Jackson v. District of Columbia, 826 F. Supp. 2d 109

AJP, a child with moderate to severe physical disabilities and developmental delays, is entitled to special education services under IDEIA.
DCPS developed an initial IEP in 2004; in 2005 a placement change to a citywide autism program at Barnard and a reclassification to autistic occurred against Ms. Jackson's wishes.
Judge Urbina issued a 2005 stay-put order and later rulings requiring DCPS to fund services under the 2004 IEP, which were subsequently set aside in 2009.
From 2005–2009, Ms. Jackson withdrew AJP from DCPS and engaged in homeschooling, with limited contact between DCPS and AJP during that period.
In 2009–2010, DCPS updated AJP’s evaluations and, following MDT/IEP proceedings, placed him at Tyler Elementary with a new IEP; Jackson challenged this placement and related services.
Jackson I and Jackson II were filed challenging the IEP/placement decisions and seeking relief including stay-put, compensatory education, and private placement; the courts granted partial dismissal and ordered further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether stay-put claim is barred by res judicata	Jackson seeks stay-put relief based on the 2005 order.	Judge Urbina’s 2005 order was set aside; the stay-put claim was finalized previously.	Barred by res judicata
Whether IDEA-based §1983 claim survives	IDEA violations with municipal policy support §1983 claim for relief.	Plaintiff fails to plead policy, exceptional circumstances, or inadequacy of IDEA remedies.	Dismissed for failure to state a §1983 claim
Whether §504 claim survives	DCPS discriminated against AJP under §504 due to placement and lack of proper services.	§504 requires more than IDEIA failure; no discriminatory treatment shown.	Dismissed for failure to state a §504 claim
Whether ADA claim survives	DCPS denied benefits to AJP because of disability under ADA.	Plaintiff failed to show discrimination by reason of disability; IDEIA issues alone are insufficient.	Dismissed for lack of ADA discrimination showing
Whether Counts II–VI in Jackson II are viable or duplicative	Counts II–VI articulate related theories of IDEA/504/ADA violations and remedies.	Counts II–VI are duplicative or fail to state claims; Rhee is not a proper party.	Counts II–VI dismissed; Rhee properly dismissed

Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (IEP as centerpiece of IDEA; requires meaningful educational plan)
Lesesne v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (IEP relevance to FAPE and evaluation timing)
Walker v. District of Columbia, 157 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2001) (Section 504 requires bad faith or gross misjudgment for IDEA-relating claims)
R.S. v. District of Columbia, 292 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2003) (Section 504/IDEA interplay and standards for state actions)
Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Need for factual basis to support §1983 claims against municipal entities)
Shelton v. Maya Angelou Public Charter School, 656 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2009) (IDEA-based §1983 claims require showing of custom or policy and inadequate remedies)
Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1982) (Early framework for §504 bad faith/gross misjudgment standard)
Alston v. District of Columbia, 770 F. Supp. 2d 289 (D.D.C. 2011) (ADA claims require discrimination by reason of disability beyond IDEIA)
Johnson v. District of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002) (IDEA violations as predicate for §1983 claims)
Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (Plausibility standard for pleading)