Jackson v. State State v. Powell, 300 A.3d 169

Three co-defendants (Powell, Jackson, Henry) were indicted and their cases consolidated; counsel appeared April 2, 2021 and the 180‑day Hicks deadline was October 25, 2021.
On June 4, 2021 the court scheduled trials: Powell/Henry were set for October 26 after defense counsel rejected several earlier October dates due to a scheduling conflict; later that morning Jackson’s counsel asked to set Jackson’s case with the others and the court set Jackson for October 26 as well.
Jackson appeared later that day; the trial date had already been set and she acknowledged the October 26 date when the court recalled bench warrants.
No administrative-judge “good cause” finding was made for a post‑Hicks date; on October 26 the State sought a continuance and the defendants moved to dismiss for a Hicks violation; the circuit court dismissed all three indictments.
The Appellate Court affirmed dismissal for Powell (finding no express consent) and reversed dismissal for Jackson (finding express consent); the Maryland Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Appellate Court as to Powell (finding counsel’s conduct tantamount to seeking a post‑Hicks date), and affirmed as to Jackson but on the ground that her counsel — not Jackson herself — sought the post‑Hicks date.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Did Powell’s counsel, by conduct at the scheduling hearing, seek a trial date beyond the Hicks date?	State: Counsel rejected earlier October dates and thus manifested intent to obtain a later date; conduct equals seeking a post‑Hicks date.	Powell: Silence/absence of an express statement and lack of knowledge of the Hicks date means no seeking or express consent.	Held: Yes — counsel’s rejection of earlier compliant dates was tantamount to seeking a post‑Hicks date; dismissal improper (Appellate Court reversed).
Did Jackson herself expressly consent to the October 26 (post‑Hicks) trial date?	State: Jackson’s on‑the‑record “Twenty sixth, okay” was express consent.	Jackson: That reply was an acknowledgment after the date had already been set; not an affirmative, informed consent.	Held: No — Jackson’s statement was acknowledgement, not express consent.
Did Jackson’s counsel, by words and conduct at the scheduling hearing, seek a trial date beyond the Hicks date?	State: Counsel pushed to schedule Jackson with co‑defendants already set for October 26 and thus sought a post‑Hicks date.	Jackson: Counsel did not expressly agree to or push for a post‑Hicks date; counsel only noted she would not try the case.	Held: Yes — counsel’s active participation in scheduling and encouragement to set the date with the co‑defendants was tantamount to seeking a post‑Hicks date; dismissal improper.

State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 (1979) (establishes mandatory 180‑day rule and the "seeks or expressly consents" exception)
Lattisaw v. State, 48 Md. App. 20 (1981) (defense counsel’s affirmative "set it in" consent found to satisfy exception)
Farinholt v. State, 299 Md. 32 (1984) (defense attorney both sought postponement and expressly consented to post‑Hicks date)
State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651 (1986) (written, unqualified consent precludes dismissal; rejects conventional waiver framing)
Goins v. State, 293 Md. 97 (1982) (dilatory or procedural defenses do not automatically constitute seeking or express consent)
State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422 (1984) (mere silence or failure to object ordinarily does not trigger the exception)
Dorsey v. State, 349 Md. 688 (1998) (deliberate conduct producing nonappearance was tantamount to seeking a post‑Hicks date)
Pennington v. State, 299 Md. 23 (1984) (fact‑specific analysis: timing of postponement request matters to seeking inquiry)
Timberlake v. State, 257 Md. App. 129 (2023) (declined an administrative judge’s offer to move trial within Hicks and was found to have consented)
Tunnell v. State, 466 Md. 565 (2020) (overview of Hicks purpose and limits; encourages common‑sense application of the rule)