Israel Santiago-Lugo v. Warden
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7158
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- An inmate, Israel Santiago-Lugo, was charged after a cell phone found in a random search showed a call from his son; the incident report charged him with BOP Code 108 (possession of a cellular phone).
- At the disciplinary hearing Santiago-Lugo denied possession; another inmate testified on his behalf and a "kite" found in Santiago-Lugo’s cell—a letter from that inmate—stated the other inmate would accept responsibility.
- The Discipline Hearing Officer found Santiago-Lugo guilty under BOP Code 199 (conduct disrupting institutional order, akin to possession of a cell phone) and imposed loss of 40 days good-conduct time, 60 days disciplinary segregation, and other sanctions.
- Santiago-Lugo pursued administrative appeals to the regional level; the regional denial gave him 30 days to file to the Central Office. A June 15 mailing receipt is disputed in BOP records; a September 18 filing was rejected as untimely, and he did not obtain the requested BOP letterhead excuse.
- He filed a § 2241 habeas petition in federal district court alleging procedural due process violations; the district court denied relief for lack of jurisdiction (failure to exhaust) and alternatively on the merits. The Warden later conceded exhaustion on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to exhaust administrative remedies deprives court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a § 2241 petition | Santiago-Lugo argued exhaustion was not jurisdictional (or that he exhausted) | The Warden originally argued lack of jurisdiction for failure to exhaust | Failure to exhaust is not jurisdictional; exhaustion is a non-jurisdictional claim‑processing rule. The Warden later conceded exhaustion, so court reached the merits. |
| Whether BOP’s notice satisfied Wolff’s advance notice requirement when charge listed Code 108 but DHO convicted under Code 199 | Santiago-Lugo argued the notice was deficient because the conviction was for a different code (199) than charged (108) | BOP argued the notice put him on clear notice of the factual basis (possession/use of a cell phone) and regs allow conviction for similar prohibited acts | Held that notice was adequate because both codes described the same underlying conduct, Santiago-Lugo had ample time (12 days) to prepare, and regs permit finding of similar prohibited acts. |
| Whether advance notice was required for specific evidence (the kite) | Santiago-Lugo argued he should have been given advance notice that the kite would be used | BOP argued Wolff does not require advance notice of particular evidence | Court held Wolff does not require advance notice of specific evidence; Santiago-Lugo knew the kite existed (it was in his cell) and should have anticipated its use. |
| Whether district court improperly converted respondent’s answer to summary judgment or otherwise erred in procedure | Santiago-Lugo contended the conversion deprived him of opportunity to respond | Warden and district court pointed out the court gave notice and 20 days to respond and Santiago-Lugo did respond with exhibits | Court held proper procedure was followed; Santiago-Lugo had opportunity to respond. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary hearings require certain procedural protections, e.g., advance written notice and right to call witnesses)
- Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (distinguishing jurisdictional rules from claim‑processing rules)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (subject‑matter jurisdiction defined as courts’ constitutional/statutory adjudicatory authority)
- Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (Congress must clearly state if a limitation is jurisdictional)
- Gonzalez v. United States, 959 F.2d 211 (11th Cir. 1992) (prior panel held exhaustion jurisdictional; this decision was overruled by subsequent Supreme Court guidance)