Jackson v. New York State, 523 F. App'x 67

Plaintiff-appellant Dona J. Jackson, proceeding pro se, sued New York State and related defendants in the Western District of New York for civil rights violations.
The district court dismissed some claims as precluded by claim preclusion (res judicata) based on an earlier Axsmith action in which Jackson’s claims were dismissed for failure to prosecute.
The Axsmith action involved Jackson’s arrest and related events including aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, subsequent arrests for criminal contempt, involuntary psychiatric transfer, and entry of a defendant into her home in May 2000.
The district court held that the related July 2001 arrest and May 2001 arrest (arising from the earlier criminal contempt proceedings) were also precluded.
For remaining claims (primarily those arising from a September 2000 traffic stop), the court evaluated statute of limitations and continuing violation theories.
The court concluded that Jackson’s continuing violation theory did not apply and that prior events were time-barred except for certain September 2000 stop claims, which were deemed inadequately pled.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are Jackson’s claims barred by claim preclusion?	Jackson argues the prior Axsmith action does not preclude new claims against different defendants.	Defendants contend the Axsmith judgment bars later claims involving the same cause of action and related parties.	Yes; claims arising from the same group of facts are precluded.
Does continuing violation apply to preclude time-barred claims?	Jackson asserts a continuing violation policy renders some actions timely.	Defendants argue the alleged actions are discrete and not part of a non-time-barred ongoing policy.	No; continuing violation doctrine does not apply; time-bar applies to pre-May 9, 2000 events.
Are the September 2000 traffic stop claims plausibly pled under Rule 12(b)(6)?	Jackson contends the stop violated rights and is plausibly alleged.	Defendants assert the stop was lawful and the complaint lacks non-conclusory facts of illegality.	Claims regarding the September 2000 stop are not plausibly pled.
Should Jackson’s recusal and related relief motions be granted?	Jackson requests recusal and sanctions against court officers.	Defendants urge denial due to lack of substantiated wrongdoing.	Motions denied; sanctions possible for frivolous filings; Clerk has no adjudicative role.

J.S. v. T’Kach, 714 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2013) (established standard for reviewing Rule 12(b)(6) and plausibility)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (S. Ct. 2007) (plausibility standard for pleading)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (S. Ct. 2009) (pleading must show facial plausibility)
Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 2007) (judicial notice can be considered on motion to dismiss)
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d 359 (2d Cir. 1995) (privity-based preclusion doctrine)
Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 691 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2012) (claim preclusion framework in the Second Circuit)
Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1999) (continuing violation doctrine doctrine overview)
In re Smith, 645 F.3d 186 (2d Cir. 2011) (sanctions and procedural conduct guidance)
Richardson Greenshields Sec., Inc. v. Lau, 825 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1987) (litigation conduct and sanctions considerations)
In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 1993) (court authority to restrict filings)
Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2008) (continuing jurisdiction and pleading standards)
In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2008) (interpretation of court decisions and related rules)