30 F. Supp. 3d 725
N.D. Ill.2014Background
- Anna Isbell worked as a chemical engineer in Crane’s Materials Laboratory from April 2003 until termination on August 26, 2009; she had documented ADD and bipolar disorder (later Ehlers–Danlos) and sought later start times as accommodations.
- From 2006 through Oct 2008 Crane (through supervisor Derby) permitted Isbell to begin around 10:00 a.m.; new management (Wasser) in Sept 2008 imposed an 8:30 a.m. uniform start time and Derby referred Isbell to HR.
- Isbell submitted medical documentation and two formal accommodation requests (seeking a 10:00 a.m. start); Crane temporarily offered 9:15 a.m. (effectively 9:45 a.m. with a 30-minute grace period) and sought repeated medical clarification and an IME.
- Crane began assessing attendance points when Isbell arrived after the posted start-plus-grace; she received warnings in May and June 2009 and was terminated in August 2009 for attendance-policy violations.
- Isbell filed multiple EEOC charges (disability discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation) and then sued under the ADA, Title VII, and the Illinois Human Rights Act. Cross-motions for summary judgment followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to accommodate (withdrawing 10:00 a.m. accommodation) | Isbell: Crane unreasonably revoked a longstanding 10:00 a.m. accommodation and failed to engage in interactive process. | Crane: 9:15 a.m. (9:45 w/grace) was reasonable; attendance needs and customer deadlines made early presence essential. | Court: Granted Isbell summary judgment — Crane unreasonably withdrew the prior accommodation without showing undue hardship or attempting to adjust it. |
| Qualified individual / essential functions | Isbell: She performed essential duties satisfactorily for 2+ years with 10:00 start, so she was qualified with accommodation. | Crane: Early-morning presence for time-sensitive PMI work was essential. | Court: Isbell was qualified; Crane failed to show that maintaining the 10:00 start imposed undue hardship. |
| Retaliation (EEOC complaints led to discipline/termination) | Isbell: Temporal proximity and adverse actions after EEOC filings show retaliation. | Crane: Termination was for legitimate, nonretaliatory reason — repeated tardiness and accrued attendance points. | Court: Denied Isbell summary judgment on retaliation and granted Crane’s motion — attendance-based discipline provided a nonpretextual reason; timing alone insufficient. |
| Sex discrimination (male employees treated more favorably) | Isbell: Men received more scheduling flexibility; differential treatment supports inference of sex discrimination. | Crane: No similarly situated males received comparable, long-term schedule accommodations; comparisons are not parallel. | Court: Granted Crane summary judgment — insufficient evidence that similarly situated male employees were treated better; no convincing mosaic. |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden on movant)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and reasonable jury inquiry)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation)
- EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789 (7th Cir.) (elements of failure-to-accommodate under ADA)
- EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir.) (regular attendance as an essential job requirement context)
- Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (retaliation causation standard requires but-for causation)
- Sanchez v. Henderson, 188 F.3d 740 (7th Cir.) (pretext analyses for retaliation)
- Ammons v. Aramark Uniform Servs., Inc., 368 F.3d 809 (7th Cir.) (factors for determining essential job functions)
- Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715 (7th Cir.) ("convincing mosaic" direct method for discrimination)
- Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir.) (similarly situated comparator analysis)