J. Lee, and his widow, E. Lee v. WCAB (City of Philadelphia), J. Lee, and his widow, E. Lee v. WCAB (City of Philadelphia)

Background

Decedent served as a Philadelphia firefighter from 1968 until retirement in January 2004; he was subsequently diagnosed with T‑cell lymphoma (diagnosis noted in 2005; treatment since 2002) and died in 2010.
Claimant (widow Emma Lee) filed a claim petition (Jan. 30, 2013) and fatal claim petition (Feb. 4, 2013) under Section 108(r) of the Workers’ Compensation Act asserting Decedent’s cancer was caused by occupational exposure to IARC Group 1 carcinogens.
Section 301(f) grants a firefighter a presumption of causation for cancer claims made within 300 weeks of last exposure, allows claims up to 600 weeks, but limits the presumption to the first 300 weeks.
The WCJ credited Employer’s experts on causation, denied the petitions for failure to prove causation, and the Board affirmed, finding the petitions were filed more than 300 weeks after Decedent’s last exposure and thus not entitled to the statutory presumption.
Claimant argued Sections 301(c)(2) and 301(f) should be read so the presumption applies if disease manifested within 300 weeks and that filing deadlines are tolled by the discovery rule.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Section 301(f) imposes a distinct filing deadline that limits access to the Section 301(e)/(f) presumption	Lee: 301(f) only extends the manifestation period from 300 to 600 weeks; presumption applies if disease manifested within 300 weeks even if claim filed later	Employer/Board: 301(f) creates a distinct two‑tiered limitations scheme requiring claim filing within 300 weeks to preserve the presumption and allowing claims up to 600 weeks without the presumption	Court: Affirmed two distinct limits — presumption applies only if claim filed within 300 weeks; claims allowed up to 600 weeks but without presumption
Whether the discovery rule tolls the filing limits in Section 301(f) (i.e., statute of repose vs. statute of limitations)	Lee: Filing period should be tolled until claimant discovers causal link, so late filing should be excused	Employer/Board: 301(f)’s outer limit is a statute of repose and not tolled by discovery rule	Court: The 600‑week limit is a statute of repose and not subject to the discovery rule; tolling denied
Burden of proof once presumption unavailable	Lee: Even without presumption, claimant may still prove causation via expert evidence	Employer: Absent presumption claimant must prove causation by preponderance	Court: Without presumption claimant bore burden and failed — WCJ credited employer experts
Scope of Section 301(c)(2) vs 301(f) interplay	Lee: 301(c)(2) controls manifestation only; 301(f) should not create a filing cutoff for presumption	Employer: 301(f) and 301(c)(2) impose distinct requirements (manifestation vs. filing/presumption)	Court: Agreed with employer; provisions distinct and precedent supports two‑tiered scheme

Key Cases Cited

City of McKeesport v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Miletti), 746 A.2d 87 (Pa. 2000) (Section 301(c)(2) requires disease manifestation within 300 weeks but does not require filing within 300 weeks)
Fargo v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 148 A.3d 514 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (Section 301(f) creates distinct two‑tiered limits: filing within 300 weeks preserves presumption; claims allowed up to 600 weeks without presumption; 600‑week limit is a statute of repose)
Capaldi v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 152 A.3d 1107 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (consistent with Fargo interpretation of 301(f))
Demchenko v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 149 A.3d 406 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (same statutory interpretation supporting two‑tier scheme)
Hutz v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 147 A.3d 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (same)