Irvine Unified School District v. K. G.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6349
9th Cir.2017Background
- K.G., an emotionally disturbed minor, sought designation of which California agency (State, County, or Irvine Unified School District) was financially responsible for providing a FAPE under IDEA.
- An ALJ ruled the School District was responsible; the District sued in federal court naming State, County, and K.G., continuing litigation past K.G.’s April 2010 graduation.
- Ninth Circuit later reversed the district court and held the School District responsible; matter was remanded.
- K.G. sought statutory attorneys’ fees under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3). The district court initially denied fees, K.G. obtained Rule 60(b) relief based on counsel’s incapacity, then renewed a fees motion; the district court awarded partial fees.
- The School District appealed the Rule 60(b) relief and the fee award. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Rule 60(b) decision but vacated the fee award and remanded for further findings regarding post-graduation hours.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b) relief was proper for untimely appeal of fee denial | K.G.: original counsel’s severe depression and incapacitation excused failure to appeal | District: contemporaneous evidence shows counsel continued to practice; no excusable neglect | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; factual findings supported excusable neglect under the 4-factor test (Ahanchian) |
| Whether K.G. was a "prevailing party" under IDEA | K.G.: obtained enforceable relief (ALJ decision and later district/circuit outcomes) that materially altered parties’ legal relationship | District: judgment entered after graduation — no practical benefit, like Rhodes prisoners | Held: K.G. was a prevailing party — secured enforceable relief while still a student and defended that victory; Farrar/Hensley test applies |
| Whether K.G.’s victory was merely technical or de minimis | K.G.: forced an agency to assume funding responsibility, eliminating risk of discharge | District: agency designation only assigned who pays for relief already received; mostly post-graduation litigation | Held: Not de minimis — designation was significant and eliminated residual risk while K.G. was a student (Parents of Student W.) |
| Whether fees for work after K.G.’s graduation were reasonable | K.G.: counsel needed to continue litigation to secure and quantify fee entitlement; appellate effort necessary | District: most post-graduation work was unnecessary because K.G. already had all IDEA benefits; hours excessive | Vacated award and remanded: district court must review post-graduation hours, determine whether they advanced K.G.’s interests, explain percentage reductions and allocation (Barnard) |
Key Cases Cited
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (defines "prevailing party" for fee awards and discusses nominal/insubstantial relief)
- Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988) (no prevailing-party status where judgment could not benefit plaintiffs who were no longer affected)
- Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989) (prevailing-party inquiry focuses on material alteration of legal relationship)
- Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., 31 F.3d 1489 (9th Cir. 1994) (IDEA prevailing-party analysis; de minimis limitation)
- Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2010) (four-factor equitable test for excusable neglect under Rule 60(b))
- Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (standard for reviewing district court findings as not "illogical, implausible, or without support")
- Barnard v. Theobald, 721 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2013) (district court must explain basis for percentage reductions in fee awards)
- T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizes enforceable administrative judgment as meaningful relief under IDEA)