Lead Opinion
OPINION
Appellant, Israel Montoya Alcaraz, pleaded guilty to the offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child and possession of child pornography, without an agreed punishment recommendation from the State.
Appellant appeals both judgments, raising the same three issues in each appeal. He challenges two of the court costs assessed against him, and he requests that we reform the judgments to reflect that he had the right to appeal.
We affirm the judgments, as modified.
Right to Appeal
Here, both judgments of conviction contain the following special finding: “APPEAL WAIVED. NO PERMISSION TO APPEAL GRANTED.” In his third issue, Appellant requests that we reform the judgments to remove this special finding because he did not waive his right to appeal either judgment. The State agrees that Appellant did not waive his right to appeal in either case. The State does not oppose Appellant’s request to modify the judgment.
Supplemental' clerk’s' records,' filed in each appeal, contain certifications signed by the trial court indicating that Appellant has á right to' appeal each' judgment. The record supports the trial court’s certifications. Specifically, the record’shows that neither case was a plea-bárgaih case; there was no agreed sentencing recommendation when Appellant pleaded guilty to the offenses. ' See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The record also does not otherwise show that Appellant waived his right to appeal. See Ex parte Broadway, 801 S.W.3d 694, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (holding that “a defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive his entire appeal as a part of a plea, even when sentencing is not agreed upon, where consideration is given by the State for that waiver”), Thus, we agree with .Appellant that the judgments should be modified to delete the special finding that Appellant waived his right to appeal in each case. See French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (“[A]n appellate court has authority to reform a judgment ... to make the record speak the truth_”).
We sustain Appellant’s third issue in each appeal.
DNA-Testing Cost
In his first issue, Appellant challenges a statutorily-required fee, related to DNA testing, which was assessed aghinst him.
The clerk’s record in each case contains a bill of cost, itemizing the costs assessed against Appellant in the judgments. One of the costs listed in each judgment is a $250 “DNA-testing fee.” Appellant ac
Despite these acknowledgements, Appellant asserts that the DNA-testing fee constitutes “an unconstitutional tax.” To support this assertion, Appellant relies on this Court’s decision in Peraza v. State, 457 S.W.3d 134 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014) (“Peraza I ”). There, relying on the Court of Criminal Appeals’ analysis in Ex Parte Carson, 143 Tex. Crim. 498, 159 S.W.2d 126 (1942), the majority panel of this Court held that the same $250 DNA fee Appellant challenges here was an unconstitutional tax, making the relevant portions of Article 102.020 facially unconstitutional. See Peraza I, 457 S.W.3d at 149. However, since Appellant filed his brief in the instant appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed this Court’s decision in Peraza. See Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 521 (Tex.Crim.App.2015).' In its analysis, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the standard it had espoused in Carson, upon which this Court’s majority panel had relied. See id. at 517. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the $250 DNA fee, required to be assessed by Article 102.020, was not an unconstitutional tax, as Appellant asserts here. Id. at 515-16.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue in each appeal.
Sheriff’s Fee
In his second issue, Appellant requests this Court to modify the judgments to remove a $5 sheriffs fee that he claims has no support in the record.
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 102.011(a) provides that a defendant convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor shall pay certain fees for services performed in the case by a peace officer. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.011(a) (Vernon Supp.2014). Under this provision, a convicted defendant must pay a $5 fee when a peace officer arrests him without a warrant, and he must pay a $50 fee when a peace officer executes or processes an arrest wai’rant or capias. Id. § 102.011(a)(1), (2).
Here, each bill of costs reflects that Appellant has been charged a $5 fee for “arrest w/o warránt/cápias” and was also charged a $50 fee for “serving capias.” Appellant asserts that he could not have been arrested both with and without a wax-rant or capias. He states that it had to be one or the other.
As the State points out, Article 102.011(e) provides:
A fee under Subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this article shall be assessed on conviction, regardless of whether the defendant was also arrested at the same time for another offense, and shall be assessed for each arrest made of a defendant arising out of the offense for which the defendant has been convicted.
