J. Stacey v. Sally Jewell
692 F. App'x 363
9th Cir.2017Background
- Appellants sought to locate and mine a stone called PR 16 graywacke ("Spencer Stone") on public land and claimed it was a locatable (valuable) mineral deposit.
- The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) found PR 16 graywacke to be a common stone comparable to armor stone and initiated proceedings to invalidate the mining claim; the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) affirmed.
- The BLM established a prima facie case by showing PR 16 graywacke is stone, is comparable to other materials sold for common uses (armor stone, riprap, filter stone), and commands no premium price.
- Appellants attempted to rebut by arguing PR 16 graywacke is an uncommon variety with distinct properties and should be compared to a different class of stone; they relied on McClarty’s five-factor test for uncommon variety minerals.
- The IBLA concluded Appellants failed to prove distinct and special value or a market premium; the district court affirmed, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed under the limited substantial-evidence/arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the IBLA: the BLM made a prima facie case, the IBLA’s comparison to armor stone was appropriate, Appellants failed rebuttal, and application of the 2003 regulatory test was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether BLM established a prima facie case that PR 16 graywacke is not locatable | Bledsoe/claimant: BLM failed to address McClarty factors and miscompared the stone | BLM: Prima facie test requires showing stone status, comparable common-variety use, and lack of higher-value use | Held: BLM met prima facie standard; IBLA decision supported by substantial evidence |
| Proper comparison class for determining uncommon variety (what to compare PR 16 to) | Claimant: Compare to common building stones (not armor stone) to show unique properties | IBLA/BLM: Compare to its common-use class (armor stone) per Ninth Circuit precedent | Held: Comparison to armor stone appropriate and consistent with precedent |
| Whether Appellants rebutted prima facie case under McClarty five-factor test | Claimant: PR 16 has unique physical properties and commands higher market price | IBLA/BLM: Record shows no unique market premium or uncommon use; bids show prices at or below armor stone average | Held: Appellants failed to show distinct/special value or higher market price |
| Validity and applicability of 2003 BLM rule (43 C.F.R. § 3830.12(b)) versus 1962 rule | Claimant: 2003 rule invalid or inapplicable | BLM: 2003 rule in effect and codified existing IBLA/McClarty standard | Held: Applying 2003 rule was proper and did not alter substantive legal standard; challenges to rule untimely |
Key Cases Cited
- Hjelvik v. Babbitt, 198 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) (standard of review for IBLA decisions; review for arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence)
- Rodgers v. Watt, 726 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1984) (government bears initial burden to make prima facie case invalidating mining claim)
- Brubaker v. Morton, 500 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1974) (compare disputed mineral to similarly supplied stones used for same common purpose)
- Boyle v. Morton, 519 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1975) (comparison should be to similar decorative or use-specific stone, not broad classes)
- McClarty v. Sec’y of Interior, 408 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1969) (five-factor test for determining whether a mineral is an uncommon variety)
- Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (U.S. 1974) (agency rule in effect at time of decision may be applied)
- Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1991) (statute-of-limitations principles for challenging agency rules)