Althоugh the underlying cause is a contract action for material sold and services delivered, the insertion in the complaint of a claim under G. L. c. 93A, § 11, requires consideration once again of the reach of that statutory provision to commercial disputes betwеen business organizations.
First, however, we must meet a procedural issue. The complaint was filed on July 8, 1974. It alleged that the plaintiff (Trane), at the request of the defendant (Forbes), repaired a central air conditioning unit located in a department store in Springfield; that Forbes had refused to pay Trane’s bill for labor and materials; and that Forbes, from the time it first placed the written order for the work, never intended to pay Trane for its labor and materials. It is the last allegation, that in effect Forbes duped Trane into working for it, on which the c. 93A claim rests.
Procedural skirmishes followed, largely involving efforts by Trane to obtain discovery, which Forbes resisted by leading Trane a merry chase. For this Forbes incurred mild sanctions. Mass.R.Civ.P. 37,
Trane pressed the c. 93A complaint, which was tried in October of 1977, without a jury since, at that time, an action under c. 93A, § 11,.was an equitable action.
1
It is the position of Trane that once the matter became jury waived, the status of the master’s report became governed by Mass.R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2), as amended,
We turn now to whether Trane’s complaint stated a case within the scope of c. 93A. As originally enacted, c. 93A undertook to provide "a more equitable balance in the relationship of consumers
2
to persons conducting business activity.”
Commonwealth
v.
DeCotis,
The right to employ the potent weaponry of c. 93A (new substantive rights, multiple damages, counsel fees) was conferred upon businessmen, 3 as opposed to consumers, by St. 1972, c. 614, § 2, which inserted c. 93A, § 11, into the General Laws. It is the position of the defendant Forbes that, in a controversy between businesses, the unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice of which the injured party complains must (a) have an anticompetitive effect and (b) involve a plaintiff who is a "consumer,” i.e., is a vendee or lessee of goods, services or property. In -the instant case, the plaintiff Trane was a purveyor of services, rather than a purchaser.
*502
A statement issued by the House Committee on Banks and Banking, which reported favorably on the bill whiсh became St. 1972, c. 614,
4
lends some support to the proposition that the target of § 11 is activity which is anticompetitive in purpose or effect. The focus of the House Committee’s statement is exclusively on the consequences to consumers and the ecоnomy of unfair competition: businesses which could not survive unfair competition would close, allowing the survivors to set higher prices in a monopolistic environment, to the detriment of consumers. The language of § 11 suggests no such limitation, however; it speaks in terms of "an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice” (emphasis supplied). The disjunctive nature of the wrongs categorized in § 11 comes into sharp relief in
PMP Associates, Inc.
v.
Globe Newspaper Co.,
Forbes’ argument that only buyers, not sellers, may avail themselves of remedies under § 11 finds no support in the statutory language or its history. Until recently, G. L. c. 93A, § 9(1), limited rights of action to persons who were purchasers and lessees while § 11, however, contained no such limitation; rather it conferred the businessman’s 93A claim on "any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” The remedies and procedures in §§ 9 and 11 are related, but not parallel, and the conditions of one section should not be read by implication into the other.
Nader
v.
Citron,
It remains to ask whether, on the facts found, Forbes has committed a transgression which exposes it to a c. 93A claim, i.e., did it do anything unfair or deceptive? What is unfair is a definitional problem of long standing, which statutory draftsmen have prudently avoided. "It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this field.” H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1142, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). The criteria adopted in our decisions are those spelled out in
PMP Associates, Inc.
v.
Globe Newspaper Co.,
The trial judge found, however, that no such deceitful intent by Forbes had been established. Rather, he found that Forbes intended to pay Trane for the reasonable value of thе work for which it was obligated to pay. The judge based his finding, among other things, on the fact that the purchase order contained no price and since Forbes offered to pay something more than half the amount of the bill, it might have paid a smaller bill without cavil. The judge also found there existed a bona fide dispute about the scope of the manufacturer’s warranty concerning the air conditioning motor. On our review of the record we cannot say the judge was wrong. Accepting the facts found by the judge, there was no misrepresentation by Forbes, and its conduct cannot be said to have fallen to that level which gives rise to a c. 93A action.
*505 Earlier in this opinion we commented on the long and dilatory course of this litigation. On no less than ten occasions in a relatively simple case the defendant caused delay in the proceedings. It answered late; it filed tardy and inadequate answers to interrogatories and only after a court order to do so; it declined to produce documents until on more than one occasion it was ordered to produce them; it moved to continue the master’s hearings for a month, and then its lawyer failed to appear for the third session of those hearings (without prior notice to the plaintiffs counsel). A review of the docket discloses six occasions when the intervention of the court was required to secure compliance by the defendant with the discovery process.
Sanctions under Mass.R.Civ.P. 37,
*506 Acсordingly, the action is remanded to the Superior Court for review of the orders made in response to the plaintiffs several motions for sanctions, and the modification of those orders in a manner consistent with this opinion. The judgment is otherwise affirmed without costs.
So ordered.
Notes
Since thе instant case was tried before the enactment of St. 1978, c. 478, § 48, we need not decide whether that statute altered the purely "equitable” character of c. 93A actions.
The statute defined a consumer as “[a]ny person who purchases or leases goods, services or property, real or personal primarily for personal, family or household purposes ....” G. L. c. 93A, § 9(1), as amended through St. 1971, c. 241.
“Any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce ....” G. L. c. 93A, § 11, inserted by St. 1972, c. 614, § 2.
1972 House Doc. No. 3124.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1976).
Rosenberg, New Philosophy of Sanctions, appearing in New Federal Civil Discovery Rules Sourcebook 140, 141 (Treadwell ed. 1972).