J.S. Ex Rel. J.S. v. Houston County Board of Education, 877 F.3d 979

Background

J.S., an elementary student with severe physical and cognitive disabilities, had IEPs placing him 80% in regular class and 20% in special education, with a paraprofessional (Faircloth) assigned to assist him.
Beginning in third grade, Faircloth frequently removed J.S. from his regular classroom and brought him to the school weight room, where J.S. often was isolated from peers and sometimes did classwork alone.
Teachers, coaches, and a student witnessed or reported the removals; Brown (special-education teacher) told Principal Smith at least once to stop it, but Faircloth continued; student recordings later suggested verbal/possible physical abuse by Faircloth and Brown.
Faircloth resigned after investigation; Brown’s contract was not renewed; J.S. settled claims against the employees and sued the Houston County Board of Education under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The district court granted summary judgment to the School Board, concluding the removal claim was an IDEA/FAPE issue and that the Board lacked notice of possible abuse; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether removal from regular class states ADA/§504 discrimination or only an IDEA/FAPE claim	J.S.: removal and isolation were disability-based discrimination (stigma, lost interaction) cognizable under ADA/§504	School Board: dispute is an IDEA FAPE claim; ADA/§504 require more than IEP noncompliance	Court: removal can support an ADA/§504 intentional discrimination claim (Olmstead principle); not limited to IDEA relief
Whether School Board can be liable via deliberate indifference for removals	J.S.: principal and teachers had actual notice and authority to remedy; their inadequate responses were deliberately indifferent	School Board: actions (or inaction) were not clearly unreasonable; teachers lacked authority to bind district	Court: genuine issues of fact exist as to Principal Smith, Brown, and Boatright being "appropriate persons" with notice and deliberate indifference; remand for factfinding
Whether coaches (Barton, Sunday) were "appropriate persons" with authority to bind the district	J.S.: coaches frequently observed the conduct and could have stopped it	School Board: coaches lacked supervisory authority and were not high enough in chain of command	Court: insufficient evidence coaches were high-level officials with authority to constitute official district action; summary judgment for Board as to coaches affirmed
Whether School Board had notice of possible verbal/physical abuse such that deliberate indifference attaches	J.S.: removal created opportunity and risk of abuse; prior reports/recordings should have alerted officials	School Board: reports showed inattentiveness/carelessness, not notice of potential abuse	Court: knowledge of removals did not, as a matter of law, give actual notice of probable abuse; insufficient evidence of notice of abuse; summary judgment affirmed on abuse claim

Key Cases Cited

Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017) (framework for distinguishing IDEA claims from ADA/§504 claims)
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (unjustified institutional isolation is discrimination under Title II)
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (recipient liability requires notice to an appropriate person and deliberate indifference)
Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (deliberate indifference standard in school discrimination/harassment contexts)
Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010) (principal/appropriate-person analysis; corrective measures other than termination can suffice)
Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334 (11th Cir. 2012) (use Title IX deliberate-indifference framework in §504 claims)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment legal standard)