Id. § 102.011(e).
The record from the PST hearing indicates that, when the police attempted to execute the arrest warrants, Appellant fled in his vehicle, leading police on a twenty-mile chase. Appellant was finally arrested
We overrule Appellant’s second issue in each appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgments of the trial court, as modified.
Jennings, J., concurring.
. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021 (Vernon Supp.2014) (aggravated sexual assault of a child); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.26(a) (Vernon Supp.2014) (possession of child pornography).
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
To no one will We sell, to none will We deny or delay, right or justice.
I join the majority opinion and concur in the judgment of this Court, but write separately to explain why I must do so in light of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ recent and extraordinary holding in Pera-za v. State:
[I]f [a] statute under which court costs are assessed (or an interconnected statute) provides for an allocation of such court costs to be expended for legitimate criminal justice purposes, then the statute allows for a constitutional application that will not render the courts!’] tax gatherers in violation of the separation of powers clause. A criminal justice purpose is one that relates to the administration of our criminal justice system. Whether a criminal justice purpose is “legitimate” is a question to be answered on a statute-by-statute/case-by-case basis. ' • ■
467 S.W.3d 508, 517-18 (Tex.Crim.App.2015) (emphasis added) (overruling Ex Parte Carson, 143 Tex.Crim. 498, 159 S.W.2d 126 (1942) and Peraza v. State, 457 S.W.3d 134 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014), rev’d, 467 S.W.3d 508 (Tex.Crim.App.2015)).
In so holding, the court' of criminal appeals :expressly and specifically “rejected]” its long-standing- “requirement that, in order to pass constitutional muster, [a] statutorily prescribed court cost must be ‘necessary’ or ‘incidental’ to the ‘trial- of a criminal «ease.’ ” Id. at 517 (quoting Carson, 159 S.W.2d at 130). In Peraza, the court recognized that, given the express language' of the Separation of Powers Provision of the Texas - Constitution,
However, the court of criminal appeals then decided to change the meaning of the words ’ “court costs” from their “common[ ]” and “easily understood” definition to something other than what they actually mean: actual and real “court costs,” i.e., “cost[s] ‘necessary’ and ‘incidental’ to the ‘trial of a criminal case.’ ” See id. at 517 (quoting Carson, 159 SW.2d at 130). In other words, because the court found the actual definition of “court costs” to be “too limiting” for its purposes, the court judicially created a new definition for these
Using its newly created definitions, the Texas -Court of Criminal Appeals then reasons .that Texas’s Legislative Department of . Government
Réspectfully, the attempt by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to change the meaning of the words “court costs” defies logic and renders the words “court costs” meaningless. 'And the court’s holding, in regard to defendants 'in' criminal cases, nullifies both the Separation of Powers Provision
First, the court of criminal appeals’' attempt to change the meaning of the “easily understood” words “court costs” simply because it finds then actual meaning “too limiting” for its purposes-is patently unreasonable. As emphasized by D.Q. Mclnerny:
Being logical presupposes our having a sensitivity to language and a knack for its effective use, for logic and language are inseparable. It also presupposes our having a healthy respect for the firm factualness of the world in which-we live, for logic is about reality. Finally, being logical presupposes a lively awareness of how the facts that are our ideas relate to the facts that are the objects in the world, for logic is about truth.
D. Q, McInerny, Being Logical, A Guide to Good Thinking 3 (2005) (emphasis added).
Before the court of criminal appeals’ recent attempt to change their actual and real meaning, the words “court costs” have
And the court of criminal appeals’ previous and long-held understanding of the words “court costs,” prior to its opinion in Peraza, was in accord with the Texas Supreme Court’s understanding:
“[Cjourt costs,” [are] defined by Black’s Law Dictionary to include [t]he charges or fees taxed by the court,, such as filing fees, jury fees, courthouse fees, and reporter fees, or to litigation costs, like [t]he expenses of litigation, prosecution, or other legal transaction, especially] those allowed in favor of one party against the other_ “Costs,” when used in legal proceedings, refer not just to any expense, but to those paid to courts or their officers— and costs generally do not include attorney’s fees. As we have recognized for decades, the term costs is generally understood [to mean] the fees or compensation fixed by law collectible by the officers of court, witnesses, and such like items, and does not ordinarily include attorney’s fees which are recoverable only by virtue of contract or statute.
