Israel Rosell v. VMSB, LLC
67 F.4th 1141
| 11th Cir. | 2023Background
- Rosell and Gonzalez, employees of VMSB's restaurant, sued under the FLSA and Florida law alleging a customer 'service charge' was actually a tip and thus should not count toward their regular rate; complaint pleaded three counts (Counts I–III).
- Magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment for VMSB on Counts I and II (federal and state minimum wage) and denying summary judgment on Count III (federal overtime).
- While the R&R was pending, the parties settled Count III and plaintiffs moved to have Count III dismissed with prejudice and the clerk directed to enter dismissal.
- The district court adopted the R&R and entered judgment for VMSB on Counts I and II, then approved the settlement and ordered the parties to file a joint stipulation dismissing Count III with prejudice.
- Plaintiffs appealed the judgment on Counts I and II; the Eleventh Circuit, reviewing jurisdiction sua sponte, held the attempted dismissal of a single count under Rule 41(a) was ineffective, Count III remained pending, and no final appealable judgment existed.
- The Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and clarified that Rule 41(a)(2) authorizes dismissal only of an entire action (or all claims against a particular defendant in multi-defendant cases), not a single claim in a single-defendant case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 41(a)(2) permits dismissal of a single claim | The parties' settlement and court approval authorized dismissal of Count III | Dismissal was proper under Rule 41(a) or the court's inherent authority | Rule 41(a)(2) permits dismissal only of an entire action; single-claim dismissal invalid |
| Whether a final, appealable judgment existed for Counts I and II | Entry of judgment on Counts I and II plus dismissal of Count III created finality | Judgment was final once Counts I and II were entered and settlement approved | No final judgment: because Count III remains pending, appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is lacking |
| Whether district court's Lynn's Food Stores review or inherent authority justified dismissal of Count III | District court's Lynn's scrutiny and inherent powers authorized the dismissal | Dismissal should be treated as governed by Rule 41(a) | Court declined a broader inherent-authority theory and treated such dismissals as Rule 41(a)(2) matters; still cannot dismiss a single claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Compere v. Nusret Miami, LLC, 28 F.4th 1180 (11th Cir. 2022) (rejecting similar estoppel/‘service charge’ tip theory)
- Perry v. Schumacher Grp. of Louisiana, 891 F.3d 954 (11th Cir. 2018) (Rule 41(a) permits dismissal only of an entire action)
- In re Esteva, 60 F.4th 664 (11th Cir. 2023) (reaffirming that plaintiffs cannot use Rule 41(a) to dismiss particular claims)
- Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2004) (Rule 41(a) dismissal principles and limits)
- Lynn's Food Stores, Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350 (11th Cir. 1982) (requiring court scrutiny of certain FLSA settlements)
- Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962) (recognizing courts' inherent authority to dismiss for lack of prosecution)
- Univ. of S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405 (11th Cir. 1999) (standard for sua sponte jurisdictional review)