Jacob Groves v. the State of Texas, 07-21-00006-CR

Background

Appellant Jacob Groves (22 at plea) was convicted by open guilty plea of aggravated sexual assault of a child for sexual activity with a 12‑year‑old; sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment.
Pretrial counsel filed a motion suggesting incompetency; a board‑certified forensic psychologist/neuropsychologist evaluated Groves and concluded he was competent to stand trial.
The trial court engaged Groves in a plea colloquy, found him competent, accepted his open plea, ordered a presentence investigation, and later imposed an 8‑year sentence.
At sentencing, family testimony described learning/processing difficulties and possible mild autism; Groves made brief, non‑specific statements about the offense in the PSI and to the evaluator.
Groves appealed raising three points: (1) trial court abused discretion by not conducting a follow‑up competency inquiry; (2) trial court denied his statutory right to allocution; and (3) unlawful/unconstitutional assessment of court costs.
The court affirmed conviction on issues (1) and (2), but sustained (3), directing entry of a corrected judgment nunc pro tunc to fix improperly assessed costs.

Issues

Issue	Appellant's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether court should have made a follow‑up competency inquiry	Evidence (evaluation ambiguities, comments by family, Groves's in‑court confusion) created some evidence of incompetency requiring further inquiry	Expert evaluation, counsel and Groves represented competency; trial court properly assessed colloquy and record; learning disabilities alone insufficient	No abuse of discretion; no further inquiry required; competency finding affirmed
Whether trial court violated Article 42.07 by denying allocution	Court failed to ask Groves if he had anything to say before pronouncing sentence; right is mandatory and waivable only	Groves did not object at trial; allocution is forfeitable without timely preservation	Claim not preserved; allocution complaint overruled
Whether court costs were unlawfully/unconstitutionally assessed	Clerk's bill of costs used 2019/2020 fee structure and included a premature $25 time‑payment fee; costs must be assessed under law at time of offense and time‑payment fee now invalid	State agreed some fees were improperly assessed under new statutes but urged inclusion of DNA fee and local sheriff fee	Sustained in part: strike/prevent premature $25 time‑payment fee; remand for corrected judgment reflecting proper costs under pre‑2020 law

Key Cases Cited

Boyett v. State, 545 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (competency standard and procedures)
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (U.S. 1975) (due‑process prohibition on trying incompetent defendants)
Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of competency determinations)
Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (no duty to revisit competency absent material change)
Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (competency inquiry framework)
McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (deference to trial court's firsthand observations)
Proenza v. State, 541 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (analysis of waivable‑only rights under preservation doctrine)
Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (preservation exceptions)
Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (two narrow categories of appellate review without preservation)
London v. State, 490 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (costs challenge preserved when costs not imposed in open court)
Alcaraz v. State, 481 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015) (DNA fee required for listed offenses)
Culley v. State, 505 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (learning disabilities alone do not establish incompetency)
Ortiz v. State, 866 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993) (same)
Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (legislatively mandated fees may be withdrawn from inmate account without oral pronouncement)
Owen v. State, 352 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011) (same principle on fees)
Dulin v. State, 583 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019) (challenge to time‑payment fee as violating separation of powers)