In re Nalle Plastics Family Ltd. P’ship, 406 S.W.3d 168, 175 (Tex.2013) (third, fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original)-(emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Moreover, the legislature itself, in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, has explained that, in a civil case, a judge may include in any order or judgment all “court costs,” including the following:
(1) fees of the clerk and service fees due the county;
(2) fees of the court reporter for the original of stenographic transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the suit;
(3) masters, interpreters, and guardians ■ ad litem appointed pursuant to these rules and state statutes; and
' (4) such other costs and fees as may be permitted by these rules and state statutes.
Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 31.007(b) (Vernon 2015).
Second, in regard to the Separation of Powers Provision of the Texas Constitution,
Our Separation of Powers Provision explicitly states:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.
Id. art. II, § 1 (emphasis added). Under the express language of this provision, the Judicial Department of Government absolutely may not exercise any powers that belong to the Executive or Legislative Departments of Government and those departments may not force the Judicial Department to do so.
In Carson, the court of criminal appeals considered the issue of whether it was constitutionally permissible to impose a $1 fee as a court cost in all cases filed in counties with more than eight district courts or more than three county courts at law. 159 S.W.2d at 127. The revenue collected from' the $1 fee was directed to the “County Law Library Fund” and “available to be used for certain' costs and expenses in'acquiring, maintaining and operating a law library available to the judges of the courts and to the attorneys of litigants in the courts.” ' Id. (internal quotations omitted). The court held that the fee constituted an unconstitutional tax, not a legitimate court cost, because it was “neither necessary nor incidental to the trial of a criminal case.” Id. at 127, 130.
The court’s reasoning and holding in Cdrson were in harmony with the express language of our Separation of Powers Provision that “no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these depart
Under our constitution, “[t]he judicial power of th[e] State” is “vested” in our constitutionally established courts. Id. art. V, § 1. And our judiciary, as a separate, co-equal department of government, acts as a check on the power of the other departments, safeguarding the rule of law and ensuring public justice through an independent, fair, and competent application of the law for the resolution of disputes. Simply put, judges are not tax collectors, and the Texas Legislature may not legally make them into such to fund the needs of the Executive Department.
Regardless, the court of criminal appeals, in “rejecting]” its long-standing “requirement that, in order to pass constitutional muster, the statutorily prescribed court cost must be ‘necessary* or ‘incidental’ to the ‘trial of a criminal case,” ’ found that although the words “ ‘necessary’ and ‘incidental’ are commonly used and easily understood,” “they are too limiting.” Per-aza, 467 S.W.3d at 517 (emphasis added) (quoting Carson, 159 S.W.2d at 130). And without citation to authority, it opined that since Carson, “the prosecution of criminal cases and our criminal justice system have greatly evolved” and the “legislature has
developed statutorily, prescribed court costs mth the intention of reimbursing the judicial system for costs incurred in the administration of the criminal justice system.” Id. (emphasis added). Based on these premises, the court concluded: ■
To require such costs tb be ‘necessary* or ‘incidental’ to the, "trial óf a criminal case in order to .b.e constitutionally valid ignores the legitimacy of costs that, although not necessary to, or an incidental expense of, the actual trial of a criminal case, may nevertheless .be directly related to the recoupment of costs of judicial resources expended in connection with ■ the prosecution of criminal cases within our criminal justice system.
Id. (emphasis added).
