iTech U.S., Inc v. Tracy Renaud
5f4th59
| D.C. Cir. | 2021Background
- iTech filed an I-140 immigrant-petition for Vishnu Reddy in July 2015; USCIS approved it shortly thereafter.
- USCIS later issued a notice of intent to revoke, asserting inconsistencies about Reddy’s degree and iTech’s ability to pay the proffered wage; USCIS revoked the approval and denied a motion to reopen.
- iTech sued under the Administrative Procedure Act in district court, alleging the revocation was arbitrary and capricious; the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
- Central statutory provisions: §1155 (permits the Secretary to revoke any approved petition “may…for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause”) and §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (bars judicial review of “any other decision or action … the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of [the Secretary]”).
- The D.C. Circuit considered whether §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes review of revocations under §1155 and affirmed the dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (does the catchall reach actions beyond denials of relief?) | Clause limited to denials of discretionary relief (heading and clause (i) limit scope). | “Any other decision or action” is broad; context and IIRIRA’s purpose show Congress intended a broad bar. | Clause (ii) is broad and not limited to denial-of-relief decisions; it covers other discretionary actions specified in Subchapter II. |
| Does §1155 specify that revocation is discretionary? | §1155 lacks the literal word “discretion,” and “good and sufficient cause” supplies a judicially manageable standard. | §1155’s language (“may…deems”) confers discretion; Zhu precedent treats similar language as discretionary. | §1155 plainly specifies discretionary authority; revocation is within the Secretary’s discretion. |
| Does “good and sufficient cause” create a judicially manageable standard permitting review? | Yes — it supplies an adjudicable standard that courts can apply to arbitrariness claims. | Even if the phrase is manageable, the “may…deems” framework signals discretionary, nonreviewable action. | Court assumes arguendo manageable standard but holds the statutory grant’s discretionary wording renders revocations unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). |
| Precedent and circuit consensus (is jurisdiction barred despite some contrary authority?) | Some circuits have treated revocations as reviewable (e.g., Ninth Circuit authority). | A majority of circuits treat §1155 revocations as unreviewable; Zhu controls in D.C. Circuit. | The decision aligns with nine circuits holding revocations unreviewable; D.C. Circuit follows Zhu and affirms dismissal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Zhu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 292 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (held similar INA language conferred discretionary, unreviewable authority)
- Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (interpreting §1252’s limits on review and the instructive role of clause (i))
- Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214 (2008) (statutory interpretation principles on broad words like “any” and use of disjunctive lists)
- Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (IIRIRA reflects Congress’s intent to protect executive discretion in immigration)
- Polfliet v. Cuccinelli, 955 F.3d 377 (4th Cir. 2020) (circuit decision treating §1155 revocations as nonreviewable)
- Jilin Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2006) (treating revocation decisions as precluded from judicial review)
- Mehanna v. USCIS, 677 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (same conclusion on §1155 revocations)