31 F. Supp. 3d 933
N.D. Ohio2014Background
- Rule 52 is a content-neutral regulation prohibiting nudity and certain sexual activities at establishments operating with a liquor license in Ohio.
- Plaintiffs—three Ohio strip clubs and a strip-club association—sued to enjoin enforcement of Rule 52’s provisions A(2), B(2), and B(3).
- The district court previously enjoined Rule 52 as facially overbroad; the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding it was not facially overbroad in J.L. Spoons I.
- After remand, the court conducted multiple evidentiary hearings (Dec. 2013, Apr. 2014, Jun. 2014) addressing as-applied challenges and secondary effects evidence.
- Evidence included expert testimony on secondary effects (Linz; McCleary; Hanna) and undercover observations of criminal activity in adult cabarets by Agent Bouza.
- The court ultimately upheld Rule 52 as applied, finding it serves a substantial government interest and leaves ample alternative channels for speech.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality under Alameda Books burden-shifting | Linz undermines State rationale for Rule 52. | Rule 52 is reasonably related to reducing secondary effects; Alameda burden met. | Rule 52 valid as applied. |
| Adequacy of evidence linking Rule 52 to reduced secondary effects | State evidence is insufficient and Linz undermines the link. | State relied on diverse, reasonably relevant evidence; not required to have direct empirical proof. | State evidence establishes reasonable basis; burden satisfied. |
| Effect of pasties requirement on speech | Pasties unnecessarily restrict expressive content; no evidence of crime reduction. | Pasties and G-strings are a minimal restriction consistent with Pap's A.M. | Pasties requirement passes scrutiny; constitutional. |
| Direct evidence of criminal activity in relation to Rule 52 | Bouza's testimony does not prove Rule 52 reduces crime; could be other factors. | Bouza's testimony supports link between nude dancing, alcohol, and criminal activity. | Direct evidence corroborates State interest and justifies regulation. |
Key Cases Cited
- J.L. Spoons, Inc. v. Dragani, 538 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2008) (initial ruling that Rule 52 was not facially overbroad)
- Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1986) (content-neutral secondary-effects regulation may survive if tied to substantial government interest)
- Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2000) (pasties/G-strings may be permissible where they further government interests)
- Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 535 U.S. 425 (U.S. Supreme Court, 2002) (plurality opinion outlining Alameda Books burden-shifting framework)
- Entm’t Prods., Inc. v. Shelby Cnty., Tenn., 721 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2013) (application of Alameda Books burden-shifting with diverse evidentiary sources)
- Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Knox Cnty., Tenn., 555 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2009) (recognizes governmental interest in addressing secondary effects)
- J.L. Spoons I, 538 F.3d 379 (6th Cir. 2008) (recognizes Rule 52 as related to secondary effects but not automatically overbroad)