Respectfully, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ reasoning and holding in Per-aza, unlike that in Carson, directly conflicts with the express language of our Separation of Powers Provision that “no person,, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others.” Tex. Const, art, II, § 1. And, by allowing Texas’s Legislative Department to use the Judicial Department to collect monies from criminal defendants for purposes “not necessary to, or an incidental expense of, the actual trial of a criminal ease,” the court of criminal appeals has failed in its duty to act as a check on the power of the legislature. See Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 517.
Although the money and resources needed to finance the machinery of Texas’s “criminal. justice system,” the bulk of which consists of the Executive Department’s law enforcement agencies, i.e., police, prosecutors, and jails and prisons,
Third and most important, in regard to the Open Courts Provision of the Texas Constitution,
Specifically, our Open Courts Provision provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,. nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, • goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. 1
Tex. Const, art. I, § 13 (emphasis added). And the' provision “guarantees all litigants the right to redress their grievances—to use a popular and correct phrase, the right to their day in court.” LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 341 (emphasis added).
Because this right, is a “substantial” constitutional right, “the legislature cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably interfere with a litigant’s right of access to the courts.” Id. Thus, to determine whether a statute passed by the Texas Legislature violates the Open Courts Provision, a court must balance “the legislature’s actu.al purpose in enacting [the] law against that law’s interference with the individual’s right of access to the courts.” Id. And the state bears the burden of “show[ing] that the legislative purpose outweighs the interference with the individual’s right of access.” Id. Notably, in Peraza, the court of criminal, appeals did not apply this test, and, as illustrated in LeCroy, the state cannot meet its burden.
In LeCroy, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether a filing fee that goes to state general revenues is an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with the right of access to the court.” Id. As noted by the' supreme court:
The major-defect with the filing fee is that it is a general revenue tax on, the right to litigate: the money goes to other statewide programs besides the judiciary..
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the court held that “filing- fees that go to state general revenues—in other words taxes on the right to litigate that pay for other pro
Court filing fees and taxes may be imposed only for purposes relating to the operation and,. maintenance of the courts .... [For example,] [d]issolution-of-marriage petitioners should not be required as a condition to filing, to support a general welfare program that relates neither to their litigation nor to the court system. If the right to obtain justice freely is to be a meaningful guarantee, it must preclude the legislature from raising general revenue through charges assessed to those who would utilize our courts.
Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and, citations omitted).
In response to the State’s argument that “a tax on individual litigants is reasonable as long as the amount raised for general revenues is less than the amount spent from general revenues on the judiciary,” the supreme court noted that such an argument utilizes “the wrong perspective: a societal perspective.” Id. Instead, it explained that “[w]hen individual rights guaranteed by the state constitution are involved, an individual rights perspective [must be] used." Id. (emphasis added). And from that perspective, “litigants [are required to] pay a tax for general welfare programs as a condition to being allowed their right of access to the courts. This [is precisely what] the [0]pen [C]ourts [Provision prohibits.” Id.
In the present case, the Texas Legislature has dedicated thirty-five percent of the $250 DNA Record Fee challenged by appellant, Isreal Montoya Alcaraz, to the state highway fund, with the remaining sixty-five percent dedicated to the general revenue fund of the state’s criminal justice planning account. See Tex. Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 102.020(h). As previously noted by this Court, the DNA Record Fee, collected by Texas courts from criminal defendants, does not relate to the trial of a defendant’s criminal case. See Peraza, 457 S.W.3d at 141-50. In fact, the DNA Record Fee, dedicated to statewide programs outside of the judiciary, actually has nothing to do with, the, operation and maintenance of Texas’s courts. See id. Like the filing fee in LeCroy, the DNA Record Fee challenged here is nothing more than a general revenue tax on the right to one’s .day in court and is, thus, an unconstitutional imposition on an individual’s constitutional right of access to the courts. See LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 341.
Notably, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ attempt to alter the meaning of the words “court costs” to accommodate the DNA Record Fee does not change the reality that the monies collected through this fee actually “go for non-court related purposes” in direct violation of the Texas Constitution’s Open Courts Provision. Id. at 342; see also Tex. Const, art. I, § 13. Simply put, there is no way, in intellectual honesty, to reconcile the court of criminal appeals’ remarkable holding in Peraza with our Open Courts Provision and the well-established precedent of the Texas Supreme Court in LeCroy.
