J.C. v. J.H., AC 15-P-1612

J.C. obtained an ex parte harassment prevention order under G. L. c. 258E after J.H., her ex‑boyfriend, repeatedly contacted and followed her for ~15 months despite police warnings.
Harassing conduct included abusive and threatening text messages (e.g., “You should be scared,” threats to blackmail and “ruin” her, sexualized name‑calling), repeated appearances at her yoga class and a Starbucks, and blocking the driveway at her workplace while she was caring for children.
The District Court extended the harassment prevention order on November 7, 2014, finding the plaintiff proved three or more malicious acts causing fear/intimidation.
The judge also ordered the defendant to surrender firearms; the defendant appealed both the extension and the firearm surrender requirement.
The Appeals Court affirmed the extension of the harassment order but vacated the firearm‑surrender portion, holding G. L. c. 258E does not authorize mandatory firearm surrender like G. L. c. 209A does.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff proved three or more acts of willful, malicious harassment under G. L. c. 258E	J.C.: multiple texts, stalking/following incidents, workplace confrontation constitute at least three qualifying acts causing fear	J.H.: challenged sufficiency; argued texts were constitutionally protected speech and did not amount to malicious acts	Held: Sufficient evidence of three malicious acts causing fear/intimidation; order extension affirmed
Whether the texts were protected speech (First Amendment) or "true threats"	J.C.: texts were threatening and, in context with appearances, were true threats causing fear	J.H.: claimed texts were protected expression	Held: Texts were true threats in context and unprotected (citing O'Brien v. Borowski and related precedent)
Whether c. 258E authorizes ordering surrender of firearms	J.C.: argued surrender was permissible relief under c. 258E (or via § 3(g) / other remedies)	J.H.: challenged authority to order surrender under c. 258E	Held: Vacated firearm surrender — c. 258E § 3(a) does not include surrender; Legislature omitted 209A‑style firearm provisions deliberately
Whether plaintiff’s fear must be objectively reasonable	J.C.: relied on her subjective fear, corroborated by circumstances	J.H.: implied contested reasonableness of fear	Held: Fear under c. 258E is judged subjectively — whether plaintiff actually was placed in fear, not objective reasonableness

A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532 (discusses elements and proof standard for c. 258E harassment acts)
O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415 (true‑threat doctrine and harassment relief principles)
Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58 (statutory interpretation and standards under harassment law)
Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31 (application of c. 258E standards)
V.J. v. N.J., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 22 (language on insults/threats and inference of malicious intent)
Worcester v. College Hill Properties, LLC, 465 Mass. 134 (statutory construction: plain meaning governs)
Fernandes v. Attleboro Hous. Authy., 470 Mass. 117 (omission of language in related statutes is deliberate and meaningful)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (recognition that protection from threats includes prevention of fear and disruption)