J.S. v. D.S., 150 A.3d 10

Plaintiff (wife) obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act against defendant (husband) and sought a final restraining order (FRO).
At the final hearing the parties reached a settlement: defendant would get exclusive possession of the marital home and defendant would consent to an FRO.
The judge swore both parties, confirmed they voluntarily consented, and entered the FRO without eliciting testimony describing any act of domestic violence or having defendant admit to committing such an act.
Defendant appealed, arguing the FRO was void because the court made no factual findings that domestic violence occurred or that plaintiff needed protection.
After the parties tried to dismiss the appeal and keep the FRO in effect as part of their settlement, the appellate court declined to dismiss and instead considered the merits due to public-policy concerns about FROs.
The appellate court vacated the FRO, reinstated the TRO, and remanded for a proper final hearing with factual findings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an FRO may be entered without a factual foundation or judicial finding of domestic violence	Plaintiff consented to the FRO as part of a negotiated settlement; entry by consent is permissible	FRO is void because judge did not take testimony, find violence occurred, or determine plaintiff needed protection	Court held FRO may not be entered by mere consent; must have factual foundation and judicial findings, so vacated FRO
Whether appellate court should dismiss appeal due to parties’ stipulation to dismiss and preserve FRO	Parties asked dismissal to honor their settlement and stop litigation	Defendant had appealed; public interest requires review of potential void FRO	Court exercised discretion not to dismiss; reviewed merits because of public-policy interests in DV orders
Whether parties can use FRO as bargaining chip in matrimonial settlements	Plaintiff: settlement resolves disputes; continuation of FRO was mutual compromise	Use of FRO as bargaining chip is impermissible; courts must scrutinize dismissals/agreements	Court emphasized public policy bars treating FROs as bargaining chips and required court inquiry into voluntariness and consequences
Remedy when FRO lacks factual findings	Plaintiff: maintain FRO per settlement	Defendant: vacate FRO and remand for hearing	Court vacated FRO, reinstated TRO, remanded for a final hearing; did not retain jurisdiction

State v. D.G.M., 439 N.J. Super. 630 (App. Div. 2015) (discussing requirements for entry of domestic violence restraints)
Franklin v. Sloskey, 385 N.J. Super. 534 (App. Div. 2006) (FRO may not be entered by consent without factual foundation)
Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465 (1990) (public policy favors settlement but courts retain oversight)
Jannarone v. W.T. Co., 65 N.J. Super. 472 (App. Div. 1961) (settlement recognized in public policy context)
State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147 (2003) (judicial role beyond mere referee in certain contexts)
State v. Brito, 345 N.J. Super. 228 (App. Div. 2001) (state interest in enforcement of FROs)
Leeds v. Harrison, 9 N.J. 202 (1952) (may v. must regarding court discretion to dismiss appeals)
Kanaszka v. Kunen, 313 N.J. Super. 600 (App. Div. 1998) (court must ensure dismissal is knowing and voluntary)
Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006) (FRO necessary to protect plaintiff from immediate danger or prevent further abuse)