When the legislature oversteps its bounds and passes a law that violates the Texas Constitution, there is no shame in a Texas court saying so. As Justice Franklin Spears wrote:
[The legislature may not] force the judiciary into the role of a subordinate and supplicant governmental service—in ef-*723 feet, a mere agency. . The judiciary is not an agency, but is a constitutionally established separate, equal and independent branch of government.
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... The judicial power provides a cheek on the abuse of authority by other governmental branches. If the courts are to provide that check, they cannot be subservient to the other branches of government but must ferociously shield their ability to judge independently and fairly. This is the essence of our very existence; we owe the people of Texas no less than our unflinching insistence on a true tripartite government. It is the responsibility of this court to preserve this constitutional framework.
... The judiciary may often be denominated-as the “third” branch of government, but that does not m'ean it is third in importance; it is in reality one of three equal branches. As such, the judiciary is an integral part of our government and cannot be impeded in its function _
Mays v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 755 S.W.2d 78, 80-81 (Tex.1988) (Spears, J., concurring) (footnotes and internal quotations omitted). .
Indeed, Texas courts have “the power and duty to protect” -the constitutionally “guaranteed rights of all Texans.” LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d‘at 339 (emphasis added); see also Tex. Const, art. ,V, § 1. If lawyers and judges want to preserve , and protect the 800-year-old legacy of Magna Carta, we must be ever vigilant in the performance of our duties as stewards and “guardians of the law.”
In sum, the attempt by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Peraza, to change the meaning of the words “court costs” to accommodate the challenged DNA Record Fee defies logic and renders the words meaningless. And the court’s holding that the Texas Legislature may now use the judiciary to collect monies from defendants in criminal cases to fund “the administration of our criminal justice system,” which now apparently includes the state.highway fund, by Texas’s Executive Department nullifies both the Separation of Powers and Open Courts Provisions of the Texas Constitution. Moreover, requiring criminal defendants to pay a tax on their right to be heard according to law, is not just unseemly, but, as noted, by the Texas Supreme Court, violates the fundamental principle of the Magna Carta that “To no one will We sell, to none will We deny or delay, right or justice.”
For these reasons,-1 respectfully request that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals Overrule its holding in Peraza and reinstate its holding in Carson,
Until the court of criminal appeals corrects its holding in Peraza, or the United States Supreme ■ Court overrules it, this Court, as an intermediate court of appeals, however, is bound to follow Péraza, no matter how erroneous the reasoning expressed therein. See State ex reí. Vanee v. Clawson, 465 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex.Crim. App.1971) (“The Court of Criminal Ap-péals is the court of last resort in this state in' criminal matters. This being so, no other court of this state has authority to overrule or circumvent its decisions, or disobey its mandates.” (internal quotations omitted)); Lewis v. State, 448 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref d) (“We are bound in criminal cases- to follow decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeals.”).
Accordingly, I must reluctantly concur in the judgment of this Court.
. Magna Carta, ch. 40, in A.E. Dick Howard, Magna Carta: Text & Commentary 45 (1964).
. Tex. Const, art. II, § 1.
. See id. art. V; see also id. art. II, § 1 (dividing ”[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Texas .., into three distinct departments,” including Judicial Department).
. See id. art. Ill; see also id. art, II, § 1 (dividing ‘‘[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Texas ... into three distinct departments;” including Legislative Department). ■,
, See id. art. IV; see also id. art, II, § 1 (dividing "[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Texas ... into three distinct departments,” including Executive Department),
. See id. art. II, § 1.
.' See id. art. I, § 13.
