whether UCPD discriminated because of perceived disability (direct threat defense) | Lewis: UCPD acted because it regarded her as disabled and did not perform individualized direct‑threat assessment | City: Dr. Harris’s letter showed Lewis could not be at work safely; direct threat justified leave/termination | Court: cannot resolve direct threat defense at summary judgment because essential functions and individualized assessment are in dispute |
| Whether race/gender discrimination occurred under Title VII/§1981 | Lewis: differential treatment vs. two white male officers (longer leaves) and a circumstantial "mosaic" (timing, inconsistent reasons, pretext) supports inference of discrimination | City: comparators not similarly situated (failed fitness tests vs. weapons certification), and actions were non‑discriminatory enforcement of leave/FMLA rules | Court: genuine factual disputes exist about comparator similarity and a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence; summary judgment improper on race/gender claims against individuals but municipal §1983 liability largely dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 2012) (summary judgment standard and view evidence for nonmovant)
- Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2014) (ADA/ADAAA interpretation and scope of "substantially limits")
- Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2007) (reasonable accommodation and ADA prima facie framework)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002) (direct threat defense requires individualized medical judgment)
- Samson v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 746 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2014) (factors for determining whether a job function is essential)
- Smith v. Lockheed‑Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (surviving summary judgment via circumstantial "convincing mosaic" of discrimination evidence)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy/custom or final‑policy decision)
- Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (single decision by municipal policymakers can establish municipal liability)
- Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2013) (credibility determinations are for the jury, not the court)