Island Creek Kentucky Mining v. Roy Ramage, Sr.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 24933
| 6th Cir. | 2013Background
- Roy P. Ramage Sr., longtime coal‑mine employee (5 years underground; 23 years aboveground at an underground mine), filed a federal black‑lung claim in 2007; ALJ conducted hearing in 2009 and awarded benefits in 2011.
- In 2010 Congress (PPACA §1556) reinstated a rebuttable presumption that miners with 15+ years in underground coal mines and a totally disabling respiratory impairment are presumed totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis; the amendment applies to claims filed after Jan. 1, 2005 and pending on enactment.
- ALJ found Ramage had 28 years qualifying employment, a totally disabling respiratory impairment (qualifying blood‑gas studies), and credited physicians (Simpao, Rasmussen, Houser) diagnosing legal pneumoconiosis and causation; discredited contrary opinions (Selby, Repsher) for specific reasoning flaws.
- Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ, agreeing that aboveground work at an underground mine counted toward the 15‑year presumption and that the ALJ permissibly weighed and discredited certain medical opinions.
- Island Creek petitioned for review arguing (1) the presumption did not apply without a comparability showing for aboveground work, (2) the ALJ misweighed medical opinions, (3) the ALJ failed properly to analyze rebuttal of the presumption, and (4) application of the 2010 statutory amendment was premature absent implementing DOL regulations.
- The Sixth Circuit denied review, holding the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, the DOL regulation’s definition of "underground coal mine" is a reasonable construction, and the PPACA amendment is self‑executing (no waiting for new regulations).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ramage) | Defendant's Argument (Island Creek) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether aboveground work at an underground mine counts toward 15‑year presumption | Aboveground years at an underground mine qualify without separate comparability showing | Aboveground work should require showing that conditions were "substantially similar" to underground work | Aboveground employment at an underground coal mine counts; ALJ and BRB correctly credited Ramage’s years (agency definition reasonable under Chevron) |
| Whether ALJ properly weighed medical opinions on pneumoconiosis and causation | ALJ correctly credited well‑reasoned opinions diagnosing legal pneumoconiosis and causation (Simpao, Rasmussen) | ALJ improperly credited equivocal opinions and unjustifiably discredited Selby and Repsher | ALJ’s credibility assessments and reasons for discounting certain opinions were supported by substantial evidence; no reversal |
| Whether employer rebutted the 15‑year presumption (causation) | Presumption unrebutted; ALJ’s findings on existence of legal pneumoconiosis resolve causation chain | Employer contends ALJ failed to analyze separate rebuttal of causation adequately | The ALJ’s analysis sufficed: existence of legal pneumoconiosis and causation are closely related and employer failed to rebut |
| Whether PPACA presumption can be applied before DOL issued implementing regulations | Statutory amendment is self‑executing and governs claims pending on enactment; no need to wait for regulations | Award premature until DOL issues implementing regulations | Statute is self‑executing; applying the 2010 amendment without new regulations was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agency reasonable interpretation review under Chevron)
- Vision Processing, LLC v. Groves, 705 F.3d 551 (6th Cir. 2013) (discussing PPACA reinstatement of § 411(c)(4))
- Cornett v. Benham Coal, Inc., 227 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 2000) (physicians’ unequivocal attribution of dust as aggravating cause upheld)
- Griffith v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 49 F.3d 184 (6th Cir. 1995) (ALJ may discount equivocal medical opinions)
- Morrison v. Tenn. Consol. Coal Co., 644 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2011) (ALJ must adequately explain weighing of evidence to satisfy substantial‑evidence review)