. See also Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v: Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., No. 03-10-00826-CV, 2014 WL 6705741, at *4 (Tex. App.-Austin Nov. 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Under the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, taxable court costs include clerk fees and service fees due the county, which include, for example, filing fees, service fees, jury fees,- and subpoena fees. Statutorily allowed costs also include court reporter fees for original stenographic transcripts. Thus, Texas courts have held that expenses related to depositions, including a deposition on written questions, are taxable court costs. The costs for video depositions or copies of depositions .or transcripts, however, are not recoverable as court costs.” (internal .citations omitted)); Allen v. Crabtree, 936 S,W.2d 6, 8 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) (“Both the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure specify items recoverable as costs. The Civil Practice and Remedies Code lists the following items a court may include in awarding costs: (1) fees of the clerk and service fees due the county; (2) fees of the court reporter for the original of stenographic transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the suit; (3) masters, inter
. See Tex Const, art. II, § 1
. The Comptroller of Public Accounts, firmly established under the Texas Constitution in the '.‘Executive Department” of our state government, is the state’s chief tax collector. See id. art. IV, §§ 1, 23 (establishing Comptroller of Public. Accounts as an officer of Executive Department).
. In 1945, three years after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided Ex parte Carson, 143 Tex.Crim. 498, 159 S.W.2d 126 (1942), Texas's prison-inmate population was 3,270, Paul M. Lucko, Prison System, in 5 The New Handbook o.f Tex. 341, 343 (Ron Tyler et al, eds., 1996). In 2014, it was 166,043, more than any other state in the country. E. Ann Cárson, Prisoners'in 2014, U.S; Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics 3 (Sept.2015), http://www. bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pl4.pdf. And United States Senator John Cornyn has noted that although the federal-prison population, from 1940 through 1980, was stable at approximately 24,000 inmates, today there are oyer 200,000 men and women in federal prison, John Comyn & Sheldon Whitehouse, How to Cut Crime and S'dve Money, CNN.Com (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:50 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 2015/10/21/opinions/cornyn-whitehouse-criminal-justice-reform/.
Indeed, noting" that'“our prisons are overcrowded” and our criminal justice system “often perpetuates a vicious cycle in which prisoners are released unprepared to succeed,” Senator Comyn has recently introduced "historic bipartisan legislation to reform our nation’s criminal justice system”— the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015. Id.; see also Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015, S. 2123, 114th Cong. (2015).
As of 2010, the United States was spending more than $80 billion on criminal corrections expenditures at federal, state, and local levels. Melissa S. Kearney et al, Ten Economic Facts about Crime and Incarceration in the United States, The Hamilton Project 2, 13 (May 2014), http ://www.brooldngs. edu/~/media/research/ files/papers/2014/05/01% 20crime% 20facts/ v8_thp_10criméf acts .pdf (noting "more than 90 percent” of $80 billion corrections expenditures ”occur[ed] at state and local levels”); Aimee Picchi, The High Price of Incarceration in America, CBSNews.Com (May 8, 2014, 5:53 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-high-price-of-americas-incarceration-80-billion/ (explaining United States spent more than $80 billion on corrections expenditures at federal, state, and local levels in 2010); see also Matt Vespa, Our Ruinously Expensive Criminal Justice System, Townhall.com (July 17, 2015), http://townhall.com/tipsheeV mattvespa/2015/07/17/criminal-justice-event-n 2026028 (noting "our criminal justice system has seen an explosion in government spending on the federal level amounting to an 800 percent increase”). And one study has found that "[cjrime-related expenditures generate a significant strain on state and federal budgets” and "[tjoday’s high rate of incarceration .is considerably costly .., with state governments bearing the bulk of the fiscal burden." Kearney et al., supra, at 12-13 (emphasis added). ■
For instance, in 2012, Texas spent $50.04 per person, per day to incarcerate an individual in a Texas prison. See Legislative Budget Bd„ Criminal Justice Uniform Cost Report, Fiscal Years 2010 to 2012 8 (Jan.2013), http://www. lbb.state.tx.us/Public_Safety_Criminal_Justice/ Uniform_Cost/Criminal% 20Justice% 20Uni-form% 20Cost% 20Report% 20Fiscal% 20Years% 202010% 20to% 202012.pdf. At that time, there were approximately 137,095 individuals incarcerated in Texas prisons, meaning the state was paying $6,860,233.80 per- day to imprison these individuals. See id.; Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”), Fiscal Year 2012 Statistical Report 1, http:// www.tdcj.state.tx.us /documents/Statisti-caLReport_FY2012.pdf.
