Isaac v. Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc.
1:17-cv-11827
| D. Mass. | Oct 18, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Alex Isaac purchased an Ashley "DuraBlend" sofa from BD’s Furniture and sued under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A on behalf of a putative class, alleging deceptive marketing.
- Complaint alleges the DuraBlend name and marketing conveyed that the upholstery was "durable leather" and comparable in strength and durability to genuine leather, but the material peels and disintegrates.
- The attached product tag expressly stated composition: 57% polyurethane, 25% cotton, 17% leather, and warned DuraBlend is a composite material and not 100% leather.
- Defendant Ashley moved to dismiss, arguing the labeling and "DuraBlend" name are non-actionable puffery and that no reasonable consumer could be misled.
- Court declined to reach a statute-of-limitations defense because the claim fails on its face, and dismissed claims against both Ashley and BD (plaintiff made no meaningful distinction between defendants).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "DuraBlend" and related labeling are deceptive or unfair under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A | "DuraBlend" implies upholstery is as durable as leather; consumers reasonably rely on that impression | The mark and labels constitute non-actionable advertising puffery; labels plainly disclose composition so no reasonable consumer would be misled | Dismissed — name/labels are puffery and not deceptive as a matter of law |
| Whether plaintiff's subjective reliance can create a 93A claim despite the label disclosure | Isaac contends he reasonably relied and discovered defect only after peeling occurred | Defendant says objective reasonableness matters and no reasonable reliance given explicit tag disclosure | Dismissed — court rejects subjective-reliance inference where no reasonable consumer could be misled |
| Whether documentary judicial notice of other courts' orders/opinions is appropriate | N/A (defendant cited prior dismissal in California to support its position) | Judicial notice of relevant court opinions is permissible on a motion to dismiss | Court took judicial notice of a California decision and found its reasoning persuasive |
| Whether dismissal should apply to BD as well as Ashley | Isaac did not differentiate claims between manufacturer and retailer | Defendants sought dismissal for both; argued plaintiff failed to plead actionable misrepresentation against either | Court dismissed claims against BD sua sponte along with Ashley |
Key Cases Cited
- Levings v. Forbes & Wallace, Inc., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 498 (framework that 93A requires conduct reaching a certain level of rascality)
- Mass. Eye & Ear Infirmary v. QLT Phototherapeutics, Inc., 552 F.3d 47 (1st Cir.) (definition of unfair/deceptive conduct and consumer protection standards)
- Mulder v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 865 F.3d 17 (1st Cir.) (advertising puffery is generally non-actionable under Chapter 93A)
- Vitt v. Apple Computer, Inc., 469 F. App’x 605 (9th Cir.) (promotional phrases like "durable" are generalized puffery)
- Kowalski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299 (1st Cir.) (federal courts may take judicial notice of other courts’ written orders and opinions)