According to Houston Police Department Chief Charles McClelland, one reason for the explosion in government spending on our criminal justice system is “mandatory sentencing laws for minor crime offenses, drug offenses, for people who are really not the greatest threat to community safety.” St. John Barned-Smith, HPD’s Chief Seeks Reform, Hous. Chron., Nov, 22, 2015, at Bl. The prosecution of such cases requires "massive amounts of law enforcement resources.”- Id. For example, of the 137,095 individuals in Texas prisons in 2012, 20,313 of them were incarcerated for drug-related offenses, approximately fifty-one percent of which were possession-only drug offensés. See TDCJ, supra, at 1, 9 (10,331 individuals incarcerated in Texas prisons in 2012 for possession-only drug offenses). Thus, based on these figures, Texas, in 2012, spent $516,963.24 per day to incarcerate individuals in Texas prisons for possession-only offenses. S<?e Legislative Budget Bd„ supra, at 8; TDCJ, supra, at 9. And this amount does not include the $144,658.80 also spent per day by the state to incarcerate individuals in Téxas state jails for possession-only drug offenses. See Legislative Budget Bd., supra, at 8 (costs state $42.90 per person, per day to incarcerate individual in Texas
, Tex. Const, art. I, § 13.
. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct preamble ¶ 1, reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Vernon 2013). Judges must always "comply with the law” and “accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.” Tex. Code Jud. Conduct, Canons 2(A), 3(B)(8), reprinted in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B (Vernon 2013).
. Magna Carta, supra note 1, at 45.
. In Peraza, the court of criminal appeals, criticized, as being "a reductio ad absurdum argument,” its previous explanation in Carson
We continue to hold, as we did in Weir, that court costs should be related to the recoupment of costs of judicial resources. However, we must revisit whether Carson’s requirement—that such costs be "necessary" and "incidental” to the trial of a criminal case—is still a proper standard for assess-ing whether a court cost assessed against a criminal defendant is constitutionally valid. The terms “necessary” and "incidental” are commonly used and easily understood words; however, we find that they are too limiting to continue to be the litmus test. In the 73-years since Carson was decided, the prosecution of criminal'cases and our criminal justice system have greatly evolved. Our legislature has developed 'Statutorily prescribed court costs with the intention of reimbursing the judicial system for costs incurred in the administration of the criminal justice system. To require such costs to be "necessary” or "incidental” to the trial of a criminal case in order to be constitutionally valid ignores the legitimacy of costs that, although not necessary to, or an incidental expense of, the actual trial of a criminal case, may nevertheless be directly related to the recoupment of costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the prosecution of criminal cases within our criminal justice system.
We therefore reject Carson's requirement that, in order to pass constitutional muster, the. statutorily prescribed court cost must be "necessary” or "incidental” to the "trial of a criminal case.” We hold that, if the statute under which court costs are assessed (or an..interconnected statute) provides for an allocation of such court costs to be expended for legitimate criminal justice purposes, then' the statute allows for a constitutional application that will not render the courts tax gatherers in violation of the separation of powers clause. A criminal justice purpose is one that relates to the administration of our criminal justice system. Whether a'driminal justice purpose is "legitimate” is a question to be answered on a statute-by-statute/case-by-case basis.
Peraza, 467 S.W,3d at 517-18 (footnotes omitted). In fact, by redefining the words "court costs” to include monies dedicated to the state highway fund and the general revenue fund of the state’s criminal justice account, the Court in Peraza very well proves the point that it had previously made in Carson.